Papers Containing Keywords(s): 'incentive'
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Authors
Lucia Foster - 3
John Haltiwanger - 3
Viewing papers 1 through 10 of 57
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Working PaperDesperate Capital Breeds Productivity Loss: Evidence From Public Pension Investments in Private Equity
July 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-47
I study investments of U.S. public pensions in private equity (PE), and trace them to ultimate micro assets'target firms which PE funds invest in, using micro-data on private investments combined with confidential U.S. Census data. I show that more severely underfunded public pensions receive lower average PE returns, and match with smaller GPs on average, than less underfunded pensions. Consistent with matching and returns, firms financed by most underfunded public pensions and smallest PE funds face labor productivity decreases. I introduce a novel instrument'public unionization'in support of underfunding positions driving selection into funds. Lastly, I evaluate alternate mechanisms.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperTip of the Iceberg: How Much Do Tips Bunch at Reporting Thresholds?
June 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-40
We study the importance of bunching in the context of tip-income reporting by workers at full-service, single-unit restaurants in the United States. Using tax reports at both the individual and the employer levels, we show that reported tip income varies with minimum-wage laws that provide an incentive for tipped workers to report some, but not necessarily all, of their tips. As a result, reported tips bunch at the minimum required threshold. We quantify missing tips due to bunching at nearly $63 million per year in 2018 dollars, on average over the period 2005-2018. Bunching is stronger for jobs at small employers and in the earlier part of the time series and declined monotonically from 2010 to 2018. Using restaurant-level revenue data, we also estimate the total value of unreported tips assuming an average tip rate of 12%. We find that tips are missing throughout the distribution. All told, missing tips exceed $4 billion per year, implying that bunching explains only 1.5% of all missing tips.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperUnemployment Insurance, Wage Pass-Through, and Endogenous Take-Up
September 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-59
This paper studies how unemployment insurance (UI) generosity affects reservation wages, re-employment wages, and benefit take-up. Using Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data, we estimate a cross-sectional elasticity of reservation wages with respect to weekly UI benefits of 0.014. Exploiting state variation in Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) intensity and the timing of federal supplements, we find that expanded benefits during COVID-19 increased reservation wages by 8'12 percent. Using CPS rotation data, we also document a 9 percent rise in re-employment wages for UI-eligible workers relative to ineligible workers. Over the same period, the UI take-up rate rose from roughly 30 to 40 percent; Probit estimates indicate that higher benefit levels, rather than changes in observables, account for this increase. A directed search model with an endogenous filing decision replicates these facts: generosity primarily operates through the extensive margin of take-up, which mutes the pass-through from benefits to wages.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperPrivate Equity and Workers: Modeling and Measuring Monopsony, Implicit Contracts, and Efficient Reallocation
June 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-37
We measure the real effects of private equity buyouts on worker outcomes by building a new database that links transactions to matched employer-employee data in the United States. To guide our empirical analysis, we derive testable implications from three theories in which private equity managers alter worker outcomes: (1) exertion of monopsony power in concentrated markets, (2) breach of implicit contracts with targeted groups of workers, including managers and top earners, and (3) efficient reallocation of workers across plants. We do not find any evidence that private equity-backed firms vary wages and employment based on local labor market power proxies. Wage losses are also very similar for managers and top earners. Instead, we find strong evidence that private equity managers downsize less productive plants relative to productive plants while simultaneously reallocating high-wage workers to more productive plants. We conclude that post-buyout employment and wage dynamics are consistent with professional investors providing incentives to increase productivity and monitor the companies in which they invest.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperWork Organization and Cumulative Advantage
March 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-18
Over decades of wage stagnation, researchers have argued that reorganizing work can boost pay for disadvantaged workers. But upgrading jobs could inadvertently shift hiring away from those workers, exacerbating their disadvantage. We theorize how work organization affects cumulative advantage in the labor market, or the extent to which high-paying positions are increasingly allocated to already-advantaged workers. Specifically, raising technical skill demands exacerbates cumulative advantage by shifting hiring towards higher-skilled applicants. In contrast, when employers increase autonomy or skills learned on-the-job, they raise wages to buy worker consent or commitment, rather than pre-existing skill. To test this idea, we match administrative earnings to task descriptions from job posts. We compare earnings for workers hired into the same occupation and firm, but under different task allocations. When employers raise complexity and autonomy, new hires' starting earnings increase and grow faster. However, while the earnings boost from complex, technical tasks shifts employment toward workers with higher prior earnings, worker selection changes less for tasks learned on-the-job and very little for high autonomy tasks. These results demonstrate how reorganizing work can interrupt cumulative advantage.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperTip of the Iceberg: Tip Reporting at U.S. Restaurants, 2005-2018
November 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-68
Tipping is a significant form of compensation for many restaurant jobs, but it is poorly measured and therefore not well understood. We combine several large administrative and survey datasets and document patterns in tip reporting that are consistent with systematic under-reporting of tip income. Our analysis indicates that although the vast majority of tipped workers do report earning some tips, the dollar value of tips is under-reported and is sensitive to reporting incentives. In total, we estimate that about eight billion in tips paid at full-service, single-location, restaurants were not captured in tax data annually over the period 2005-2018. Due to changes in payment methods and reporting incentives, tip reporting has increased over time. Our findings have implications for downstream measures dependent on accurate measures of compensation including poverty measurement among tipped restaurant workers.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperPayroll Tax Incidence: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance
June 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-35
Economic models assume that payroll tax burdens fall fully on workers, but where does tax incidence fall when taxes are firm-specific and time-varying? Unemployment insurance in the United States has the key feature of varying both across employers and over time, creating the potential for labor demand responses if tax costs cannot be fully passed through to worker wages. Using state policy changes and administrative data of matched employer-employee job spells, I study how employment and earnings respond to unexpected payroll tax increases for highly exposed employers. I find significant drops in employment growth driven by lower hiring, and minimal evidence of passthrough to earnings. The negative employment effects are strongest for young workers and single-establishment firms.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperThe Icing on the Cake: The Effects of Monetary Incentives on Income Data Quality in the SIPP
January 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-03
Accurate measurement of key income variables plays a crucial role in economic research and policy decision-making. However, the presence of item nonresponse and measurement error in survey data can cause biased estimates. These biases can subsequently lead to sub-optimal policy decisions and inefficient allocation of resources. While there have been various studies documenting item nonresponse and measurement error in economic data, there have not been many studies investigating interventions that could reduce item nonresponse and measurement error. In our research, we investigate the impact of monetary incentives on reducing item nonresponse and measurement error for labor and investment income in the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Our study utilizes a randomized incentive experiment in Waves 1 and 2 of the 2014 SIPP, which allows us to assess the effectiveness of incentives in reducing item nonresponse and measurement error. We find that households receiving incentives had item nonresponse rates that are 1.3 percentage points lower for earnings and 1.5 percentage points lower for Social Security income. Measurement error was 6.31 percentage points lower at the intensive margin for interest income, and 16.48 percentage points lower for dividend income compared to non-incentive recipient households. These findings provide valuable insights for data producers and users and highlight the importance of implementing strategies to improve data quality in economic research.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperThe Impact of Industrial Opt-Out from Utility Sponsored Energy Efficiency Programs
October 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-52
Industry accounts for one-third of energy consumption in the US. Studies suggest that energy efficiency opportunities represent a potential energy resource for regulated utilities and have resulted in rate of return regulated demand-side management (DSM) and energy efficiency (EE) programs. However, many large customers are allowed to self-direct or opt-out. In the Carolinas (NC and SC), over half of industrial and large commercial customers have selected to opt out. Although these customers claim they invest in EE improvements when it is economic and cost-effective to do so, there is no mechanism to validate whether they actually achieved energy savings. This project examines the industrial energy efficiency between the program participants and non participants in the Carolinas by utilizing the non-public Census of Manufacturing data and the public list of firms that have chosen to opt out. We compare the relative energy efficiency between the stay-in and opt-out plants. The t-test results suggest opt-out plants are less efficient. However, the opt-out decisions are not random; large plants or plants belonging to large firms are more likely to opt out, possibly because they have more information and resources. We conduct a propensity score matching method to account for factors that could affect the opt-out decisions. We find that the opt-out plants perform at least as well or slightly better than the stay-in plants. The relative performance of the opt-out firms suggest that they may not need utility program resources to obtain similar levels of efficiency from the stay-in group.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperUnionization, Employer Opposition, and Establishment Closure
July 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-35
We study the effect of private-sector unionization on establishment employment and survival. Specifically, we analyze National Labor Relations Board union elections from 1981'2005 using administrative Census data. Our empirical strategy extends standard difference-in-differences techniques with regression discontinuity extrapolation methods. This allows us to avoid biases from only comparing close elections and to estimate treatment effects that include larger marginof- victory elections. Using this strategy, we show that unionization decreases an establishment's employment and likelihood of survival, particularly in manufacturing and other blue-collar and industrial sectors. We hypothesize that two reasons for these effects are firms' ability to avoid working with new unions and employers' opposition to unions. We find that the negative effects are significantly larger for elections at multi-establishment firms. Additionally, after a successful union election at one establishment, employment increases at the firms' other establishments. Both pieces of evidence are consistent with firms avoiding new unions by shifting production from unionized establishments to other establishments. Finally, we find larger declines in employment and survival following elections where managers or owners were likely more opposed to the union. This evidence supports new reasons for the negative effects of unionization we document.View Full Paper PDF
