Measures of exposure to artificial intelligence (AI) are widely used to study where AI is likely to affect firm and worker outcomes, yet limited evidence exists on how closely exposure relates to realized AI adoption at the firm level. We examine this relationship by linking 14 firm-level exposure measures, constructed from occupational exposure estimates in the literature and occupational employment shares from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics program, to direct measures of firm AI adoption from the Census Bureau's Business Trends and Outlook Survey. Exposure is positively and statistically significantly associated with adoption, but explains only a modest share of its variation. The strength of the relationship varies considerably across standardized exposure measures: a one-standard-deviation increase in firm-level exposure is associated with a 4'11 percentage point higher firm adoption probability, falling to 1'8 percentage points after controlling for year and sub-sector fixed effects. The exposure'adoption relationship is also heterogeneous across firm-size classes and sectors. Exposure is thus an informative but incomplete signal of adoption. More broadly, the results have implications for the interpretation of exposure-based measures in studies of the economic effects of AI.
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The Microstructure of AI Diffusion: Evidence From Firms, Business Functions, and Worker Tasks
April 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-25
Using novel, nationally representative data from the 2026 AI supplement to the U.S. Census Bureau's Business Trends and Outlook Survey (BTOS), we characterize AI diffusion across three interconnected layers: overall firm use, deployment across business functions, and worker-task use. This multi-layered approach provides a nuanced picture of business AI adoption. During the supplement reference period (Nov 2025-Jan 2026), 18% of firms used AI in a business function, rising to 32% on an employment-weighted basis; adoption is expected to reach 22% within six months. AI use is substantially higher in large firms and knowledge-intensive sectors, with use rates reaching 50%-60% (60%-70%, employment-weighted) for very large firms in the Information, Professional Services, and Finance sectors. Among adopting firms, the scope of use remains limited: 57% of users integrate AI in three or fewer business functions, most commonly Sales and Marketing (52%), Strategy and Business Development (45%), and IT (41%). In 23% (41%, employment-weighted) of firms, workers use AI in work-related tasks. Writing, document analysis, and information search are the leading Generative AI use in tasks, though 65% of firms limit use to three or fewer tasks. The evidence points to both top-down and bottom-up diffusion channels: worker task use sometimes occurs without formal firm-level adoption, and firm-level adoption sometimes occurs without worker task use. Most users (66%) rely on AI solely to augment tasks, while AI-related employment decreases are rare, occurring in only 2% of firms. Regression analysis shows a robust positive correlation between firm commercial performance and the breadth of AI integration, including functional deployment, task-level use, and operational investment. A distinct divergence emerges, however, with respect to labor outcomes. Functional breadth and operational investment are positively associated with employment decreases, whereas worker-task integration shows no significant link to headcount reduction once functional integration and operational investment are taken into account.
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You're (not) Hired: Artificial Intelligence and Early Career Hiring in the Quarterly Workforce Indicators
April 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-27
Using detailed tabulations from matched employer-employee administrative data, I document evidence of an immediate, sizable, and persistent decrease in the level of early career (22-24 year old) hires following introduction of ChatGPT within the industry-state cells that are most exposed to AI. The decline in hires is the primary cause of large observed declines in employment over the subsequent period. Regressionadjusted employment of early career workers in the most AI-exposed quintile of industry-state cells declined by 12% over the 10 quarters following the introduction of ChatGPT, even as employment in lessexposed industries has remained stable. The rate of hiring largely recovered by early 2025, attributable to a smaller employment base. Earnings growth of early career workers in the most exposed industries slowed slightly relative to those in less exposed industries. Although the most AI-exposed quintile of detailed industries is dominated by a handful of industry sectors, I find that the association of higher AI exposure with reduced early career employment and fewer hires is observed across most sectors of the economy. Timing of effects in event studies is consistent with an immediate effect on hiring following introduction of ChatGPT. However, triple difference estimates provide some evidence of earlier trend shifts on employment, hiring, and separations around the onset of the COVID pandemic. I discuss potential explanations, including the increase in remote work and increased educational attainment among workers in AI-exposed occupations. Nonetheless, job gains to early career workers and backfill hires show evidence of discontinuous decline at the time of ChatGPT's release in comparison to older workers in the same industries. A local projections analysis at the NAICS industry group level shows that industries with high AI exposure are not particularly sensitive to unexpected fluctuations in monetary policy on average relative to other industries in employment, hiring, or separations. A historical decomposition suggests that up to one quarter of relative early career employment declines through 2025q2 may be attributable to monetary policy shocks through 2023, but the analysis does not find evidence that these shocks can explain the rapid decline in hires at the most AI-exposed firms in comparison to others.
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Graduating Into Disruption: Labor Market Outcomes for AI-Exposed College Majors
September 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-56
How are new college graduates affected by the rise of artificial intelligence, and what can this tell us about the mechanisms behind AI's overall labor market effects? We use administrative records on college graduates to observe how economic outcomes among college majors with differing levels of labor market AI exposure have evolved since large language models became available. We find that post-graduation employment, earnings, and job switching patterns among the most AI-exposed college majors began to diverge immediately following the introduction of ChatGPT in late 2022. In regression-adjusted estimates, the most AI-exposed decile of college majors saw their likelihood of initial employment decline by five percentage points, while full-quarter initial earnings declined by thirteen percent. This earnings decline is comparable in magnitude to the earnings losses associated with graduating into a large recession. Roughly half of the decline in earnings is attributable to lower earnings within the industry sectors that employ these graduates, with the remainder resulting from a shift in the industry mix into lower-wage sectors such as restaurants and retail. The effects attenuate as graduates move further from labor market entry but remain substantial for the most exposed majors.
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Tracking Firm Use of AI in Real Time: A Snapshot from the Business Trends and Outlook Survey
March 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-16R
Timely and accurate measurement of AI use by firms is both challenging and crucial for understanding the impacts of AI on the U.S. economy. We provide new, real-time estimates of current and expected future use of AI for business purposes based on the Business Trends and Outlook Survey for September 2023 to February 2024. During this period, bi-weekly estimates of AI use rate rose from 3.7% to 5.4%, with an expected rate of about 6.6% by early Fall 2024. The fraction of workers at businesses that use AI is higher, especially for large businesses and in the Information sector. AI use is higher in large firms but the relationship between AI use and firm size is non-monotonic. In contrast, AI use is higher in young firms. Common uses of AI include marketing automation, virtual agents, and data/text analytics. AI users often utilize AI to substitute for worker tasks and equipment/software, but few report reductions in employment due to AI use. Many firms undergo organizational changes to accommodate AI, particularly by training staff, developing new workflows, and purchasing cloud services/storage. AI users also exhibit better overall performance and higher incidence of employment expansion compared to other businesses. The most common reason for non-adoption is the inapplicability of AI to the business.
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Automation and the Workforce: A Firm-Level View from the 2019 Annual Business Survey
April 2022
Authors:
John Haltiwanger,
Lucia Foster,
Emin Dinlersoz,
Nikolas Zolas,
Daron Acemoglu,
Catherine Buffington,
Nathan Goldschlag,
Zachary Kroff,
David Beede,
Gary Anderson,
Eric Childress,
Pascual Restrepo
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-12R
This paper describes the adoption of automation technologies by US firms across all economic sectors by leveraging a new module introduced in the 2019 Annual Business Survey, conducted by the US Census Bureau in partnership with the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES). The module collects data from over 300,000 firms on the use of five advanced technologies: AI, robotics, dedicated equipment, specialized software, and cloud computing. The adoption of these technologies remains low (especially for AI and robotics), varies substantially across industries, and concentrates on large and young firms. However, because larger firms are much more likely to adopt them, 12-64% of US workers and 22-72% of manufacturing workers are exposed to these technologies. Firms report a variety of motivations for adoption, including automating tasks previously performed by labor. Consistent with the use of these technologies for automation, adopters have higher labor productivity and lower labor shares. In particular, the use of these technologies is associated with a 11.4% higher labor productivity, which accounts for 20'30% of the difference in labor productivity between large firms and the median firm in an industry. Adopters report that these technologies raised skill requirements and led to greater demand for skilled labor, but brought limited or ambiguous effects to their employment levels.
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Job Tasks, Worker Skills, and Productivity
September 2025
Authors:
John Haltiwanger,
Lucia Foster,
Cheryl Grim,
Zoltan Wolf,
Cindy Cunningham,
Sabrina Wulff Pabilonia,
Jay Stewart,
Cody Tuttle,
G. Jacob Blackwood,
Matthew Dey,
Rachel Nesbit
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-63
We present new empirical evidence suggesting that we can better understand productivity dispersion across businesses by accounting for differences in how tasks, skills, and occupations are organized. This aligns with growing attention to the task content of production. We link establishment-level data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics survey with productivity data from the Census Bureau's manufacturing surveys. Our analysis reveals strong relationships between establishment productivity and task, skill, and occupation inputs. These relationships are highly nonlinear and vary by industry. When we account for these patterns, we can explain a substantial share of productivity dispersion across establishments.
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Advanced Technologies Adoption and Use by U.S. Firms: Evidence from the Annual Business Survey
December 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-40
We introduce a new survey module intended to complement and expand research on the causes and consequences of advanced technology adoption. The 2018 Annual Business Survey (ABS), conducted by the Census Bureau in partnership with the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES), provides comprehensive and timely information on the diffusion among U.S. firms of advanced technologies including artificial intelligence (AI), cloud computing, robotics, and the digitization of business information. The 2018 ABS is a large, nationally representative sample of over 850,000 firms covering all private, nonfarm sectors of the economy. We describe the motivation for and development of the technology module in the ABS, as well as provide a first look at technology adoption and use patterns across firms and sectors. We find that digitization is quite widespread, as is some use of cloud computing. In contrast, advanced technology adoption is rare and generally skewed towards larger and older firms. Adoption patterns are consistent with a hierarchy of increasing technological sophistication, in which most firms that adopt AI or other advanced business technologies also use the other, more widely diffused technologies. Finally, while few firms are at the technology frontier, they tend to be large so technology exposure of the average worker is significantly higher. This new data will be available to qualified researchers on approved projects in the Federal Statistical Research Data Center network.
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Who Hires Whom? Entrepreneurial Backgrounds and Labor Market Opportunities
July 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-45
What are the implications of unequal access to entrepreneurial careers for labor markets? Using data from the U.S. Census and LinkedIn profiles, we document that entrepreneurs are significantly more likely to hire workers from similar social backgrounds (gender, race, age, education, etc.). These effects are quantitatively large across several demographic dimensions. For example, female employee share at female-founded startups is 36.4pp higher after controlling for industry-by-metro area-by-cohort fixed effects, with corresponding estimates of 51.2pp for Blacks, 37.3pp for Hispanics, and 11.3pp for non-college individuals. Large effects are present in high-growth startups, across industries and occupations, and remain stable across new firm cohorts. In addition, we find that these differences persist out to at least 20 years. We use wage data and an AKM research design to untangle whether the relative differences are driven by labor demand or labor supply effects. We find that demand drives the differences: group-specific wage decompositions show that new firms pay higher relative wages to individuals from similar backgrounds to the entrepreneur. Using these estimates, we calibrate a model of entrepreneurship with heterogeneous ability and production functions, and assess the impacts on relative wage from reducing access barriers to entrepreneurship.
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Tapping Business and Household Surveys to Sharpen Our View of Work from Home
June 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-36
Timely business-level measures of work from home (WFH) are scarce for the U.S. economy. We review prior survey-based efforts to quantify the incidence and character of WFH and describe new questions that we developed and fielded for the Business Trends and Outlook Survey (BTOS). Drawing on more than 150,000 firm-level responses to the BTOS, we obtain four main findings. First, nearly a third of businesses have employees who work from home, with tremendous variation across sectors. The share of businesses with WFH employees is nearly ten times larger in the Information sector than in Accommodation and Food Services. Second, employees work from home about 1 day per week, on average, and businesses expect similar WFH levels in five years. Third, feasibility aside, businesses' largest concern with WFH relates to productivity. Seven percent of businesses find that onsite work is more productive, while two percent find that WFH is more productive. Fourth, there is a low level of tracking and monitoring of WFH activities, with 70% of firms reporting they do not track employee days in the office and 75% reporting they do not monitor employees when they work from home. These lessons serve as a starting point for enhancing WFH-related content in the American Community Survey and other household surveys.
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New U.S. Business Establishments: Surging or Stalling?
June 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-36
Since the 1990s, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has reported much more rapid growth in U.S. private sector employer establishments than has the Census Bureau' the gap reached roughly 1.6 million by 2023. Using linked BLS-Census microdata, we document two main drivers. First, a large and growing number of employers providing services to the elderly and persons with disabilities are in scope for the BLS frame but not the Census Bureau's. Second, many firms appear with substantially more establishments in the BLS frame. These discrepancies substantially affect the measured establishment size distribution and quantitative policy analysis.
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