With administrative data, we test whether institutional ownership with a social preference is related to employee-level gender equality. We show that the gender pay gap, which is an unexplained part of the lower wages of female employees, does not have a significant relation with socially responsible investments. Next, we show that female directorship strengthens the relation between socially responsible investments and the gender pay gap. When there are female directors, socially responsible investments have a robust correlation with a lower gender pay gap. This is because female directorship alleviates information asymmetry in gender equality.
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Shareholder Power and the Decline of Labor
May 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-17
Shareholder power in the US grew over recent decades due to a steep rise in concentrated
institutional ownership. Using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database for 1982-2015, this paper examines the impact of increases in concentrated institutional ownership on employment, wages, shareholder returns, and labor productivity. Consistent with theory of the firm based on conflicts of interests between shareholders and stakeholders, we find that establishments of firms that experience an increase in ownership by larger and more concentrated institutional shareholders have lower employment and wages. This result holds in both panel regressions with establishment fixed effects and a difference-in-differences design that exploits large increases in concentrated institutional ownership, and is robust to controls for industry and local shocks. The result is more pronounced in industries where labor is relatively less unionized, in more monopsonistic local labor markets, and for dedicated and activist institutional shareholders. The labor losses are accompanied by higher shareholder returns but no improvements in labor productivity, suggesting that shareholder power mainly reallocates rents away from workers. Our results imply that the rise in concentrated institutional ownership could explain about a quarter of the secular decline in the aggregate labor share.
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Access to Financing and Racial Pay Gap Inside Firms
July 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-36
How does access to financing influence racial pay inequality inside firms? We answer this question using the employer-employee matched data administered by the U.S. Census Bureau and detailed resume data recording workers' career trajectories. Exploiting exogenous shocks to firms' debt capacity, we find that better access to debt financing significantly narrows the earnings gap between minority and white workers. Minority workers experience a persistent increase in earnings and also a rise in the pay rank relative to white workers in the same firm. The effect is more pronounced among mid- and high-skill minority workers, in areas where white workers are in shorter supply, and for firms with ex-ante less diverse boards and greater pre-existing racial inequality. With better access to financing, minority workers are also more likely to be promoted or be reassigned to technology-oriented occupations compared to white workers. Our evidence is consistent with access to financing making firms better utilize minority workers' human capital.
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The Employee Clientele of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from Personal Labor Income Diversification
January 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-01
Using employee job-level data, we empirically test the equilibrium matching between a firm's debt usage and its employee job risk aversion ('clientele effect'), as predicted by the existing theories. We measure job risk aversion for a firm's employees using their labor income concentration in the firm, calculated as the fraction of the employees' total personal labor income or total household labor
income that is accounted for by their income from this particular firm. Using a sample of about 1,400 U.S. public firms from 1990-2008, we find a robust negative relation between leverage and employee job risk aversion, which is consistent with the clientele effect. Specifically, when a firm's existing employees have higher labor income concentration in it, the firm tends to have lower contemporaneous and future leverage. Moreover, in terms of new hires, firms with lower leverage are more likely to recruit employees with less alternative labor income. Our results continue to hold after we control for firm fixed effects, other employee characteristics such as wages, gender, age, race, and education, and managerial risk attitudes. Further, the matching between a firm's leverage and its workers' labor income concentration in it is more pronounced for firms with higher labor intensity and those in financial distress.
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Employee Capitalism or Corporate Socialism? Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership
December 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-44
How employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) affect employee compensation and shareholder value depends on the size. Small ESOPs, defined as those controlling less than 5% of outstanding shares, benefit both workers and shareholders, implying positive productivity gains. However, the effects of large ESOPs on worker compensation and shareholder value are more or less neutral, suggesting little productivity gains. These differential effects appear to be due to two non-value-creating motives specific to large ESOPS: (1) To form management-worker alliances ala Pagano and Volpin (2005), wherein management bribes workers to garner worker support in thwarting hostile takeover threats and (2) To substitute wages with ESOP shares by cash constrained firms. Worker compensation increases when firms under takeover threats adopt large ESOPs, but only if the firm operates in a non-competitive industry. The effects on firm valuation also depend on the strength of product market competition: When the competition is strong (weak), most of the productivity gains accrue to employees (shareholders). Competitive industry also implies greater job mobility within the industry, enabling workers to take a greater portion of productivity gains.
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Pay, Productivity and Management
September 2021
Working Paper Number:
CES-21-31
Using confidential Census matched employer-employee earnings data we find that employees at more productive firms, and firms with more structured management practices, have substantially higher pay, both on average and across every percentile of the pay distribution. This pay-performance relationship is particularly strong amongst higher paid employees, with a doubling of firm productivity associated with 11% more pay for the highest-paid employee (likely the CEO) compared to 4.7% for the median worker. This pay-performance link holds in public and private firms, although it is almost twice as strong in public firms for the highest-paid employees. Top pay volatility is also strongly related to productivity and structured management, suggesting this performance-pay relationship arises from more aggressive monitoring and incentive practices for top earners.
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HUMAN CAPITAL LOSS IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
July 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-37
This paper quantifies the 'human costs of bankruptcy' by estimating employee wage losses induced by the bankruptcy filing of employers using employee-employer matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau's LEHD program. We find that employee wages begin to deteriorate one year prior to bankruptcy. One year after bankruptcy, the magnitude of the decline in annual wages is 30% of pre-bankruptcy wages. The decrease in wages persists (at least) for five years post-bankruptcy. The present value of wage losses summed up to five years after bankruptcy amounts to 29-49% of the average pre-bankruptcy market value of firm. Furthermore, we find that the ex-ante wage premium to compensate for the ex-post wage loss due to bankruptcy can be of similar magnitude with that of the tax benefits of debt.
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THE OPTION TO QUIT: THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS ON TURNOVER
January 2014
Working Paper Number:
CES-14-06
We show that in the years following a large broad-based employee stock option (BBSO) grant, employee turnover falls at the granting firm. We find evidence consistent with a causal relation by exploiting unexpected changes in the value of unvested options. A large fraction of the reduction in turnover appears to be temporary with turnover increasing in the 3rd year following the year of the adoption of the BBSO plan. We also find that the effect of BBSO plans is larger at market leaders, identified as firms with high industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios, market share or industry-adjusted profit margins, as measured at the time of the grant.
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USING LINKED CENSUS R&D-LRD DATA TO ANALYZE THE EFFECT OF R&D INVESTMENT ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
January 1989
Working Paper Number:
CES-89-02
Previous studies have demonstrated that productivity growth is positively correlated with the intensity of R&D investment. However, existing studies of this relationship at the micro (firm or line of business) level have been subject to some important limitations. The most serious of these has been an inability to adequately control for the diversified activities of corporations. This study makes use of linked Census R&D - LRD data, which provides comprehensive information on each firms' operations at the 4-digit SIC level. A marked improvement in explaining the association between R&D and TFP occurs when we make appropriate use of the data by firm by industry. Significant relationships between the intensities of investment in total, basic, and company-funded R&D, and TFP growth are confirmed.
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The Financial Performance of Whole Company LBOs
November 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-16
Using the previously untapped Census Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) file, we explored the financial performance of a large unbiased sample of 209 leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and 48 going private transactions occurring between 1978 and 1989. Our principal findings are: First, we confirm previous work showing that LBOs substantially increase operating performance and reduce taxes. Second, we find that the operating performance gains are sustained for three years. However, there is a significant drop in performance in the fourth and fifth years. Performance in these years is not significantly above the pre- LBO level. Third, total debt to assets displays only a slight insignificant downward trend. Thus, high debt remains after the drop in performance. Fourth, we find evidence that the performance gains decline in the mid- to late 1980s, with the exception of 1989. Fifth, the data suggest that LBOs target typical firms. The only significant pre-LBO firm characteristic was lower bank debt relative to nonbank debt. Sixth, we identify a number of factors that differentiate LBO performance. Performance tends to be higher when pre-LBO performance is low and the firm is classified as a large R&D performer. Conversely, management buyouts and buyouts involving extensive restructuring did not outperform other buyouts. Finally, we observe a clear linkage between debt and performance, since nonleveraging going-private deals have significantly lower performance than LBOs.
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LBOs, Debt And R&D Intensity
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-03
This paper details the impact of debt on R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout (LBO). We develop seven hypotheses based on capital market imperfection theories and agency theory. To test these hypotheses, we compare 72 R&D performing LBOs with 3329 non-LBO control observations and 126 LBOs with little or no R&D expenditures. The regressions yield four statistically significant major findings. First, pre-LBO R&D intensity is roughly one-half of the overall manufacturing mean and two-thirds of the firm's industry mean. Second, LBOs cause R&D intensity to drop by 40 percent. Third, large firms tend to have smaller LBO- related declines in R&D intensity. Fourth, R&D intensive LBOs outperform both their non-LBO industry peers and other LBOs without R&D expenditures.
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