We study how bonus depreciation, a policy designed to lower the cost of capital, impacted investment and labor demand in the US manufacturing sector. Difference-in-differences estimates using restricted-use US Census Data on manufacturing establishments show that this policy increased both investment and employment, but did not lead to wage or productivity gains. Using a structural model, we show that the primary effect of the policy was to increase the use of all inputs by lowering overall costs of production. The policy further stimulated production employment due to the complementarity of production labor and capital. Supporting this conclusion, we nd that investment is greater in plants with lower labor costs. Our results show that recent policies that incentivize capital investment do not lead manufacturing plants to replace workers with machines.
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Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States
March 2007
Working Paper Number:
CES-07-04
Theory predicts that mandated employment protections may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. Firms facing (non-Coasean) worker dismissal costs will curtail hiring below efficient levels and retain unproductive workers, both of which should affect productivity. These theoretical predictions have rarely been tested. We use the adoption of wrongful discharge protections by U.S. state courts over the last three decades to evaluate the link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Longitudinal Business Database, our estimates suggest that wrongful discharge protections reduce employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, analysis of plant-level data provides evidence of capital deepening and a decline in total factor productivity following the introduction of wrongful discharge protections. This last result is potentially quite important, suggesting that mandated employment protections reduce productive efficiency as theory would suggest. However, our analysis also presents some puzzles including, most significantly, evidence of strong employment growth following adoption of dismissal protections. In light of these puzzles, we read our findings as suggestive but tentative.
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Payroll Tax Incidence: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance
June 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-35
Economic models assume that payroll tax burdens fall fully on workers, but where does tax incidence fall when taxes are firm-specific and time-varying? Unemployment insurance in the United States has the key feature of varying both across employers and over time, creating the potential for labor demand responses if tax costs cannot be fully passed through to worker wages. Using state policy changes and administrative data of matched employer-employee job spells, I study how employment and earnings respond to unexpected payroll tax increases for highly exposed employers. I find significant drops in employment growth driven by lower hiring, and minimal evidence of passthrough to earnings. The negative employment effects are strongest for young workers and single-establishment firms.
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What Do Establishments Do When Wages Increase?
Evidence from Minimum Wages in the United States
November 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-31
I investigate how establishments adjust their production plans on various margins when wage rates increase. Exploiting state-by-year variation in minimum wage, I analyze U.S. manufacturing plants' responses over a 23-year period. Using instrumental variable method and Census Microdata, I find that when the hourly wage of production workers increases by one percent, manufacturing plants reduce the total hours worked by production workers by 0.7 percent and increase capital expenditures on machinery and equipment by 2.7 percent. The reduction in total hours worked by production workers is driven by intensive-margin changes. The estimated elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 0.85. Following the wage increases, no statistically significant changes emerge in revenue, materials or total factor productivity. Additionally, I nd that when wage rates increase, establishments are more likely to exit the market. Finally, I provide evidence that when the minimum wage increases the wages of some of the establishments in a firm, the firm also increases the wages for its other establishments.
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Do Short-Term Incentives Affect Long-Term Productivity?
March 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-10
Previous research shows that stock repurchases that are caused by earnings management lead to reductions in firm-level investment and employment. It is natural to expect firms to cut less productive investment and employment first, which could lead to a positive effect on firm-level productivity. However, using Census data, we find that firms make cuts across the board irrespective of plant productivity. This pattern seems to be associated with frictions in the labor market. Specifically, we find evidence that unionization of the labor force may prevent firms from doing efficient downsizing, forcing them to engage in easy or expedient downsizing instead. As a result of this inefficient downsizing, EPS-driven repurchases lead to a reduction in long-term productivity.
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CAPITAL AND LABOR REALLOCATION INSIDE FIRMS
April 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-22
We document how a plant-specific shock to investment opportunities at one plant of a firm ("treated plant") spills over to other plants of the same firm-but only if the firm is financially constrained. While the shock triggers an increase in investment and employment at the treated plant, this increase is offset by a decrease at other plants of the same magnitude, consistent with headquarters channeling scarce resources away from other plants and toward the treated plant. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases, suggesting that the reallocation is beneficial for the firm as a whole. We also show that-in order to provide the treated plant with scarce resources-headquarters does not uniformly "tax" all of the firm's other plants in the same way: It is more likely to take away resources from plants that are less productive, are not part of the firm's core industries, and are located far away from headquarters. We do not find any evidence of investment or employment spillovers at financially unconstrained firms.
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Automation, Labor Share, and Productivity:
Plant-Level Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing
September 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-39
This paper provides new evidence on the plant-level relationship between automation, labor and capital usage, and productivity. The evidence, based on the U.S. Census Bureau's Survey of Manufacturing Technology, indicates that more automated establishments have lower production labor share and higher capital share, and a smaller fraction of workers in production who receive higher wages. These establishments also have higher labor productivity and experience larger long-term labor share declines. The relationship between automation and relative factor usage is modelled using a CES production function with endogenous technology choice. This deviation from the standard Cobb-Douglas assumption is necessary if the within-industry differences in the capital-labor ratio are determined by relative input price differences. The CES-based total factor productivity estimates are significantly different from the ones derived under Cobb-Douglas production and positively related to automation. The results, taken together with earlier findings of the productivity literature, suggest that the adoption of automation may be one mechanism associated with the rise of superstar firms.
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Creditor Rights, Technology Adoption, and Productivity: Plant-Level Evidence
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-36
I analyze the impact of strengthening of creditor rights on productivity using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws that improve the ability of lenders to access the collateral of the firm, total factor productivity of treated plants increases by 2.6 percent. This effect is mainly observed among plants belonging to financially constrained firms. Furthermore, treated plants invest in capital of younger vintage and newer technology, and become more capital-intensive. My results suggest that strengthening of creditor rights leads to a relaxation in borrowing constraints, and helps firms adopt a more efficient production technology.
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Creditor Rights, Technology Adoption, and
Productivity: Plant-Level Evidence
April 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-20
I analyze the impact of stronger creditor rights on productivity using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws that give lenders greater access to the collateral of firms in financial distress, total factor productivity of treated plants increases by 2.6 percent. This effect is mainly observed among plants belonging to financially constrained firms. Furthermore, treated plants invest in capital of younger vintage and newer technology, and become more capital-intensive. My results suggest that stronger creditor rights relax borrowing constraints and help firms adopt more efficient production technologies.
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Eclipse of Rent-Sharing: The Effects of Managers' Business Education on Wages and the Labor Share in the US and Denmark
December 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-58
This paper provides evidence from the US and Denmark that managers with a business degree
('business managers") reduce their employees' wages. Within five years of the appointment of a business manager, wages decline by 6% and the labor share by 5 percentage points in the US, and by 3% and 3 percentage points in Denmark. Firms appointing business managers are not on differential trends and do not enjoy higher output, investment, or employment growth thereafter. Using manager retirements and deaths and an IV strategy based on the diffusion of the practice of appointing business managers within industry, region and size quartile cells, we provide additional evidence that these are causal effects. We establish that the proximate cause of these (relative) wage effects are changes in rent-sharing practices following the appointment of business managers. Exploiting exogenous export demand shocks, we show that non-business managers share profits with their workers, whereas business managers do not. But consistent with our first set of results, these business managers show no greater ability to increase sales or profits in response to exporting opportunities. Finally, we use the influence of role models on college major choice to instrument for the decision to enroll in a business degree in Denmark and show that our estimates correspond to causal effects of practices and values acquired in business education--rather than the differential selection into business education of individuals unlikely to share rents with workers.
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The Transitional Costs of Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from the Clean Air Act and the Workforce
January 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-02
New environmental regulations lead to a rearrangement of production away from polluting industries, and workers in those industries are adversely affected. This paper uses linked worker-firm data in the United States to estimate the transitional costs associated with reallocating workers from newly regulated industries to other sectors of the economy. The focus on workers rather than industries as the unit of analysis allows me to examine previously unobserved economic outcomes such as non-employment and long run earnings losses from job transitions, both of which are critical to understanding the reallocative costs associated with these policies. Using panel variation induced by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), I find that the reallocative costs of environmental policy are significant. Workers in newly regulated plants experienced, in aggregate, more than $9 billion inforegone earnings for the years after the change in policy. Most of these costs are driven by non-employment and lower earnings in future employment, while earnings of workers who remain with their firm change little. Relative to the estimated benefits of the 1990 CAAA, these one-time transitional costs are small. However, the estimated costs far exceed the workforce compensation policies designed to mitigate some of these earnings losses.
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