Using Census microdata on multi-state firms, we estimate the impact of state taxes on business activity. For C corporations, employment and the number of establishments have corporate tax elasticities of -0.4, and do not vary with changes in personal tax rates. Pass-through entity activities show tax elasticities of -0.2 to -0.3 with respect to personal tax rates, and are invariant with respect to corporate tax rates. Reallocation of productive resources to other states drives around half the effect. Capital shows similar patterns but is 36% less elastic than labor. The responses are strongest for firms in tradable and footloose industries.
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Creditor Rights and Entrepreneurship:
Evidence from Fraudulent Transfer Law*
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-31
We examine entrepreneurial activity following the adoption of fraudulent transfer laws in the U.S. These laws strengthen creditor rights by removing the burden of proof from creditors attempting to claw back funds that were transferred out of failing businesses. These laws are particularly important for entrepreneurs whose personal assets are often commingled with those of the venture. Using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we find significant declines in start-up entry, churning among new entrants, and closures of existing ventures after the passage of these laws. Our
findings suggest that strengthening creditor rights can, in some circumstances, impede entrepreneurial activity and slow down the process of creative destruction.
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Democratizing Entry: Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Entrepreneurship
December 2007
Working Paper Number:
CES-07-33
We study how US branch-banking deregulations affected the entry and exit of firms in the non-financial sector using establishment-level data from the US Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database. The comprehensive micro-data allow us to study how the entry rate, the distribution of entry sizes, and survival rates for firms responded to changes in banking competition. We also distinguish the relative effect of the policy reforms on the entry of startups versus facility expansions by existing firms. We find that the deregulations reduced financing constraints, particularly among small startups, and improved ex ante allocative efficiency across the entire firm-size distribution. However, the US deregulations also led to a dramatic increase in 'churning' at the lower end of the size distribution, where new startups fail within the first three years following entry. This churning emphasizes a new mechanism through which financial sector reforms impact product markets. It is not exclusively better ex ante allocation of capital to qualified projects that causes creative destruction; rather banking deregulations can also 'democratize' entry by allowing many more startups to be founded. The vast majority of these new entrants fail along the way, but a few survive ex post to displace incumbents.
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CAPITAL AND LABOR REALLOCATION INSIDE FIRMS
April 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-22
We document how a plant-specific shock to investment opportunities at one plant of a firm ("treated plant") spills over to other plants of the same firm-but only if the firm is financially constrained. While the shock triggers an increase in investment and employment at the treated plant, this increase is offset by a decrease at other plants of the same magnitude, consistent with headquarters channeling scarce resources away from other plants and toward the treated plant. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases, suggesting that the reallocation is beneficial for the firm as a whole. We also show that-in order to provide the treated plant with scarce resources-headquarters does not uniformly "tax" all of the firm's other plants in the same way: It is more likely to take away resources from plants that are less productive, are not part of the firm's core industries, and are located far away from headquarters. We do not find any evidence of investment or employment spillovers at financially unconstrained firms.
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Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States
March 2007
Working Paper Number:
CES-07-04
Theory predicts that mandated employment protections may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. Firms facing (non-Coasean) worker dismissal costs will curtail hiring below efficient levels and retain unproductive workers, both of which should affect productivity. These theoretical predictions have rarely been tested. We use the adoption of wrongful discharge protections by U.S. state courts over the last three decades to evaluate the link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Longitudinal Business Database, our estimates suggest that wrongful discharge protections reduce employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, analysis of plant-level data provides evidence of capital deepening and a decline in total factor productivity following the introduction of wrongful discharge protections. This last result is potentially quite important, suggesting that mandated employment protections reduce productive efficiency as theory would suggest. However, our analysis also presents some puzzles including, most significantly, evidence of strong employment growth following adoption of dismissal protections. In light of these puzzles, we read our findings as suggestive but tentative.
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Collateral Values and Corporate Employment
September 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-30R
We examine the impact of real estate collateral values on corporate employment. Our empirical strategy exploits regional variation in local real estate price growth, firm-level data on real estate holdings, as well as establishment-level data on employment and the location of firms' operations from the U.S. Census Bureau. Over the period from 1993 until 2006, we show that a typical U.S. publicly-traded firm increases employment expenditures by $0.10 per $1 increase in collateral. We show this additional hiring is funded through debt issues and the effects are stronger for firms likely to be financially constrained. These firms increase employment at establishments outside of their core industry focus and away from the location of real estate holdings, leading to regional spillover effects. We document how shocks to collateral values influence labor allocation within firms and how these effects show up in the aggregate.
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Home Equity Lending, Credit Constraints and Small Business in the US
October 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-32
We use Texas's constitutional amendment in 1997 that expanded the scope of home equity loans as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the effects of relaxing credit constraints on small businesses. We find, using standard panel data methods and restricted-use microdata from the US Census Bureau, that the Texas amendment increased the use of home equity finance by small businesses, increased new business and job creation and reduced establishment exit and job loss. The effects are larger and significant for businesses with fewer than ten employees.
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Capital Investment and Labor Demand
February 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-04
We study how bonus depreciation, a policy designed to lower the cost of capital, impacted investment and labor demand in the US manufacturing sector. Difference-in-differences estimates using restricted-use US Census Data on manufacturing establishments show that this policy increased both investment and employment, but did not lead to wage or productivity gains. Using a structural model, we show that the primary effect of the policy was to increase the use of all inputs by lowering overall costs of production. The policy further stimulated production employment due to the complementarity of production labor and capital. Supporting this conclusion, we nd that investment is greater in plants with lower labor costs. Our results show that recent policies that incentivize capital investment do not lead manufacturing plants to replace workers with machines.
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Creditor Control Rights and Resource Allocation within Firms
November 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-39
We examine the within-firm resource allocation effects of creditor interventions and their relationship to performance gains at firms violating financial covenants. By linking firm-level data to establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we show that covenant violations are followed by large reductions in employment and more frequent establishment sales and closures. These operational cuts are concentrated in violating firms' noncore business lines and unproductive establishments. We conclude that refocusing activities and improving productive efficiency are important mechanisms through which creditors enhance violating firms' performance.
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Payroll Tax Incidence: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance
June 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-35
Economic models assume that payroll tax burdens fall fully on workers, but where does tax incidence fall when taxes are firm-specific and time-varying? Unemployment insurance in the United States has the key feature of varying both across employers and over time, creating the potential for labor demand responses if tax costs cannot be fully passed through to worker wages. Using state policy changes and administrative data of matched employer-employee job spells, I study how employment and earnings respond to unexpected payroll tax increases for highly exposed employers. I find significant drops in employment growth driven by lower hiring, and minimal evidence of passthrough to earnings. The negative employment effects are strongest for young workers and single-establishment firms.
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DO LOCAL MANAGERS GIVE LABOR AN EDGE?
April 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-16
Based on the psychological theory of place attachments, native local managers should be more rooted in their communities than non-locals and should act accordingly. Consistent with this, local managers are 33% less likely to lay of employees than their non-local industry peers following industry distress. Additionally, when managers are forced to lay off employees, establishments near managers' homes are less likely to experience layoffs than those located elsewhere. Locals pay for these higher employment levels by spending cash, cutting investment, and selling assets. While there is no direct evidence that labor-friendly policies of locals have a differential impact on firm performance or value, only locals with weaker incentives implement these policies, suggesting that favoritism by locals may be suboptimal. Taken together these results suggest that managerial preferences impact corporate employment decisions.
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