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Growing Oligopolies, Prices, Output, and Productivity
November 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-48
American industries have grown more concentrated over the last forty years. In the absence of productivity innovation, this should lead to price hikes and output reductions, decreasing consumer welfare. Using public data from 1972-2012, I use price data to disentangle revenue from output. Difference-in-difference estimates show that industry concentration increases are positively correlated to productivity and real output growth, uncorrelated with price changes and overall payroll, and negatively correlated with labor's revenue share. I rationalize these results in a simple model of competition. Productive industries (with growing oligopolists) expand real output and hold down prices, raising consumer welfare, while maintaining or reducing their workforces, lowering labor's share of output.
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Aggregating From Micro to Macro Patterns of Trade
February 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-10
We develop a new framework for aggregating from micro to macro patterns of trade. We derive price indexes that determine comparative advantage across countries and sectors and the aggregate cost of living. If firms and products are imperfect substitutes, we show that these price indexes depend on variety, average demand/quality and the dispersion of demand/quality-adjusted prices, and are only weakly related to standard empirical measures of average prices, thereby providing insight for elasticity puzzles. Of the cross-section (time-series) variation in comparative advantage, 50 (90) percent is accounted for by variety and average demand/quality, with average prices contributing less than 10 percent.
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The Role of Agents and Brokers in the Market for Health Insurance
December 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-58
Health insurance markets in the United States are characterized by imperfect information, complex products, and substantial search frictions. Insurance agents and brokers play a significant role in helping employers navigate these problems. However, little is known about the relation between the structure of the agent/broker market and access and affordability of insurance. This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating the influence of agents/brokers on health insurance decisions of small firms, which are particularly vulnerable to problems of financing health insurance. Using a unique membership database from the National Association of Health Underwriters together with a nationally representative survey of employers, we find that small firms in more competitive agent/broker markets are more likely to offer health insurance and at lower premiums. Moreover, premiums are less dispersed in more competitive agent/broker markets.
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Productivity Dispersion and Plant Selection in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry
September 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-25
This paper presents a quantitative model of productivity dispersion to explain why inefficient producers are slowly selected out of the ready-mix concrete industry. Measured productivity dispersion between the 10th and 90th percentile falls from a 4 to 1 difference using OLS, to a 2 to 1 difference using a control function. Due to volatile productivity and high sunk entry costs, a dynamic oligopoly model shows that to rationalize small gaps in exit rates between high and low productivity plants, a plant in the top quintile must produce 1.5 times more than a plant in the bottom quintile.
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Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal? Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas
September 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-27
The steel industry has been protected by a wide variety of trade policies, both tariff- and quota-based, over the past decades. This extensive heterogeneity in trade protection provides the opportunity to examine the well-established theoretical literature predicting nonequivalent effects of tariffs and quotas on domestic firms' market power. Robust to a variety of empirical specifications with U.S. Census data on the population of U.S. steel plants from 1967-2002, we find evidence for significant market power effects for binding quota-based protection, but not for tariff-based protection. There is only weak evidence that antidumping protection increases market power.
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Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry
April 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-08
In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. The U.S. cement industry is a clear example. For this industry, I study the effect of two policies on the entry behavior and industry equilibrium: An asymmetric environmental policy that creates barriers to greenfield entry and a policy that creates barriers to entry by acquisition (like an antitrust policy). In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and the regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. To model this industry, I use a perfect information static entry game. To estimate the supply and demand primitives of my model, I apply a recent estimator of discrete games to a rich database of the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the years 1963-2002. In my counterfactual analyses, I find that a less favorable environment for mergers during the Reagan-Bush administration would decrease the acquired plants by 70% and increase the new plants by 20%. Also, I find that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 increased the number of acquisitions by 7.8%. Furthermore, my simulations suggest that regulations that create barriers to greenfield entry are less favorable in terms of welfare than regulations that create barriers to entry by acquisition. Finally, I demonstrate how my parameter estimates change when I apply the traditional approach in the entry literature where entry by acquisition is not considered, and when using a simple OLS estimation.
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Firm Performance And Evolution Empirical Regularities In The U.S. Microdata
October 1996
Working Paper Number:
CES-96-10
This paper presents a view of firm performance, industry evolution, and economic growth that contrasts with the traditional representative firm model. The paper reviews recent empirical work, primarily studies using the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), that explicitly focuses on individual business units. The major empirical regularity in the studies is that heterogeneity is pervasive -- it is found across and within all sectors and across all plant characteristics. Further, firms are not only different in the cross-section. They enter at different times, make different choices, and react differently to economic shocks. Thus, to understand economic performance and competition, one must move beyond representative firm models. Competition must be understood as a process in which some firms choose correctly and grow while other firms choose poorly and die; the growth of the successful firms at the expense of less successful rivals drives economic growth.
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Capital Structure And Product Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?
February 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-03
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior. We examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure. The evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. This finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. Following the empirical evidence we introduce the "strategic investment" effects of debt and argue that this effect, in conjunction with agency costs, appears to fit the data.
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Learning By Doing And Competition In The Early Rayon Industry
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-04
In this paper, I derive a structural econometric model of learning by doing from a dynamic oligopoly game. Unlike previous empirical models, this model is capable of testing hypotheses concerning both the technological nature and behavioral implications of learning. I estimate the model with firm level data from the early U.S. rayon industry. The empirical results show that there were considerable differences across firms in both proprietary and spillover learning. The results also indicate that two of the three firms took their rival's reactions into account when choosing their strategies.
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Costs, Demand, and Imperfect Competition as Determinants of Plant_level Output Prices
June 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-05
The empirical modeling of imperfectly competitive markets has been constrained by the difficulty of obtaining micro data on individual producer prices, outputs, and costs. In this paper we utilize micro data collected from the 1977 Census of Manufactures to study the determinants of plant-level output prices among U.S. bread producers. A theoretical model of short-run price competition among plants producing differentiated products is used to specify reduced-form equations for each plant's price and output. Estimates of the reduced-form equations indicate that the main determinants of both the plant's output level and output price are the plant's own cost variables, particularly its capital stock and the prices of material inputs. The number of rival producers faced by the plant, the production costs of these rivals, and the demand conditions faced by the plant play no role in price or output determination. The results are not consistent with either oligopolistic competition or monopoly behavior, but rather are consistent with price-taking behavior by individual producers combined with output quality differentials across producers.
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