This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior. We examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure. The evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. This finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. Following the empirical evidence we introduce the "strategic investment" effects of debt and argue that this effect, in conjunction with agency costs, appears to fit the data.
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Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions
March 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-04
This paper examines whether capital structure decisions interact with product market characteristics to influence plant closing and investment decisions. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that a firm's capital structure, plant level efficiency, and industry capacity utilization are significant determinants of plant (dis)investment decisions. We find that the effects of high leverage on investment and plant closing are significant when the industry is highly concentrated. Following their recapitalizations, firms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. In addition, we find that rival firms are less likely to close plants and more likely to invest when the market share of leveraged firms is higher.
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Efficiency of Bankrupt Firms and Industry Conditions: Theory and Evidence
October 1996
Working Paper Number:
CES-96-12
We show that the incentives to reorganize inefficient firms and redeploy their assets depend on the change in industry output and industry characteristics. We use plant-level data to investigate the productivity of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms and asset-sale and closure decisions. We find no evidence of bankruptcy costs in industries with declining output growth, where most bankruptcies occur. In declining industries, bankrupt firms' plants are not less productive than industry averages and do not decline in productivity while in Chapter 11. In these industries, Chapter 11 appears to be a mechanism for fostering exit of capacity. In high-growth industries, there is some limited evidence of productivity declines while in Chapter 11 for a subsample of firms that remain in Chapter 11 for four or more years. Examining asset sales and closures by bankrupt firms and their competitors, we find that Chapter 11 status is of limited importance in predicting these decisions once industry and plant characteristics are taken into account. More generally, the findings imply that Chapter 11 may involve few real economic costs, and that industry effects and sample selection issues are very important in evaluating the performance of bankrupt firms.
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Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm
April 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-11
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.
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Long-Run Expectations And Capacity
April 1988
Working Paper Number:
CES-88-01
In this paper, we argue at a general level, that recent economic models of capacity and of its utilization are deficient because they do not adequately take into account firms' long-run expectations about conditions which are pertinent to their investment decisions, i.e., their decisions about altering productive capacity. We argue that the problem with these models is that they rely on the two conventional definitions of capacity which ignore these long-run expectations. Accordingly, we propose a third definition of capacity which incorporates these expectations and, thereby, corrects the problem. Furthermore, we argue that a correct, empirical analysis with the proposed definition -- indeed, any credible analysis of capacity or its utilization -- must take into account the demand for the output produced by the firms being studied. Finally, we apply the definition to clarify the meaning of surveys of capacity and, thus, show how it can be used to improve future surveys of capacity.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-23
Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.
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Plant-Level Productivity and the Market Value of a Firm
June 2001
Working Paper Number:
CES-01-03
Some plants are more productive than others ' at least in terms of how productivity is conventionally measured. Do these differences represent an intangible asset? Does the stock market place a higher value on firms with highly productive plants? This paper tests this hypothesis with a new data set. We merge plant-level fundamental variables with firm-level financial variables. We find that firms with highly productive plants have higher market valuations as measured by Tobin's q ' productivity does indeed have a price.
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Asymmetric Learning Spillovers
April 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-07
In this paper, I employ a linear-quadratic model of an industry characterized by learning by doing to examine the implications of asymmetric learning spillovers. Importantly, I show that distribution of spillover benefits can influence market structure in ways that can not be seen in models where spillovers are symmetric. If spillovers are asymmetric, a tradeoff between improved industry performance and increased market concentration can arise which does not occur when they are symmetric. This tradeoff leads to a policy dilemma; whether to promote static or dynamic efficiency in markets where learning is important.
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USING LINKED CENSUS R&D-LRD DATA TO ANALYZE THE EFFECT OF R&D INVESTMENT ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
January 1989
Working Paper Number:
CES-89-02
Previous studies have demonstrated that productivity growth is positively correlated with the intensity of R&D investment. However, existing studies of this relationship at the micro (firm or line of business) level have been subject to some important limitations. The most serious of these has been an inability to adequately control for the diversified activities of corporations. This study makes use of linked Census R&D - LRD data, which provides comprehensive information on each firms' operations at the 4-digit SIC level. A marked improvement in explaining the association between R&D and TFP occurs when we make appropriate use of the data by firm by industry. Significant relationships between the intensities of investment in total, basic, and company-funded R&D, and TFP growth are confirmed.
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LBOs, Debt And R&D Intensity
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-03
This paper details the impact of debt on R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout (LBO). We develop seven hypotheses based on capital market imperfection theories and agency theory. To test these hypotheses, we compare 72 R&D performing LBOs with 3329 non-LBO control observations and 126 LBOs with little or no R&D expenditures. The regressions yield four statistically significant major findings. First, pre-LBO R&D intensity is roughly one-half of the overall manufacturing mean and two-thirds of the firm's industry mean. Second, LBOs cause R&D intensity to drop by 40 percent. Third, large firms tend to have smaller LBO- related declines in R&D intensity. Fourth, R&D intensive LBOs outperform both their non-LBO industry peers and other LBOs without R&D expenditures.
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