This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior. We examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure. The evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. This finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. Following the empirical evidence we introduce the "strategic investment" effects of debt and argue that this effect, in conjunction with agency costs, appears to fit the data.
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Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions
March 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-04
This paper examines whether capital structure decisions interact with product market characteristics to influence plant closing and investment decisions. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that a firm's capital structure, plant level efficiency, and industry capacity utilization are significant determinants of plant (dis)investment decisions. We find that the effects of high leverage on investment and plant closing are significant when the industry is highly concentrated. Following their recapitalizations, firms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. In addition, we find that rival firms are less likely to close plants and more likely to invest when the market share of leveraged firms is higher.
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Efficiency of Bankrupt Firms and Industry Conditions: Theory and Evidence
October 1996
Working Paper Number:
CES-96-12
We show that the incentives to reorganize inefficient firms and redeploy their assets depend on the change in industry output and industry characteristics. We use plant-level data to investigate the productivity of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms and asset-sale and closure decisions. We find no evidence of bankruptcy costs in industries with declining output growth, where most bankruptcies occur. In declining industries, bankrupt firms' plants are not less productive than industry averages and do not decline in productivity while in Chapter 11. In these industries, Chapter 11 appears to be a mechanism for fostering exit of capacity. In high-growth industries, there is some limited evidence of productivity declines while in Chapter 11 for a subsample of firms that remain in Chapter 11 for four or more years. Examining asset sales and closures by bankrupt firms and their competitors, we find that Chapter 11 status is of limited importance in predicting these decisions once industry and plant characteristics are taken into account. More generally, the findings imply that Chapter 11 may involve few real economic costs, and that industry effects and sample selection issues are very important in evaluating the performance of bankrupt firms.
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Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm
April 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-11
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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Long-Run Expectations And Capacity
April 1988
Working Paper Number:
CES-88-01
In this paper, we argue at a general level, that recent economic models of capacity and of its utilization are deficient because they do not adequately take into account firms' long-run expectations about conditions which are pertinent to their investment decisions, i.e., their decisions about altering productive capacity. We argue that the problem with these models is that they rely on the two conventional definitions of capacity which ignore these long-run expectations. Accordingly, we propose a third definition of capacity which incorporates these expectations and, thereby, corrects the problem. Furthermore, we argue that a correct, empirical analysis with the proposed definition -- indeed, any credible analysis of capacity or its utilization -- must take into account the demand for the output produced by the firms being studied. Finally, we apply the definition to clarify the meaning of surveys of capacity and, thus, show how it can be used to improve future surveys of capacity.
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The Winner's Curse of Human Capital
February 1999
Working Paper Number:
CES-99-05
We extend a model developed by Evans) to explain when start-ups are credit constrained. We show that the magnitude of the credit constraint is conditioned by the relative productivity of human capital in both wage work and self employment. Empirical analysis reveals that entrepreneurs with greater levels of human capital and entrepreneurial abilities have both greater financial wealth and greater levels of start-up capital pointing to the endogenous nature of credit constraints. Start-ups are generally financially constrained when measured by the impact on start-up capital of predicted household income. Greater levels of human capital relaxes financial constraints, apparently due to greater productivity of human capital in wage work than in self-employment. Paradoxically, then, those who are the least likely to be credit constrained in self-employment are those that are least likely to switch into self-employment, and vice versa.
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Plant-Level Productivity and the Market Value of a Firm
June 2001
Working Paper Number:
CES-01-03
Some plants are more productive than others ' at least in terms of how productivity is conventionally measured. Do these differences represent an intangible asset? Does the stock market place a higher value on firms with highly productive plants? This paper tests this hypothesis with a new data set. We merge plant-level fundamental variables with firm-level financial variables. We find that firms with highly productive plants have higher market valuations as measured by Tobin's q ' productivity does indeed have a price.
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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition
July 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-14
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention, we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value. Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target firms' productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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R&D or R vs. D?
Firm Innovation Strategy and Equity Ownership
April 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-14
We analyze a unique dataset that separately reports research and development expenditures
for a large panel of public and private firms. Definitions of 'research' and 'development' in this dataset, respectively, correspond to definitions of knowledge 'exploration' and 'exploitation' in the innovation theory literature. We can thus test theories of how equity ownership status relates to innovation strategy. We find that public firms have greater research intensity than private firms, inconsistent with theories asserting private ownership is more conducive to exploration. We also find public firms invest more intensely in innovation of all sorts. These results suggest relaxed financing constraints enjoyed by public firms, as well as their diversified shareholder bases, make them more conducive to investing in all types of innovation. Reconciling several seemingly conflicting results in prior research, we find private-equity-owned firms, though not less innovative overall than other private firms, skew their innovation strategies toward development and away from research.
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Reconciling the Firm Size and Innovation Puzzle
March 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-20RR
There is a prevailing view in both the academic literature and the popular press that firms need to behave more entrepreneurially. This view is reinforced by a stylized fact in the innovation literature that R&D productivity decreases with size. However, there is a second stylized fact in the innovation literature that R&D investment increases with size. Taken together, these stylized facts create a puzzle of seemingly irrational behavior by large firms--they are increasing spending despite decreasing returns. This paper is an effort to resolve that puzzle. We propose and test two alternative resolutions: 1) that it arises from mismeasurement of R&D productivity, and 2) that firm size endogenously drives R&D strategy, and that the returns to R&D strategies depend on scale. We are able to resolve the puzzle under the first tack--using a recent measure of R&D productivity, RQ, we find that both R&D spending and R&D productivity increase with scale. We had less success with the second tack--while firm size affects R&D strategy in the manners expected by theory, there is no strategy whose returns decrease in scale. Taken together, our results are consistent with the Schumpeter view that large firms are the major engine of growth, they both spend more in aggregate than small firms, and are more productive with that spending. Moreover the prescription that firms should behave more entrepreneurially, should be treated with caution--one small firm strategy has lower returns to scale than its large firm counterpart.
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