Papers Containing Keywords(s): 'equilibrium'
The following papers contain search terms that you selected. From the papers listed below, you can navigate to the PDF, the profile page for that working paper, or see all the working papers written by an author. You can also explore tags, keywords, and authors that occur frequently within these papers.
See Working Papers by Tag(s), Keywords(s), Author(s), or Search Text
Click here to search again
Frequently Occurring Concepts within this Search
Authors
No authors occur more than twice in this search.
Viewing papers 1 through 10 of 15
-
Working PaperWhat Drives Stagnation: Monopsony or Monopoly?
October 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-45
Wages for the vast majority of workers have stagnated since the 1980s while productivity has grown. We investigate two coexisting explanations based on rising market power: 1. Monopsony, where dominant firms exploit the limited mobility of their own workers to pay lower wages; and 2. Monopoly, where dominant firms charge too high prices for what they sell, which lowers production and the demand for labor, and hence equilibrium wages economy-wide. Using establishment data from the US Census Bureau between 1997 and 2016, we find evidence of both monopoly and monopsony, where the former is rising over this period and the latter is stable. Both contribute to the decoupling of productivity and wage growth, with monopoly being the primary determinant: in 2016 monopoly accounts for 75% of wage stagnation, monopsony for 25%.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperThe Employee Clientele of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from Personal Labor Income Diversification
January 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-01
Using employee job-level data, we empirically test the equilibrium matching between a firm's debt usage and its employee job risk aversion ('clientele effect'), as predicted by the existing theories. We measure job risk aversion for a firm's employees using their labor income concentration in the firm, calculated as the fraction of the employees' total personal labor income or total household labor income that is accounted for by their income from this particular firm. Using a sample of about 1,400 U.S. public firms from 1990-2008, we find a robust negative relation between leverage and employee job risk aversion, which is consistent with the clientele effect. Specifically, when a firm's existing employees have higher labor income concentration in it, the firm tends to have lower contemporaneous and future leverage. Moreover, in terms of new hires, firms with lower leverage are more likely to recruit employees with less alternative labor income. Our results continue to hold after we control for firm fixed effects, other employee characteristics such as wages, gender, age, race, and education, and managerial risk attitudes. Further, the matching between a firm's leverage and its workers' labor income concentration in it is more pronounced for firms with higher labor intensity and those in financial distress.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperHow Wide Is the Firm Border?
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-35
We quantify the normally unobservable forces that determine the boundary of the firm; that is, which transactions are mediated by ownership control as opposed to contracts or markets. To do so, we examine the shipment decisions of tens of thousands of establishments that produce and distribute a variety of products throughout the goods-producing sector. We examine how a firm's willingness to ship over distance varies with whether the recipient is owned by the firm. Because shipping costs increase with distance for many reasons, a greater volume of internal transactions at any given distance reveals the size of the firm's perceived net cost advantage of internal transactions. We find that the firm boundary is notably wide. Having one more vertically integrated downstream establishment in a location has the same effect on transaction volumes to that location as does a 40 percent reduction in distance between sender and destination. We further characterize how this 'internal advantage' varies with observable attributes of the transaction or product being shipped. Finally, we conduct a calibration of a multi-sector general equilibrium trade model and find that costs associated with transacting across firm boundaries also have discernible economy-wide implications.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperCogeneration Technology Adoption in the U.S.
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-30
Well over half of all electricity generated in recent years in Denmark is through cogeneration. In U.S., however, this number is only roughly eight percent. While both the federal and state governments provided regulatory incentives for more cogeneration adoption, the capacity added in the past five years have been the lowest since late 1970s. My goal is to first understand what are and their relative importance of the factors that drive cogeneration technology adoption, with an emphasis on estimating the elasticity of adoption with respect to relative energy input prices and regulatory factors. Very preliminary results show that with a 1 cent increase in purchased electricity price from 6 cents (roughly current average) to 7 cents per kwh, the likelihood of cogeneration technology adoption goes up by about 0.7-1 percent. Then I will try to address the general equilibrium effect of cogeneration adoption in the electricity generation sector as a whole and potentially estimate some key parameters that the social planner would need to determine the optimal cogeneration investment amount. Partial equilibrium setting does not consider the decrease in investment in the utilities sector when facing competition from the distributed electricity generators, and therefore ignore the effects from the change in equilibrium price of electricity. The competitive market equilibrium setting does not consider the externality in the reduction of CO2 emissions, and leads to socially sub-optimal investment in cogeneration. If we were to achieve the national goal to increase cogeneration capacity half of the current capacity by 2020, the US Department of Energy (DOE) estimated an annual reduction of 150 million metric tons of CO2 annually ' equivalent to the emissions from over 25 million cars. This is about five times the annual carbon reduction from deregulation and consolidation in the US nuclear power industry (Davis, Wolfram 2012). Although the DOE estimates could be an overly optimistic estimate, it nonetheless suggests the large potential in the adoption of cogeneration technology.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperHOW IMPORTANT ARE SECTORAL SHOCKS
September 2014
Working Paper Number:
CES-14-31
I quantify the contribution of sectoral shocks to business cycle fluctuations in aggregate output. I develop a multi-industry general equilibrium model in which each industry employs the material and capital goods produced by other sectors, and then estimate this model using data on U.S. industries sales, output prices, and input choices. Maximum likelihood estimates indicate that industry-specific shocks account for nearly two-thirds of the volatility of aggregate output, substantially larger than previously assessed. Identification of the relative importance of industry-specific shocks comes primarily from data on industries intermediate input purchases, data that earlier estimations of multi-industry models have ignored.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperIPO Waves, Product Market Competition, and the Going Public Decision: Theory and Evidence
March 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-07
We develop a new rationale for IPO waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperInformation and Industry Dynamics
August 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-16R
This paper develops a dynamic industry model in which firms compete to acquire customers over time by disseminating information about themselves under the presence of random shocks to their efficiency. The properties of the model's stationary equilibrium are related to empirical regularities on firm and industry dynamics. As an application of the model, the effects of a decline in the cost of information dissemination on firm and industry dynamics are explored.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperEarnings Inequality and Coordination Costs: Evidence from U.S. Law Firms
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-24
Earnings inequality has increased substantially since the 1970s. Using evidence from confidential Census data on U.S. law offices on lawyers' organization and earnings, we study the extent to which the mechanism suggested by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), a scale of operations effect linking spans of control and earnings inequality, is responsible for increases in inequality. We first show that earnings inequality among lawyers increased substantially between 1977 and 1992, and that the distribution of partner-associate ratios across offices changed in ways consistent with the hypothesis that coordination costs fell during this period. We then propose a 'hierarchical production function' in which output is the product of skill and time and estimate its parameters, applying insights from the equilibrium assignment literature. We find that coordination costs fell broadly and steadily during this period, so that hiring one's first associate leveraged a partner's skill by about 30% more in 1992 than 1977. We find also that changes in lawyers' hierarchical organization account for about 2/3 of the increase in earnings inequality among lawyers in the upper tail, but a much smaller share of the increase in inequality between lawyers in the upper tail and other lawyers. These findings indicate that new organizational efficiencies potentially explain increases in inequality, especially among individuals toward the top of the earnings distribution.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperQuality Sorting and Networking: Evidence from the Advertising Agency Industry
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-16
This paper provides a model of knowledge sharing and networking among single unit advertising agencies and investigates the implications of this model in the presence of heterogeneity in agencies' quality. In a stylized screening model, we show that, under a modest set of assumptions, the separation outcome is a Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium. That is, high quality agencies locate themselves in a high wage and rent area to sift out low quality agencies and guarantee their network quality. We identify a necessary condition for the separating equilibrium to exist and to reject the pooling equilibrium even in the presence of agglomeration economies from networking. We derive the maximum profit of an agency and show the condition has a directly testable implication in the empirical specification of the agency's profit function. We use a sample of movers'existing agencies that relocate among urban areas'in order to extract a predetermined measure of their quality prior to relocation. We estimate the parameters of the profit function, using the Census confidential establishment-level data, and show that the necessary condition for separation is met and that there is strong separation and sorting on quality among agencies in their location decisions.View Full Paper PDF
-
Working PaperHierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry
May 2004
Working Paper Number:
CES-04-07
What role do hierarchies play with respect to the organization of production and what determines their structure? We develop an equilibrium model of hierarchical organization, then provide empirical evidence using confidential data on thousands of law offices from the 1992 Census of Services. The driving force in the model is increasing returns in the utilization of acquired knowledge. We show how the equilibrium assignment of individuals to hierarchical positions varies with the degree to which their human capital is field-specialized, then show how this equilibrium changes with the extent of the market. We find empirical evidence consistent with a central proposition of the model: the share of lawyers that work in hierarchies and the ratio of associates to partners increases as market size increases and lawyers field-specialize. Other results provide evidence against alternative interpretations that emphasize unobserved differences in the distribution of demand or 'firm size effects,' and lend additional support to the view that a role hierarchies play in legal services is to help exploit increasing returns associated with the utilization of human capital.View Full Paper PDF
