Papers written by Author(s): 'Ali Hortacsu'
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Chad Syverson - 4
Viewing papers 1 through 4 of 4
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Working PaperHow Wide Is the Firm Border?
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-35
We quantify the normally unobservable forces that determine the boundary of the firm; that is, which transactions are mediated by ownership control as opposed to contracts or markets. To do so, we examine the shipment decisions of tens of thousands of establishments that produce and distribute a variety of products throughout the goods-producing sector. We examine how a firm's willingness to ship over distance varies with whether the recipient is owned by the firm. Because shipping costs increase with distance for many reasons, a greater volume of internal transactions at any given distance reveals the size of the firm's perceived net cost advantage of internal transactions. We find that the firm boundary is notably wide. Having one more vertically integrated downstream establishment in a location has the same effect on transaction volumes to that location as does a 40 percent reduction in distance between sender and destination. We further characterize how this 'internal advantage' varies with observable attributes of the transaction or product being shipped. Finally, we conduct a calibration of a multi-sector general equilibrium trade model and find that costs associated with transacting across firm boundaries also have discernible economy-wide implications.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperWhy Do Firms Own Production Chains?
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-31
Many firms own links of production chains--i.e., they own both upstream and downstream plants in vertically linked industries. We use broad-based yet detailed data from the economy's goods-producing sectors to investigate the reasons for such vertical ownership. It does not appear that vertical ownership is usually used to facilitate transfers of goods along the production chain, as is often presumed. Shipments from firms' upstream units to their downstream units are surprisingly low, relative to both the firms' total upstream production and their downstream needs. Roughly one-third of upstream plants report no shipments to their firms' downstream units. Half ship less than three percent of their output internally. We do find that manufacturing plants in vertical ownership structures have high measures of 'type' (productivity, size, and capital intensity). These patterns primarily reflect selective sorting of high plant types into large firms; once we account for firm size, vertical structure per se matters much less. We propose an alternative explanation for vertical ownership that is consistent with these results. Namely, that rather than moderating goods transfers down production chains, it instead allows more efficient transfers of intangible inputs (e.g., managerial oversight) within the firm. We document some suggestive evidence of this mechanism.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperCementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices
December 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-41
This paper empirically investigates the possible market power effects of vertical integration proposed in the theoretical literature on vertical foreclosure. It uses a rich data set of cement and ready-mixed concrete plants that spans several decades to perform a detailed case study. There is little evidence that foreclosure is quantitatively important in these industries. Instead, prices fall, quantities rise, and entry rates remain unchanged when markets become more integrated. These patterns are consistent, however, with an alternative efficiency-based mechanism. Namely, higher productivity producers are more likely to vertically integrate and are also larger, more likely to survive, and charge lower prices. We find evidence that integrated producers' productivity advantage is tied to improved logistics coordination afforded by large local concrete operations. Interestingly, this benefit is not due to firms' vertical structures per se: non-vertical firms with large local concrete operations have similarly high productivity levels.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperCementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices
July 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-21
This paper looks at the reasons for and results of vertical integration, with specific regard to its possible effects on market power as proposed in the theoretical literature on foreclosure. It uses a rich data set on producers in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries over a 34- year period to perform a detailed case study. There is little evidence that foreclosure effects are quantitatively important in these industries. Instead, prices fall, quantities rise, and entry rates remain unchanged when markets become more integrated. We suggest an alternative mechanism that is consistent with these patterns and provide additional evidence in support of it: namely, that higher productivity producers are more likely to vertically integrate, and as has been documented elsewhere, are also larger, more likely to grow and survive, and charge lower prices. We explore possible sources of vertically integrated producers' productivity advantage and find that the advantage is tied to firm size, possibly in part through improved logistics coordination, but not to several other possible explanations.View Full Paper PDF
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