We show that the incentives to reorganize inefficient firms and redeploy their assets depend on the change in industry output and industry characteristics. We use plant-level data to investigate the productivity of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms and asset-sale and closure decisions. We find no evidence of bankruptcy costs in industries with declining output growth, where most bankruptcies occur. In declining industries, bankrupt firms' plants are not less productive than industry averages and do not decline in productivity while in Chapter 11. In these industries, Chapter 11 appears to be a mechanism for fostering exit of capacity. In high-growth industries, there is some limited evidence of productivity declines while in Chapter 11 for a subsample of firms that remain in Chapter 11 for four or more years. Examining asset sales and closures by bankrupt firms and their competitors, we find that Chapter 11 status is of limited importance in predicting these decisions once industry and plant characteristics are taken into account. More generally, the findings imply that Chapter 11 may involve few real economic costs, and that industry effects and sample selection issues are very important in evaluating the performance of bankrupt firms.
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Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions
March 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-04
This paper examines whether capital structure decisions interact with product market characteristics to influence plant closing and investment decisions. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that a firm's capital structure, plant level efficiency, and industry capacity utilization are significant determinants of plant (dis)investment decisions. We find that the effects of high leverage on investment and plant closing are significant when the industry is highly concentrated. Following their recapitalizations, firms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. In addition, we find that rival firms are less likely to close plants and more likely to invest when the market share of leveraged firms is higher.
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Capital Structure And Product Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?
February 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-03
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior. We examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure. The evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. This finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. Following the empirical evidence we introduce the "strategic investment" effects of debt and argue that this effect, in conjunction with agency costs, appears to fit the data.
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The Industry Life Cycle and Acquisitions and Investment: Does Firm Organization Matter?
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-29
We examine the effect of financial dependence on the acquisition and investment of single segment and conglomerate firms for different long-run changes in industry conditions. Conglomerates and single-segment firms differ in the investments they make. The main differences are in the investment in acquisitions rather than in the level of capital expenditure. Financial dependence, a deficit in a segment's internal financing, decreases the likelihood of acquisitions and opening new plants, especially for single-segment firms. These effects are mitigated for conglomerates in growth industries and also for firms that are publicly traded. In declining industries, plants of segments that are financially dependent are less likely to be closed by conglomerate firms. These findings persist after controlling for firm size and segment productivity. We also find that plants acquired by conglomerate firms in growth industries increase in productivity post-acquisition. The results are consistent with the comparative advantages of different firm organizations differing across long-run industry conditions.
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Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm
April 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-11
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.
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PRODUCTIVITY AND ACQUISITIONS IN U.S. COAL MINING
December 1999
Working Paper Number:
CES-99-17
This paper extends the literature on the productivity incentives for mergers and acquisitions. We develop a stochastic matching model that describes the conditions under which a coal mine will change owners. This model suggests two empirically testable hypotheses: i. acquired mines will exhibit low productivity prior to being acquired relative to non-acquired mines and ii. extant acquired mines will show post-acquisition productivity improvements over their pre-acquisition productivity levels. Using a unique micro data set on the universe of U.S. coal mines observed from 1978 to 1996, it is estimated that acquired coal mines are significantly less productive than non-acquired mines prior to having been acquired. Additionally, there is observable and significant evidence of post-acquisition productivity improvements. Finally, it is found that having been acquired positively and significantly influences the likelihood that a coal mine fails.
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Efficiency Implications of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Micro Data
November 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-26
In this study, we contribute to the ongoing research on the rationales for corporate diversification. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we examine whether combining several lines of business in one entity leads to increased productive efficiency. Studying the direct effect of diversification on efficiency allows us to discern between two major theories of corporate diversification: the synergy hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis. To measure productive efficiency, we employ a non-parametric approach'a test based on Varian's Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM). This method has several advantages over other conventional measures of productive efficiency. Most importantly, it allows one to perform the efficiency test without relying on assumptions about the functional form of the underlying production function. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first application of the WAPM test to a large sample of non-financial firms. The study provides evidence that business segments of diversified firms are more efficient compared to single-segment firms in the same industry. This finding suggests that the existence of the so-called 'diversification discount' cannot be explained by efficiency differences between multi-segment and focused firms. Furthermore, more efficient segments tend to be vertically integrated with others segments in the same firm and to have been added through acquisitions rather than grown internally. Overall, the results of this study indicate that corporate diversification is value-enhancing, and that it is not necessarily driven by managers' pursuit of their private benefits.
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The Financial Performance of Whole Company LBOs
November 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-16
Using the previously untapped Census Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) file, we explored the financial performance of a large unbiased sample of 209 leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and 48 going private transactions occurring between 1978 and 1989. Our principal findings are: First, we confirm previous work showing that LBOs substantially increase operating performance and reduce taxes. Second, we find that the operating performance gains are sustained for three years. However, there is a significant drop in performance in the fourth and fifth years. Performance in these years is not significantly above the pre- LBO level. Third, total debt to assets displays only a slight insignificant downward trend. Thus, high debt remains after the drop in performance. Fourth, we find evidence that the performance gains decline in the mid- to late 1980s, with the exception of 1989. Fifth, the data suggest that LBOs target typical firms. The only significant pre-LBO firm characteristic was lower bank debt relative to nonbank debt. Sixth, we identify a number of factors that differentiate LBO performance. Performance tends to be higher when pre-LBO performance is low and the firm is classified as a large R&D performer. Conversely, management buyouts and buyouts involving extensive restructuring did not outperform other buyouts. Finally, we observe a clear linkage between debt and performance, since nonleveraging going-private deals have significantly lower performance than LBOs.
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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition
July 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-14
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention, we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value. Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target firms' productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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THE MANUFACTURING PLANT OWNERSHIP CHANGE DATABASE: ITS CONSTRUCTION AND USEFULNESS
September 1998
Working Paper Number:
CES-98-16
The Center for Economic Studies, U. S. Bureau of the Census, has constructed the "Manufacturing Plant Ownership Change Database" (OCD)using plant-level data taken from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). The OCD contains data on all manufacturing establishments that have experienced ownership change at least once during the period 1963-1992 . This is a unique data set which, together with the LRD, can be used to conduct a variety of economic studies that were not possible before. This paper describes how the OCD was constructed and discusses the usefulness of these data for economic research.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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