Using the previously untapped Census Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) file, we explored the financial performance of a large unbiased sample of 209 leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and 48 going private transactions occurring between 1978 and 1989. Our principal findings are: First, we confirm previous work showing that LBOs substantially increase operating performance and reduce taxes. Second, we find that the operating performance gains are sustained for three years. However, there is a significant drop in performance in the fourth and fifth years. Performance in these years is not significantly above the pre- LBO level. Third, total debt to assets displays only a slight insignificant downward trend. Thus, high debt remains after the drop in performance. Fourth, we find evidence that the performance gains decline in the mid- to late 1980s, with the exception of 1989. Fifth, the data suggest that LBOs target typical firms. The only significant pre-LBO firm characteristic was lower bank debt relative to nonbank debt. Sixth, we identify a number of factors that differentiate LBO performance. Performance tends to be higher when pre-LBO performance is low and the firm is classified as a large R&D performer. Conversely, management buyouts and buyouts involving extensive restructuring did not outperform other buyouts. Finally, we observe a clear linkage between debt and performance, since nonleveraging going-private deals have significantly lower performance than LBOs.
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LBOs, Debt And R&D Intensity
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-03
This paper details the impact of debt on R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout (LBO). We develop seven hypotheses based on capital market imperfection theories and agency theory. To test these hypotheses, we compare 72 R&D performing LBOs with 3329 non-LBO control observations and 126 LBOs with little or no R&D expenditures. The regressions yield four statistically significant major findings. First, pre-LBO R&D intensity is roughly one-half of the overall manufacturing mean and two-thirds of the firm's industry mean. Second, LBOs cause R&D intensity to drop by 40 percent. Third, large firms tend to have smaller LBO- related declines in R&D intensity. Fourth, R&D intensive LBOs outperform both their non-LBO industry peers and other LBOs without R&D expenditures.
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Efficiency of Bankrupt Firms and Industry Conditions: Theory and Evidence
October 1996
Working Paper Number:
CES-96-12
We show that the incentives to reorganize inefficient firms and redeploy their assets depend on the change in industry output and industry characteristics. We use plant-level data to investigate the productivity of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms and asset-sale and closure decisions. We find no evidence of bankruptcy costs in industries with declining output growth, where most bankruptcies occur. In declining industries, bankrupt firms' plants are not less productive than industry averages and do not decline in productivity while in Chapter 11. In these industries, Chapter 11 appears to be a mechanism for fostering exit of capacity. In high-growth industries, there is some limited evidence of productivity declines while in Chapter 11 for a subsample of firms that remain in Chapter 11 for four or more years. Examining asset sales and closures by bankrupt firms and their competitors, we find that Chapter 11 status is of limited importance in predicting these decisions once industry and plant characteristics are taken into account. More generally, the findings imply that Chapter 11 may involve few real economic costs, and that industry effects and sample selection issues are very important in evaluating the performance of bankrupt firms.
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Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm
April 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-11
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.
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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition
July 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-14
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention, we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value. Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target firms' productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions
March 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-04
This paper examines whether capital structure decisions interact with product market characteristics to influence plant closing and investment decisions. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that a firm's capital structure, plant level efficiency, and industry capacity utilization are significant determinants of plant (dis)investment decisions. We find that the effects of high leverage on investment and plant closing are significant when the industry is highly concentrated. Following their recapitalizations, firms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. In addition, we find that rival firms are less likely to close plants and more likely to invest when the market share of leveraged firms is higher.
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The Effects Of Leveraged Buyouts On Productivity And Related Aspects Of Firm Behavior
July 1989
Working Paper Number:
CES-89-05
We investigate the economic effects of leveraged buyouts (LBOs) using large longitudinal establishment and firm-level Census Bureau data sets linked to a list of LBOs compiled from public data sources. About 5 percent, or 1100, of the manufacturing plants in the sample were involved in LBOs during 1981-1986. We find that plants involved in LBOs had significantly higher rates of total-factor productivity (TFP) growth than other plants in the same industry. The productivity impact of LBOs is much larger than our previous estimates of the productivity impact of ownership changes in general. Management buyouts appear to have a particularly strong positive effect on TFP. Labor and capital employed tend to decline (relative to the industry average) after the buyout, but at a slower rate than they did before the buyout. The ratio of nonproduction to production labor cost declines sharply, and production worker wage rates increase, following LBOs. LBOs are production-labor-using, nonproduction-labor-saving, organizational innovations. Plants involved in management buyouts (but not in other LBOs) are less likely to subsequently close than other plants. The average R&D- intensity of firms involved in LBOs increased at least as much from 1978 to 1986 as did the average R&D-intensity of all firms responding to the NSF/Census survey of industrial R&D.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ACQUIRING AND ACQUIRED FIRMS' PRODUCT LINES
September 1990
Working Paper Number:
CES-90-12
This study develops detailed information on the relationships among the activities of acquiring and acquired firms at and near the time of merger for a sample of 94 takeovers undertaken between 1977-1982. We focus on takeovers for two reasons. First, takeovers are an important and controversial phenomenon. Second, takeovers allow us to look at marginal changes, admittedly large ones, in the firm's boundaries. Thus, they provide a useful way of examining relationships among activities of the firm without having to go into great detail regarding the historical decisions that generated the firm's current structure. While the individual establishment is our basic data unit, in this study we aggregate the activities of the firm to the line of business (LOB) level. Each LOB of an acquired firm is classified as to its relationship horizontal, vertical (upstream or downstream), and conglomerate to the LOBs of the acquiring firm. Using these categorizations we aggregate the LOB-level information to the firm level to investigate the degree to which our sample of mergers is specialized to particular types of relationships. While we find a significant group of unspecialized takeovers, most appear to fit a specific category. We also look at the pattern of closed operations immediately following the takeover. Closings are generally concentrated in operations involving horizontal relationships. Finally, we consider the pattern of relationships between hostile and friendly takeovers and whether takeover premiums vary by type of merger. Merger premiums are not related to the type of relationship between the acquiring and acquired firm, but they are tied to whether the takeover is friendly or hostile.
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The Efficiency of Internal Capital Markets: Evidence from the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey
April 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-08
We empirically examine whether greater firm diversity results in the inefficient allocation of capital. Using both COMPUSTAT and the Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES) we find firm diversity to be negatively related to the efficiency of investment. However once we distinguish between capital expenditure for structures and equipment, we find that while firms do inefficiently allocate capital for equipment, they efficiently allocate capital for structures. These results suggest that when the decision will have long-lasting repercussions, headquarters will, more often than not, make the correct choice.
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Employee Capitalism or Corporate Socialism? Broad-Based Employee Stock Ownership
December 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-44
How employee share ownership plans (ESOPs) affect employee compensation and shareholder value depends on the size. Small ESOPs, defined as those controlling less than 5% of outstanding shares, benefit both workers and shareholders, implying positive productivity gains. However, the effects of large ESOPs on worker compensation and shareholder value are more or less neutral, suggesting little productivity gains. These differential effects appear to be due to two non-value-creating motives specific to large ESOPS: (1) To form management-worker alliances ala Pagano and Volpin (2005), wherein management bribes workers to garner worker support in thwarting hostile takeover threats and (2) To substitute wages with ESOP shares by cash constrained firms. Worker compensation increases when firms under takeover threats adopt large ESOPs, but only if the firm operates in a non-competitive industry. The effects on firm valuation also depend on the strength of product market competition: When the competition is strong (weak), most of the productivity gains accrue to employees (shareholders). Competitive industry also implies greater job mobility within the industry, enabling workers to take a greater portion of productivity gains.
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