We study the causal effect of a large increase in firm leverage. Our setting is dividend recapitalizations in private equity (PE), where portfolio companies take on new debt to pay investor returns. After accounting for positive selection into more debt, we show that large leverage increases make firms much riskier, dramatically raising exit and bankruptcy rates but also IPOs. The debt-bankruptcy relationship is in line with Altman-Z model predictions for private firms. Dividend recapitalizations increase deal returns but reduce: (a) wages among surviving firms; (b) pre-existing loan prices; and (c) fund returns, which seems to reflect moral hazard via new fundraising. These results suggest negative implications for employees, pre-existing creditors, and investors.
-
After the Storm: How Emergency Liquidity Helps Small Businesses Following Natural Disasters
April 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-20
Does emergency credit prevent long-term financial distress? We study the causal effects of government-provided recovery loans to small businesses following natural disasters. The rapid financial injection might enable viable firms to survive and grow or might hobble precarious firms with more risk and interest obligations. We show that the loans reduce exit and bankruptcy, increase employment and revenue, unlock private credit, and reduce delinquency. These effects, especially the crowding-in of private credit, appear to reflect resolving uncertainty about repair. We do not find capital reallocation away from neighboring firms and see some evidence of positive spillovers on local entry.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
The Financial Performance of Whole Company LBOs
November 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-16
Using the previously untapped Census Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) file, we explored the financial performance of a large unbiased sample of 209 leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and 48 going private transactions occurring between 1978 and 1989. Our principal findings are: First, we confirm previous work showing that LBOs substantially increase operating performance and reduce taxes. Second, we find that the operating performance gains are sustained for three years. However, there is a significant drop in performance in the fourth and fifth years. Performance in these years is not significantly above the pre- LBO level. Third, total debt to assets displays only a slight insignificant downward trend. Thus, high debt remains after the drop in performance. Fourth, we find evidence that the performance gains decline in the mid- to late 1980s, with the exception of 1989. Fifth, the data suggest that LBOs target typical firms. The only significant pre-LBO firm characteristic was lower bank debt relative to nonbank debt. Sixth, we identify a number of factors that differentiate LBO performance. Performance tends to be higher when pre-LBO performance is low and the firm is classified as a large R&D performer. Conversely, management buyouts and buyouts involving extensive restructuring did not outperform other buyouts. Finally, we observe a clear linkage between debt and performance, since nonleveraging going-private deals have significantly lower performance than LBOs.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Private Equity and Employment
March 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-07R
Private equity critics claim that leveraged buyouts bring huge job losses. To investigate this claim, we construct and analyze a new dataset that covers U.S. private equity transactions from 1980 to 2005. We track 3,200 target firms and their 150,000 establishments before and after acquisition, comparing outcomes to controls similar in terms of industry, size, age, and prior growth. Relative to controls, employment at target establishments declines 3 percent over two years post buyout and 6 percent over five years. The job losses are concentrated among public-to-private buyouts, and transactions involving firms in the service and retail sectors. But target firms also create more new jobs at new establishments, and they acquire and divest establishments more rapidly. When we consider these additional adjustment margins, net relative job losses at target firms are less than 1 percent of initial employment. In contrast, the sum of gross job creation and destruction at target firms exceeds that of controls by 13 percent of employment over two years. In short, private equity buyouts catalyze the creative destruction process in the labor market, with only a modest net impact on employment. The creative destruction response mainly involves a more rapid reallocation of jobs across establishments within target firms.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
LBOs, Debt And R&D Intensity
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-03
This paper details the impact of debt on R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout (LBO). We develop seven hypotheses based on capital market imperfection theories and agency theory. To test these hypotheses, we compare 72 R&D performing LBOs with 3329 non-LBO control observations and 126 LBOs with little or no R&D expenditures. The regressions yield four statistically significant major findings. First, pre-LBO R&D intensity is roughly one-half of the overall manufacturing mean and two-thirds of the firm's industry mean. Second, LBOs cause R&D intensity to drop by 40 percent. Third, large firms tend to have smaller LBO- related declines in R&D intensity. Fourth, R&D intensive LBOs outperform both their non-LBO industry peers and other LBOs without R&D expenditures.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
THE OPTION TO QUIT: THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS ON TURNOVER
January 2014
Working Paper Number:
CES-14-06
We show that in the years following a large broad-based employee stock option (BBSO) grant, employee turnover falls at the granting firm. We find evidence consistent with a causal relation by exploiting unexpected changes in the value of unvested options. A large fraction of the reduction in turnover appears to be temporary with turnover increasing in the 3rd year following the year of the adoption of the BBSO plan. We also find that the effect of BBSO plans is larger at market leaders, identified as firms with high industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios, market share or industry-adjusted profit margins, as measured at the time of the grant.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
HUMAN CAPITAL LOSS IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
July 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-37
This paper quantifies the 'human costs of bankruptcy' by estimating employee wage losses induced by the bankruptcy filing of employers using employee-employer matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau's LEHD program. We find that employee wages begin to deteriorate one year prior to bankruptcy. One year after bankruptcy, the magnitude of the decline in annual wages is 30% of pre-bankruptcy wages. The decrease in wages persists (at least) for five years post-bankruptcy. The present value of wage losses summed up to five years after bankruptcy amounts to 29-49% of the average pre-bankruptcy market value of firm. Furthermore, we find that the ex-ante wage premium to compensate for the ex-post wage loss due to bankruptcy can be of similar magnitude with that of the tax benefits of debt.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Fraudulent Financial Reporting and the Consequences for Employees
March 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-12
We examine employment effects, such as wages and employee turnover, before, during, and after periods of fraudulent financial reporting. To analyze these effects, we combine U.S. Census data with SEC enforcement actions against firms with serious misreporting ('fraud'). We find compared to a matched sample that fraud firms' employee wages decline by 9% and the separation rate is higher by 12% during and after fraud periods while employment growth at fraud firms is positive during fraud periods and negative afterward. We discuss several reasons that plausibly drive these findings. (i) Frauds cause informational opacity, misleading employees to still join or continue to work at the firm. (ii) During fraud, managers overinvest in labor changing employee mix, and after fraud the overemployment is unwound causing effects from displacement. (iii) Fraud is misconduct; association with misconduct can affect workers in the labor market. We explore the heterogeneous effects of fraudulent financial reporting, including thin and thick labor markets, bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy firms, worker movements, pre-fraud wage levels, and period of hire. Negative wage effects are prevalent across these sample cuts, indicating that fraudulent financial reporting appears to create meaningful and negative consequences for employees possibly through channels such as labor market disruptions, punishment, and stigma.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
On the Lifecycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms
May 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-13
We use a new data set that tracks U.S. firms from their birth over two decades to understand the life cycle dynamics and outcomes (both successes and failures) of VC- and non-VC financed firms. We first ask to what market-wide and firm-level characteristics venture capitalists respond in choosing to make their investments and how this differs for firms financed solely by non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital. We then ask what are the eventual differences in outcomes for firms that receive VC financing relative to non-VC-financed firms. Our findings suggest that VCs follow public market signals similar to other investors and typically invest largely in young firms, with potential for large scale being an important criterion. The main way that VC financed firms differ from matched non-VC financed firms, is they demonstrate remarkably larger scale both for successful and failed firms, at every point of the firms' life cycle. They grow more rapidly, but we see little difference in profitability measures at times of exit. We further examine a number of hypotheses relating to VC-financed firms' failure. We find that VC-financed firms' cumulative failure rates are lower than non-VC-financed firms but the story is nuanced. VC appears initially 'patient' in that VC-financed firms are less likely to fail in the first five years but conditional on surviving past this point become more likely to fail relative to non-VC-financed firms. We perform a number of robustness checks and find that VC does not appear to have more stringent survival thresholds nor do VC-financed firm failures appear to be disguised as acquisitions nor do particular kinds of VC firms seem to be driving our results. Overall, our analysis supports the view that VC is 'patient' capital relative to other non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital in the early part of firms' lifecycles and that an important criterion for receiving VC investment is potential for large scale, rather than level of profitability, prior to exit.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Do SBA Loans Create Jobs? Estimates from Universal Panel Data and Longitudinal Matching Methods
September 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-27
This pape reports estimates of the effects of the Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) and 504 loan programs on employment. The database links a complete list of all SBA loans in these programs to universal data on all employers in the U.S. economy from 1976 to 2010. Our method is to estimate firm fixed effect regressions using matched control groups for the SBA loan recipients we have constructed by matching exactly on firm age, industry, year, and pre-loan size, plus kernel-based matching on propensity scores estimated as a function of four years of employment history and other variables. The results imply positive average effects on loan recipient employment of about 25 percent or 3 jobs at the mean. Including loan amount, we find little or no impact of loan receipt per se, but an increase of about 5.4 jobs for each million dollars of loans. When focusing on loan recipients and control firms located in high-growth counties (average growth of 22 percent), places where most small firms should have excellent growth potential, we find similar effects, implying that the estimates are not driven by differential demand conditions across firms. Results are also similar regardless of distance of control from recipient firms, suggesting only a very small role for displacement effects. In all these cases, the results pass a "pre-program" specification test, where controls and treated firms look similar in the pre-loan period. Other specifications, such as those using only matching or only regression imply somewhat higher effects, but they fail the pre-program test.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Job Creation, Small vs. Large vs. Young, and the SBA
September 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-24
Analyzing a list of all Small Business Administration (SBA) loans in 1991 to 2009 linked with annual information on all U.S. employers from 1976 to 2012, we apply detailed matching and regression methods to estimate the variation in SBA loan effects on job creation and firm survival across firm age and size groups. The estimated number of jobs created per million dollars of loans within the small business sector generally increases with size and decreases in age. The results suggest that the growth of small, mature firms is least financially constrained, and that faster growing firms experience the greatest financial constraints to growth. The estimated association between survival and loan amount is larger for younger and smaller firms facing the 'valley of death.'
View Full
Paper PDF