This paper examines whether capital structure decisions interact with product market characteristics to influence plant closing and investment decisions. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that a firm's capital structure, plant level efficiency, and industry capacity utilization are significant determinants of plant (dis)investment decisions. We find that the effects of high leverage on investment and plant closing are significant when the industry is highly concentrated. Following their recapitalizations, firms in industries with high concentration are more likely to close plants and less likely to invest. In addition, we find that rival firms are less likely to close plants and more likely to invest when the market share of leveraged firms is higher.
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Capital Structure And Product Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?
February 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-03
This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior. We examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure. The evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. This finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. Following the empirical evidence we introduce the "strategic investment" effects of debt and argue that this effect, in conjunction with agency costs, appears to fit the data.
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Efficiency of Bankrupt Firms and Industry Conditions: Theory and Evidence
October 1996
Working Paper Number:
CES-96-12
We show that the incentives to reorganize inefficient firms and redeploy their assets depend on the change in industry output and industry characteristics. We use plant-level data to investigate the productivity of Chapter 11 bankrupt firms and asset-sale and closure decisions. We find no evidence of bankruptcy costs in industries with declining output growth, where most bankruptcies occur. In declining industries, bankrupt firms' plants are not less productive than industry averages and do not decline in productivity while in Chapter 11. In these industries, Chapter 11 appears to be a mechanism for fostering exit of capacity. In high-growth industries, there is some limited evidence of productivity declines while in Chapter 11 for a subsample of firms that remain in Chapter 11 for four or more years. Examining asset sales and closures by bankrupt firms and their competitors, we find that Chapter 11 status is of limited importance in predicting these decisions once industry and plant characteristics are taken into account. More generally, the findings imply that Chapter 11 may involve few real economic costs, and that industry effects and sample selection issues are very important in evaluating the performance of bankrupt firms.
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Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm
April 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-11
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.
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Mergers and Acquisitions and Productivity in the U.S. Meat Products Industries: Evidence from the Micro Data
March 2002
Working Paper Number:
CES-02-07
This paper investigates the motives for mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. meat products industry from1977-92. Results show that acquired meat and poultry plants were highly productive before mergers, and that meat plants significantly improved productivity growth in the post-merger periods, but poultry plants did not.
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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition
July 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-14
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention, we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value. Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target firms' productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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The Industry Life Cycle and Acquisitions and Investment: Does Firm Organization Matter?
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-29
We examine the effect of financial dependence on the acquisition and investment of single segment and conglomerate firms for different long-run changes in industry conditions. Conglomerates and single-segment firms differ in the investments they make. The main differences are in the investment in acquisitions rather than in the level of capital expenditure. Financial dependence, a deficit in a segment's internal financing, decreases the likelihood of acquisitions and opening new plants, especially for single-segment firms. These effects are mitigated for conglomerates in growth industries and also for firms that are publicly traded. In declining industries, plants of segments that are financially dependent are less likely to be closed by conglomerate firms. These findings persist after controlling for firm size and segment productivity. We also find that plants acquired by conglomerate firms in growth industries increase in productivity post-acquisition. The results are consistent with the comparative advantages of different firm organizations differing across long-run industry conditions.
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The Financial Performance of Whole Company LBOs
November 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-16
Using the previously untapped Census Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) file, we explored the financial performance of a large unbiased sample of 209 leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and 48 going private transactions occurring between 1978 and 1989. Our principal findings are: First, we confirm previous work showing that LBOs substantially increase operating performance and reduce taxes. Second, we find that the operating performance gains are sustained for three years. However, there is a significant drop in performance in the fourth and fifth years. Performance in these years is not significantly above the pre- LBO level. Third, total debt to assets displays only a slight insignificant downward trend. Thus, high debt remains after the drop in performance. Fourth, we find evidence that the performance gains decline in the mid- to late 1980s, with the exception of 1989. Fifth, the data suggest that LBOs target typical firms. The only significant pre-LBO firm characteristic was lower bank debt relative to nonbank debt. Sixth, we identify a number of factors that differentiate LBO performance. Performance tends to be higher when pre-LBO performance is low and the firm is classified as a large R&D performer. Conversely, management buyouts and buyouts involving extensive restructuring did not outperform other buyouts. Finally, we observe a clear linkage between debt and performance, since nonleveraging going-private deals have significantly lower performance than LBOs.
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Estimating the Hidden Costs of Environmental Regulation
May 2002
Working Paper Number:
CES-02-10
This paper examines whether accounting systems identify all the costs of environmental regulation. We estimate the relation between the 'visible' cost of regulatory compliance, i.e., costs that are correctly classified in firms' accounting systems, and 'hidden' costs i.e., costs that are embedded in other accounts. We use plant-level data from 55 steel mills to estimate hidden costs, and we follow up with structured interviews of corporate-level managers and plant-level accountants. Empirical results show that a $1 increase in the visible cost of environmental regulation is associated with an increase in total cost (at the margin) of $10-11, of which $9-10 are hidden in other accounts. The findings suggest that inappropriate identification and accumulation of the costs of environmental compliance are likely to lead to distorted costs in firms subject to environmental regulation.
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Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-23
Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.
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The Going Public Decision and the Product Market
July 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-20
At what point in a firm's life should it go public? How do a firm's ex ante product market characteristics relate to its going public decision? Further, what are the implications of a firm going public on its post-IPO operating and product market performance? In this paper, we answer the above questions by conducting the first large sample study of the going public decisions of U.S. firms in the literature. We use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which covers the entire universe of private and public U.S. manufacturing firms. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, a private firm's product market characteristics (market share, competition, capital intensity, cash flow riskiness) significantly affect its likelihood of going public. Second, private firms facing less information asymmetry and those with projects that are cheaper for outsiders to evaluate are more likely to go public (consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)). Third, IPOs of firms occur at the peak of their productivity cycle (consistent with Clementi (2002)): the dynamics of total factor productivity (TFP) and sales growth exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern. Finally, sales, capital expenditures, and other performance variables exhibit a consistently increasing pattern over the years before and after the IPO. The last two findings are consistent with the widely documented post-IPO operating underperformance of firms being due to the real investment effects of a firm going public, and inconsistent with underperformance being solely due to earnings management immediately prior to the IPO.
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