This paper examines whether accounting systems identify all the costs of environmental regulation. We estimate the relation between the 'visible' cost of regulatory compliance, i.e., costs that are correctly classified in firms' accounting systems, and 'hidden' costs i.e., costs that are embedded in other accounts. We use plant-level data from 55 steel mills to estimate hidden costs, and we follow up with structured interviews of corporate-level managers and plant-level accountants. Empirical results show that a $1 increase in the visible cost of environmental regulation is associated with an increase in total cost (at the margin) of $10-11, of which $9-10 are hidden in other accounts. The findings suggest that inappropriate identification and accumulation of the costs of environmental compliance are likely to lead to distorted costs in firms subject to environmental regulation.
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Technical Inefficiency And Productive Decline In The U.S. Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry Under The Natural Gas Policy Act
October 1991
Working Paper Number:
CES-91-06
The U.S. natural gas industry has undergone substantial change since the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Although the major focus of the NGPA was to initiate partial and gradual price deregulation of natural gas at the well-head, the interstate transmission industry was profoundly affected by changes in the relative prices of competing fuels and contractual relationships among producers, transporters, distributors, and end-users. This paper assesses the impact of the NGPA on the technical efficiency and productivity of fourteen interstate natural gas transmission firms for the period 1978-1985. We focus on the distortionary effects that resulted in the industry during a period in which changes in regulatory policy could neither anticipate changing market conditions nor rapidly adjust to those changes. Two alternative estimating methodologies, stochastic frontier production analysis and data envelopment analysis, are used to measure the firm-specific and temporal distortionary effects. Concordant findings from these alternative methodologies suggest a pervasive pattern of declining technical efficiency in the industry during the period in which this major regulatory intervention was introduced and implemented. The representative firms experience an average annual decline in efficiency of .55 percent over the sample period. In addition, it appears that the industry suffered a decline in productivity during the sample period, averaging -1.18 percent annually.
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Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation And Plant-Level Productivity
December 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-14
We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.
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The Impact of Heterogeneous NOx Regulations on Distributed Electricity Generation in U.S. Manufacturing
April 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-12
The US EPA's command-and-control NOx policies of the early 1990s are associated with a 3.1 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of manufacturing plants vertically integrating the electricity generation process. During the same period California adopted a cap-and-trade program for NOx emissions that resulted in no significant impact on distributed electricity generation in manufacturing. These results suggest that traditional command-and-control approaches to air pollution may exacerbate other market failures such as the energy efficiency gap, because distributed generation is generally recognized as a more energy efficient means of producing electricity
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The Structure Of Technology, Substitution, And Productivity In The Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Industry Under The NGPA Of 1978
August 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-09
The structure of production in the natural gas transmission industry is estimated using the dual restricted cost function based on panel data for twenty four firms. A standard translog variable cost function with firm fixed effects is augmented with controls for capacity utilization, technical change, and shifting regulatory regimes. During the implementation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 1978-1985, the industry exhibited no significant increase in productivity, largely attributable to the decline in output for the industry. Regulatory efforts to promote voluntary non-contract transmission appear to have enabled some firms to mitigate the overall industry productivity stagnation. The NGPA instituted a complex schedule of partial and gradual decontrol of natural gas prices at the well head. This form of deregulation costs natural gas producers over $100 billion in lost revenues, relative to immediate and full price deregulation. However, the transmission firms benefited by paying $1.5 billion less for natural gas than they would have under total deregulation. The benefits to consumers, totaling $98.7 billion, were unevenly distributed. On average, for the 1978-1985 period, utilities, commercial, and industrial users paid less for their gas than they would have under total decontrol and residential users paid $8.6 billion more. The NGPA and Federal Regulatory Commission oversight practices allow the transmission industry to price discriminate among customers.
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Plant Vintage, Technology, and Environmental Regulation
September 2001
Working Paper Number:
CES-01-08
Does the impact of environmental regulation differ by plant vintage and technology? We answer this question using annual Census Bureau information on 116 pulp and paper mills' vintage, technology, productivity, and pollution abatement operating costs for 1979-1990. We find a significant negative relationship between pollution abatement costs and productivity levels. This is due almost entirely to integrated mills (those incorporating a pulping process), where a one standard deviation increase in abatement costs is predicted to reduce productivity by 5.4 percent. Older plants appear to have lower productivity but are less sensitive to abatement costs, perhaps due to 'grandfathering' of regulations. Mills which undergo renovations are also less sensitive to abatement costs, although these vintage and renovation results are not generally significant. We find similar results using a log-linear version of a three input Cobb-Douglas production function in which we include our technology, vintage, and renovation variables. Sample calculations of the impact of pollution abatement on productivity show the importance of allowing for differences based on plant technology. In a model incorporating technology interactions we estimate that total pollution abatement costs reduce productivity levels by an average of 4.7 percent across all the plants. The comparable estimate without technology interactions is 3.3 percent, approximately 30% lower.
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Are We Overstating the Economic Costs of Environmental Protection?
May 1997
Working Paper Number:
CES-97-12
Reported expenditures for environmental protection in the U.S. are estimated to exceed $150 billion annually or about 2% of GDP. This estimate is often used as an assessment of the burden of current regulatory efforts and a standard against which the associated benefits are measured. This makes it a key statistic in the debate surrounding both current and future environmental regulation. Little is known, however, about how well reported expenditures relate to true economic cost. True economic cost depends on whether reported environmental expenditures generate incidental savings, involve uncounted burdens, or accurately reflect the total cost of environmental protection. This paper explores the relationship between reported expenditures and economic cost in a number of major manufacturing industries. Previous research has suggested that an incremental $1 of reported environmental expenditures increases total production costs by anywhere from $1 to $12, i.e., increases in reported costs probably understate the actual increase in economic cost. Surprisingly, our results suggest the reverse, that increases in reported costs may overstate the actual increase in economic cost. Our results are based a large plant-level data set for eleven four-digit SIC industries. We employ a cost-function modeling approach that involves three basic steps. First, we treat real environmental expenditures as a second output of the plant, reflecting perceived environmental abatement efforts. Second, we model the joint production of conventional output and environmental effort as a cost-minimization problem. Third, we calculate the effect of an incremental dollar of reported environmental expenditures at the plant, industry, and manufacturing sector levels. Our approach differs from previous work with similar data by considering a large number of industries, using a cost-function modeling approach, and paying particular attention to plant-specific effects. Our preferred, fixed-effects model obtains an aggregate estimate of thirteen cents in increased costs for every dollar of reported incremental pollution control expenditures, with a standard error of sixty-one cents. This single estimate, however, conceals the wide range of values observed at the industry and plant level. We also find that estimates using an alternative, random-effects model are uniformly higher. Although the higher, random-effects estimates are more consistent with previous work, we believe they are biased by omitted variables characterizing differences among plants. While further research is needed, our results suggest that previous estimates of the economic cost associated with environmental expenditures have been biased upward and that the possibility of overstatement is quite real. Key words: environmental costs, fixed-effects, translog cost model
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Public Disclosure of Private Information as a Tool for Regulating Environmental Emissions: Firm-Level Responses by Petroleum Refineries to the Toxics Release Inventory
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-13
I investigate whether, as is commonly believed -- and if so how -- firm disclosure of so-called "toxic" releases, required since 1987 by the federal "Toxics Release Inventory ("TRI"), has brought about the reductions in toxic releases that have occurred since that time. Existing literature, consisting principally of event studies of stock market returns, suggest that dirty firms experience abnormal negative returns. Using a micro-level data set that links TRI releases to plant level Census data for petroleum refineries, I study plant-level behavior, exploiting state variation in toxics regulations, and exploring the relationship between TRI releases and concomitant regulation of non-toxic pollutants. I find that, although TRI induced public disclosure may have contributed to the decline in reported toxic releases, that alone has not been the cause of those reductions: the evidence is strong that changes in toxic emission intensity are a byproduct of more traditional command and control regulation of emissions of non-toxic pollutants. I find that (1) since 1987, refineries have become substantially cleaner in terms of over-all toxic releases; (2) the clean-up has not occurred through substitution away from TRI listed substances as inputs or alteration in the mix of outputs; and (3) refineries in states with more stringent supplemental regulation of toxics (e.g. with specific state-wide goals for toxic reductions) have significantly lower toxic emission intensity levels than refineries in other states. I find also that (4) TRI air releases are highly correlated with levels of criteria air pollution; (5) both toxic pollution levels and intensity fall with increases in pollution abatement (operating and maintenance) expenditures for non-toxic air pollution; and (6) TRI air releases are affected by being in more stringent regulatory regions for the criteria air pollutants. Finally, I link my data-set with CRSP data to re-evaluate the effect of TRI reporting on company stock market valuation, correcting for a methodological shortcoming (stemming from the fact that all reporting firms face a common event window) of prior event studies of the impact of the TRI. Correcting for that shortcoming, I find that (7) the evidence of negative abnormal returns around TRI reporting dates for petroleum companies is not significant. My findings suggest that the most probable mechanism through which TRI reporting may induce firms to clean up is local and state governmental use of TRI disclosures. They suggest also not only that the perceived effectiveness of TRI regulation has been overstated, but perhaps more importantly that the benefits of command and control regulation of non-toxic pollutants have been underestimated.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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Pollution Abatement Expenditures and Plant-Level Productivity: A Production Function Approach
August 2003
Working Paper Number:
CES-03-16
In this paper, we investigate the impact of environmental regulation on productivity using a Cobb-Douglas production function framework. Estimating the effects of regulation on productivity can be done with a top-down approach using data for broad sectors of the economy, or a more disaggregated bottom-up approach. Our study follows a bottom-up approach using data from the U.S. paper, steel, and oil industries. We measure environmental regulation using plant-level information on pollution abatement expenditures, which allows us to distinguish between productive and abatement expenditures on each input. We use annual Census Bureau information (1979-1990) on output, labor, capital, and material inputs, and pollution abatement operating costs and capital expenditures for 68 pulp and paper mills, 55 oil refineries, and 27 steel mills. We find that pollution abatement inputs generally contribute little or nothing to output, especially when compared to their '''productive''' equivalents. Adding an aggregate pollution abatement cost measure to a Cobb-Douglas production function, we find that a $1 increase in pollution abatement costs leads to an estimated productivity decline of $3.11, $1.80, and $5.98 in the paper, oil, and steel industries respectively. These findings imply substantial differences across industries in their sensitivity to pollution abatement costs, arguing for a bottom-up approach that can capture these differences. Further differentiating plants by their production technology, we find substantial differences in the impact of pollution abatement costs even within industries, with higher marginal costs at plants with more polluting technologies. Finally, in all three industries, plants concentrating on change-in-production-process abatement techniques have higher productivity than plants doing predominantly end-of-line abatement, but also seem to be more affected by pollution abatement operating costs. Overall, our results point to the importance using detailed, disaggregated analyses, even below the industry level, when trying to model the costs of forcing plants to reduce their emissions.
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Cross Sectional Variation In Toxic Waste Releases From The U.S. Chemical Industry
August 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-08
This paper measures and examines the 1987 cross sectional variation in toxic releases from the U.S. chemical industry. The analysis is based on a unique plant level data set of over 2,100 plants, combining EPA toxic release data with Census Bureau data on economic activity. The main results are that intra-industry variation in toxic releases are as great as, or greater, than inter-industry variation, and that plant, firm, and regulatory characteristics are important factors in explaining observed variation in toxic releases. Even after controlling for primary product and plant characteristics, there are some firms that generate significantly lower toxic waste due to managerial ability and/or technology differences.
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