This paper examines whether accounting systems identify all the costs of environmental regulation. We estimate the relation between the 'visible' cost of regulatory compliance, i.e., costs that are correctly classified in firms' accounting systems, and 'hidden' costs i.e., costs that are embedded in other accounts. We use plant-level data from 55 steel mills to estimate hidden costs, and we follow up with structured interviews of corporate-level managers and plant-level accountants. Empirical results show that a $1 increase in the visible cost of environmental regulation is associated with an increase in total cost (at the margin) of $10-11, of which $9-10 are hidden in other accounts. The findings suggest that inappropriate identification and accumulation of the costs of environmental compliance are likely to lead to distorted costs in firms subject to environmental regulation.
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Technical Inefficiency And Productive Decline In The U.S. Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry Under The Natural Gas Policy Act
October 1991
Working Paper Number:
CES-91-06
The U.S. natural gas industry has undergone substantial change since the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Although the major focus of the NGPA was to initiate partial and gradual price deregulation of natural gas at the well-head, the interstate transmission industry was profoundly affected by changes in the relative prices of competing fuels and contractual relationships among producers, transporters, distributors, and end-users. This paper assesses the impact of the NGPA on the technical efficiency and productivity of fourteen interstate natural gas transmission firms for the period 1978-1985. We focus on the distortionary effects that resulted in the industry during a period in which changes in regulatory policy could neither anticipate changing market conditions nor rapidly adjust to those changes. Two alternative estimating methodologies, stochastic frontier production analysis and data envelopment analysis, are used to measure the firm-specific and temporal distortionary effects. Concordant findings from these alternative methodologies suggest a pervasive pattern of declining technical efficiency in the industry during the period in which this major regulatory intervention was introduced and implemented. The representative firms experience an average annual decline in efficiency of .55 percent over the sample period. In addition, it appears that the industry suffered a decline in productivity during the sample period, averaging -1.18 percent annually.
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Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation And Plant-Level Productivity
December 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-14
We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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The Structure Of Technology, Substitution, And Productivity In The Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Industry Under The NGPA Of 1978
August 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-09
The structure of production in the natural gas transmission industry is estimated using the dual restricted cost function based on panel data for twenty four firms. A standard translog variable cost function with firm fixed effects is augmented with controls for capacity utilization, technical change, and shifting regulatory regimes. During the implementation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 1978-1985, the industry exhibited no significant increase in productivity, largely attributable to the decline in output for the industry. Regulatory efforts to promote voluntary non-contract transmission appear to have enabled some firms to mitigate the overall industry productivity stagnation. The NGPA instituted a complex schedule of partial and gradual decontrol of natural gas prices at the well head. This form of deregulation costs natural gas producers over $100 billion in lost revenues, relative to immediate and full price deregulation. However, the transmission firms benefited by paying $1.5 billion less for natural gas than they would have under total deregulation. The benefits to consumers, totaling $98.7 billion, were unevenly distributed. On average, for the 1978-1985 period, utilities, commercial, and industrial users paid less for their gas than they would have under total decontrol and residential users paid $8.6 billion more. The NGPA and Federal Regulatory Commission oversight practices allow the transmission industry to price discriminate among customers.
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Public Disclosure of Private Information as a Tool for Regulating Environmental Emissions: Firm-Level Responses by Petroleum Refineries to the Toxics Release Inventory
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-13
I investigate whether, as is commonly believed -- and if so how -- firm disclosure of so-called "toxic" releases, required since 1987 by the federal "Toxics Release Inventory ("TRI"), has brought about the reductions in toxic releases that have occurred since that time. Existing literature, consisting principally of event studies of stock market returns, suggest that dirty firms experience abnormal negative returns. Using a micro-level data set that links TRI releases to plant level Census data for petroleum refineries, I study plant-level behavior, exploiting state variation in toxics regulations, and exploring the relationship between TRI releases and concomitant regulation of non-toxic pollutants. I find that, although TRI induced public disclosure may have contributed to the decline in reported toxic releases, that alone has not been the cause of those reductions: the evidence is strong that changes in toxic emission intensity are a byproduct of more traditional command and control regulation of emissions of non-toxic pollutants. I find that (1) since 1987, refineries have become substantially cleaner in terms of over-all toxic releases; (2) the clean-up has not occurred through substitution away from TRI listed substances as inputs or alteration in the mix of outputs; and (3) refineries in states with more stringent supplemental regulation of toxics (e.g. with specific state-wide goals for toxic reductions) have significantly lower toxic emission intensity levels than refineries in other states. I find also that (4) TRI air releases are highly correlated with levels of criteria air pollution; (5) both toxic pollution levels and intensity fall with increases in pollution abatement (operating and maintenance) expenditures for non-toxic air pollution; and (6) TRI air releases are affected by being in more stringent regulatory regions for the criteria air pollutants. Finally, I link my data-set with CRSP data to re-evaluate the effect of TRI reporting on company stock market valuation, correcting for a methodological shortcoming (stemming from the fact that all reporting firms face a common event window) of prior event studies of the impact of the TRI. Correcting for that shortcoming, I find that (7) the evidence of negative abnormal returns around TRI reporting dates for petroleum companies is not significant. My findings suggest that the most probable mechanism through which TRI reporting may induce firms to clean up is local and state governmental use of TRI disclosures. They suggest also not only that the perceived effectiveness of TRI regulation has been overstated, but perhaps more importantly that the benefits of command and control regulation of non-toxic pollutants have been underestimated.
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What Determines Environmental Performance at Paper Mills? The Roles of Abatement Spending, Regulation, and Efficiency
April 2003
Working Paper Number:
CES-03-10
This paper examines the determinants of environmental performance at paper mills, measured by air pollution emissions per unit of output. We consider differences across plants in air pollution abatement expenditures, local regulatory stringency, and productive efficiency. Emissions are significantly lower in plants with a larger air pollution abatement capital stock: a 10 percent increase in abatement capital stock appears to reduce emissions by 6.9 percent. This translates into a sizable social return: one dollar of abatement capital stock is estimated to provide and annual return of about 75 cents in pollution reduction benefits. Local regulatory stringency and productive efficiency also matter: plants in non-attainment counties have 43 percent lower emissions and plants with 10 percent higher productivity have 2.5 percent lower emissions. For pollution abatement operating costs we find (puzzlingly) positive, but always insignificant, coefficients.
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An Empirical Analysis of Capacity Costs
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-26
A central premise of management accounting is that including the cost of unused capacity in product costs can distort these costs and misguide users. Yet, there is little large-scale empirical evidence on the materiality of the cost of unused capacity. This study uses a confidential Census sample of 151,900 U.S. manufacturing plants from 1974-2011 to investigate the impact of separating the cost of unused capacity. We find that excluding the cost of unused capacity increases operating profit margins by approximately 26 percent. This order of magnitude is economically significant, and is pervasive across industries and over time. In additional analyses, we find that separating the cost of unused capacity largely smooths the time-series variation in unitized product costs and profit margins. Our finding of higher mean and lower variation of adjusted margins should be of considerable interest to both investors and managers.
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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT: A REASSESSMENT
July 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-36
This paper examines the impact of environmental regulation on industry employment, using a structural model based on data from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures Survey. This model was developed in an earlier paper (Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih (2002) - MPS). We extend MPS by examining additional industries and additional years. We find widely varying estimates across industries, including many implausibly large positive employment effects. We explore several possible explanations for these results, without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. Our results call into question the frequent use of the average impacts estimated by MPS as a basis for calculating the quantitative impacts of new environmental regulations on employment.
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Cross Sectional Variation In Toxic Waste Releases From The U.S. Chemical Industry
August 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-08
This paper measures and examines the 1987 cross sectional variation in toxic releases from the U.S. chemical industry. The analysis is based on a unique plant level data set of over 2,100 plants, combining EPA toxic release data with Census Bureau data on economic activity. The main results are that intra-industry variation in toxic releases are as great as, or greater, than inter-industry variation, and that plant, firm, and regulatory characteristics are important factors in explaining observed variation in toxic releases. Even after controlling for primary product and plant characteristics, there are some firms that generate significantly lower toxic waste due to managerial ability and/or technology differences.
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Factor Substitution In U.S. Manufacturing: Does Plant Size Matter
April 1998
Working Paper Number:
CES-98-06
We use micro data for 10,412 U.S. manufacturing plants to estimate the degrees of factor substitution by industry and by plant size. We find that (1) capital, labor, energy and materials are substitutes in production, and (2) the degrees of substitution among inputs are quite similar across plant sizes in a majority of industries. Two important implications of these findings are that (1) small plants are typically as flexible as large plants in factor substitution; consequently, economic policies such energy conservation policies that result in rising energy prices would not cause negative effects on either large or small U.S. manufacturing plants; and (2) since energy and capital are found to be substitutes; the 1973 energy crisis is unlikely to be a significant factor contributing to the post 1973 productivity slowdown. of Substitution
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