In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. The U.S. cement industry is a clear example. For this industry, I study the effect of two policies on the entry behavior and industry equilibrium: An asymmetric environmental policy that creates barriers to greenfield entry and a policy that creates barriers to entry by acquisition (like an antitrust policy). In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and the regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. To model this industry, I use a perfect information static entry game. To estimate the supply and demand primitives of my model, I apply a recent estimator of discrete games to a rich database of the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the years 1963-2002. In my counterfactual analyses, I find that a less favorable environment for mergers during the Reagan-Bush administration would decrease the acquired plants by 70% and increase the new plants by 20%. Also, I find that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 increased the number of acquisitions by 7.8%. Furthermore, my simulations suggest that regulations that create barriers to greenfield entry are less favorable in terms of welfare than regulations that create barriers to entry by acquisition. Finally, I demonstrate how my parameter estimates change when I apply the traditional approach in the entry literature where entry by acquisition is not considered, and when using a simple OLS estimation.
-
Plant Turnover and Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry
March 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-08
Fluctuations in demand cause some plants to exit a market and other to enter. Would eliminating these 'uctuations reduce plant turnover? A structural model of entry and exit in concentrated markets is estimated for the ready-mix concrete industry, using plant level data from the U.S. Census. The Nested Pseudo-Likelihood algorithm is used to 'nd parameters which rationalize behavior of 'rms involved in repeated competition. Due to high sunk costs, turnover rates would only be reduced by 3% by eliminating demand 'uctuations at the county level, saving around 20 million dollars a year in scrapped capital. However, demand 'uctuations blunt 'rms'incentive to invest, reducing the number of large plants by more than 50%.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Productivity Dispersion and Plant Selection in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry
September 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-25
This paper presents a quantitative model of productivity dispersion to explain why inefficient producers are slowly selected out of the ready-mix concrete industry. Measured productivity dispersion between the 10th and 90th percentile falls from a 4 to 1 difference using OLS, to a 2 to 1 difference using a control function. Due to volatile productivity and high sunk entry costs, a dynamic oligopoly model shows that to rationalize small gaps in exit rates between high and low productivity plants, a plant in the top quintile must produce 1.5 times more than a plant in the bottom quintile.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Has toughness of local competition declined?
May 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-13
Recent evidence on rm-level markups and concentration raises a concern that market
competition has declined in the U.S. over the last few decades. Since measuring competition is difficult, methodologies used to arrive at these findings have merits but also raise technical concerns which question the validity of these results. Given the significance of documenting how competition has changed, I contribute to this literature by studying a different measure of competition. Specifically, I estimate the toughness of local competition over time. To derive this estimate, I use a generalized monopolistic competition model with variable markups. This model generates insights that allows me to measure competition as the sensitivity of weighted-average markup to changes in the number of competitors using directly observable variables. Compared to firm-level markups estimation, this method relaxes the need to estimate production functions. I then use confidential Census data to estimate toughness of local competition from 1997 to 2016, which shows that local competition has decreased in non-tradable industries on average in the U.S. during this time period.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Cogeneration Technology Adoption in the U.S.
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-30
Well over half of all electricity generated in recent years in Denmark is through cogeneration. In U.S., however, this number is only roughly eight percent. While both the federal and state governments provided regulatory incentives for more cogeneration adoption, the capacity added in the past five years have been the lowest since late 1970s. My goal is to first understand what are and their relative importance of the factors that drive cogeneration technology adoption, with an emphasis on estimating the elasticity of adoption with respect to relative energy input prices and regulatory factors. Very preliminary results show that with a 1 cent increase in purchased electricity price from 6 cents (roughly current average) to 7 cents per kwh, the likelihood of cogeneration technology adoption goes up by about 0.7-1 percent. Then I will try to address the general equilibrium effect of cogeneration adoption in the electricity generation sector as a whole and potentially estimate some key parameters that the social planner would need to determine the optimal cogeneration investment amount. Partial equilibrium setting does not consider the decrease in investment in the utilities sector when facing competition from the distributed electricity generators, and therefore ignore the effects from the change in equilibrium price of electricity. The competitive market equilibrium setting does not consider the externality in the reduction of CO2 emissions, and leads to socially sub-optimal investment in cogeneration. If we were to achieve the national goal to increase cogeneration capacity half of the current capacity by 2020, the US Department of Energy (DOE) estimated an annual reduction of 150 million metric tons of CO2 annually ' equivalent to the emissions from over 25 million cars. This is about five times the annual carbon reduction from deregulation and consolidation in the US nuclear power industry (Davis, Wolfram 2012). Although the DOE estimates could be an overly optimistic estimate, it nonetheless suggests the large potential in the adoption of cogeneration technology.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
"It's Not You, It's Me": Breakup In U.S.-China Trade Relationships
February 2014
Working Paper Number:
CES-14-08
This paper uses confidential U.S. Customs data on U.S. importers and their Chinese exporters toinvestigate the frictions from changing exporting partners. High costs from switching partners can affect the efficiency of buyer-supplier matches by impeding the movement of importers from high to lower cost exporters. I test the significance of this channel using U.S. import data, which identifies firms on both sides (U.S. and foreign) of an international trade relationship, the location of the foreign supplier, and values and quantities for the universe of U.S. import transactions. Using transactions with China from 2003-2008, I find evidence suggesting that barriers to switching exporters are considerable: 45% of arm's-length importers maintain their partner from one year to the next, and one-third of all switching importers remain in the same city as their original partner. In addition, importers paying the highest prices are the most likely to change their exporting partner. Guided by these empirical regularities, I propose and structurally estimate a dynamic discrete choice model of exporter choice, embedded in a heterogeneous firm model of international trade. In the model, importing firms choose a future partner using information for each choice, but are subject to partner and location-specific costs if they decide to switch their current partner. Structural estimates of switching costs are large, and heterogeneous across industries. For the random sample of 50 industries I use, halving switching costs shrinks the fraction of importers remaining with their partner from 57% to 18%, and this improvement in match efficiency leads to a 12.5% decrease in the U.S.-China Import Price Index.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Energy Prices, Pass-Through, and Incidence in U.S. Manufacturing*
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-27
This paper studies how increases in energy input costs for production are split between consumers and producers via changes in product prices (i.e., pass-through). We show that in markets characterized by imperfect competition, marginal cost pass-through, a demand elasticity, and a price-cost markup are suffcient to characterize the relative change in welfare between producers and consumers due to a change in input costs. We and that increases in energy prices lead to higher plant-level marginal costs and output prices but lower markups. This suggests that marginal cost pass-through is incomplete, with estimates centered around 0.7. Our confidence intervals reject both zero pass-through and complete pass-through. We and heterogeneous incidence of changes in input prices across industries, with consumers bearing a smaller share of the burden than standards methods suggest.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Is Air Pollution Regulation Too Lenient? Evidence from US Offset Markets
June 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-27R
This paper describes a framework to estimate the marginal cost of air pollution regulation, then applies it to assess whether a large set of existing U.S. air pollution regulations have marginal benefits exceeding their marginal costs. The approach utilizes an important yet under-explored provision of the Clean Air Act requiring new or expanding plants to pay incumbents in the same or neighboring counties to reduce their pollution emissions. These "offset" regulations create several hundred decentralized, local markets for pollution that differ by pollutant and location. Economic theory and empirical tests suggest these market prices reveal information about the marginal cost of abatement for new or expanding firms. We compare estimates of the marginal benefit of abatement from leading air quality models to offset prices. We find that, for most regions and pollutants, the marginal benefits of pollution abatement exceed mean offset prices more than ten-fold. In at least one market, however, estimated marginal benefits are below offset prices.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Multiregional Firms and Region Switching in the US Manufacturing Sector
January 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-22
This paper uses data on US manufacturing firms to study a new extensive margin, the reallocation of resources that takes place within surviving firms as they open and close establishments in different regions. To motivate the empirical analysis, I extend existing models of industry dynamics to include production-location decisions within firms. The empirical results provide support for the mechanisms emphasized by the theoretical model. In the data, only about 3 percent of firms make the same product in more than one region, but these multiregional firms are more productive on average
compared to single-region firms, and they account for about two-thirds of output. The results also show that "region-switching" is pervasive among multiregional firms, is correlated with changes in firm characteristics, and leads to a more efficient allocation of resources within firms.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Materials Prices and Productivity
June 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-11
There is substantial within-industry variation, even within industries that use and produce homogeneous inputs and outputs, in the prices that plants pay for their material inputs. I explore, using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the consequences and sources of this variation in materials prices. For a sample of industries with relatively homogeneous products, the standard deviation of plant-level productivities would be 7% lower if all plants faced the same materials prices. Moreover, plant-level materials prices are both persistent across time and predictive of exit. The contribution of net entry to aggregate productivity growth is smaller for productivity measures that strip out di'erences in materials prices. After documenting these patterns, I discuss three potential sources of materials price variation: geography, di'erences in suppliers. marginal costs, and suppliers. price discriminatory behavior. Together, these variables account for 13% of the dispersion of materials prices. Finally, I demonstrate that plants.marginal costs are correlated with the marginal costs of their intermediate input suppliers.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Multi-Market Contact in International Trade; Evidence from U.S. Battery Exporters
May 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-32
When competitors compete in more than one market they are said to have multi-market contact (MMC). Firms with MMC are more likely collude to avoid cross-market retaliation. This paper investigates the impact of MMC among U.S. battery exporters on the prices they set in foreign markets using confidential export transaction data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The ability of firms to exploit MMC for collusive gain in international markets can be both detrimental to import-dependent consumers and harder for anti-trust authorities to detect. Motivated by litigation finding evidence of collusive behavior by multi-national battery manufacturers, MMC has an upward effect on export prices set by U.S. battery exporters. These results are robust across different panel regression specifications using different measures of MMC.
View Full
Paper PDF