This paper studies how increases in energy input costs for production are split between consumers and producers via changes in product prices (i.e., pass-through). We show that in markets characterized by imperfect competition, marginal cost pass-through, a demand elasticity, and a price-cost markup are suffcient to characterize the relative change in welfare between producers and consumers due to a change in input costs. We and that increases in energy prices lead to higher plant-level marginal costs and output prices but lower markups. This suggests that marginal cost pass-through is incomplete, with estimates centered around 0.7. Our confidence intervals reject both zero pass-through and complete pass-through. We and heterogeneous incidence of changes in input prices across industries, with consumers bearing a smaller share of the burden than standards methods suggest.
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Regulating Mismeasured Pollution: Implications of Firm Heterogeneity for Environmental Policy
August 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-03R
This paper provides the first estimates of within-industry heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity for the entire U.S. manufacturing sector. We measure energy and CO2 productivity as output per dollar energy input or per ton CO2 emitted. Three findings emerge. First, within narrowly defined industries, heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity across plants is enormous. Second, heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity exceeds heterogeneity in most other productivity measures, like labor or total factor productivity. Third, heterogeneity in energy and CO2 productivity has important implications for environmental policies targeting industries rather than plants, including technology standards and carbon border adjustments.
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Is Air Pollution Regulation Too Lenient? Evidence from US Offset Markets
June 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-27R
This paper describes a framework to estimate the marginal cost of air pollution regulation, then applies it to assess whether a large set of existing U.S. air pollution regulations have marginal benefits exceeding their marginal costs. The approach utilizes an important yet under-explored provision of the Clean Air Act requiring new or expanding plants to pay incumbents in the same or neighboring counties to reduce their pollution emissions. These "offset" regulations create several hundred decentralized, local markets for pollution that differ by pollutant and location. Economic theory and empirical tests suggest these market prices reveal information about the marginal cost of abatement for new or expanding firms. We compare estimates of the marginal benefit of abatement from leading air quality models to offset prices. We find that, for most regions and pollutants, the marginal benefits of pollution abatement exceed mean offset prices more than ten-fold. In at least one market, however, estimated marginal benefits are below offset prices.
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Cogeneration Technology Adoption in the U.S.
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-30
Well over half of all electricity generated in recent years in Denmark is through cogeneration. In U.S., however, this number is only roughly eight percent. While both the federal and state governments provided regulatory incentives for more cogeneration adoption, the capacity added in the past five years have been the lowest since late 1970s. My goal is to first understand what are and their relative importance of the factors that drive cogeneration technology adoption, with an emphasis on estimating the elasticity of adoption with respect to relative energy input prices and regulatory factors. Very preliminary results show that with a 1 cent increase in purchased electricity price from 6 cents (roughly current average) to 7 cents per kwh, the likelihood of cogeneration technology adoption goes up by about 0.7-1 percent. Then I will try to address the general equilibrium effect of cogeneration adoption in the electricity generation sector as a whole and potentially estimate some key parameters that the social planner would need to determine the optimal cogeneration investment amount. Partial equilibrium setting does not consider the decrease in investment in the utilities sector when facing competition from the distributed electricity generators, and therefore ignore the effects from the change in equilibrium price of electricity. The competitive market equilibrium setting does not consider the externality in the reduction of CO2 emissions, and leads to socially sub-optimal investment in cogeneration. If we were to achieve the national goal to increase cogeneration capacity half of the current capacity by 2020, the US Department of Energy (DOE) estimated an annual reduction of 150 million metric tons of CO2 annually ' equivalent to the emissions from over 25 million cars. This is about five times the annual carbon reduction from deregulation and consolidation in the US nuclear power industry (Davis, Wolfram 2012). Although the DOE estimates could be an overly optimistic estimate, it nonetheless suggests the large potential in the adoption of cogeneration technology.
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Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-07
Since the 1972 U.S. Clean Water Act, government and industry have invested over $1 trillion to abate water pollution, or $100 per person-year. Over half of U.S. stream and river miles, however, still violate pollution standards. We use the most comprehensive set of files ever compiled on water pollution and its determinants, including 50 million pollution readings from 170,000 monitoring sites, to study water pollution's trends, causes, and welfare consequences. We have three main findings. First, water pollution concentrations have fallen substantially since 1972, though were declining at faster rates before then. Second, the Clean Water Act's grants to municipal wastewater treatment plants caused some of these declines. Third, the grants' estimated effects on housing values are generally smaller than the grants' costs.
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State Taxation and the Reallocation of Business Activity: Evidence from Establishment-Level Data
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-02
Using Census microdata on multi-state firms, we estimate the impact of state taxes on business activity. For C corporations, employment and the number of establishments have corporate tax elasticities of -0.4, and do not vary with changes in personal tax rates. Pass-through entity activities show tax elasticities of -0.2 to -0.3 with respect to personal tax rates, and are invariant with respect to corporate tax rates. Reallocation of productive resources to other states drives around half the effect. Capital shows similar patterns but is 36% less elastic than labor. The responses are strongest for firms in tradable and footloose industries.
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What Do Establishments Do When Wages Increase?
Evidence from Minimum Wages in the United States
November 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-31
I investigate how establishments adjust their production plans on various margins when wage rates increase. Exploiting state-by-year variation in minimum wage, I analyze U.S. manufacturing plants' responses over a 23-year period. Using instrumental variable method and Census Microdata, I find that when the hourly wage of production workers increases by one percent, manufacturing plants reduce the total hours worked by production workers by 0.7 percent and increase capital expenditures on machinery and equipment by 2.7 percent. The reduction in total hours worked by production workers is driven by intensive-margin changes. The estimated elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 0.85. Following the wage increases, no statistically significant changes emerge in revenue, materials or total factor productivity. Additionally, I nd that when wage rates increase, establishments are more likely to exit the market. Finally, I provide evidence that when the minimum wage increases the wages of some of the establishments in a firm, the firm also increases the wages for its other establishments.
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Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry
April 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-08
In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. The U.S. cement industry is a clear example. For this industry, I study the effect of two policies on the entry behavior and industry equilibrium: An asymmetric environmental policy that creates barriers to greenfield entry and a policy that creates barriers to entry by acquisition (like an antitrust policy). In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and the regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. To model this industry, I use a perfect information static entry game. To estimate the supply and demand primitives of my model, I apply a recent estimator of discrete games to a rich database of the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the years 1963-2002. In my counterfactual analyses, I find that a less favorable environment for mergers during the Reagan-Bush administration would decrease the acquired plants by 70% and increase the new plants by 20%. Also, I find that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 increased the number of acquisitions by 7.8%. Furthermore, my simulations suggest that regulations that create barriers to greenfield entry are less favorable in terms of welfare than regulations that create barriers to entry by acquisition. Finally, I demonstrate how my parameter estimates change when I apply the traditional approach in the entry literature where entry by acquisition is not considered, and when using a simple OLS estimation.
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Materials Prices and Productivity
June 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-11
There is substantial within-industry variation, even within industries that use and produce homogeneous inputs and outputs, in the prices that plants pay for their material inputs. I explore, using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the consequences and sources of this variation in materials prices. For a sample of industries with relatively homogeneous products, the standard deviation of plant-level productivities would be 7% lower if all plants faced the same materials prices. Moreover, plant-level materials prices are both persistent across time and predictive of exit. The contribution of net entry to aggregate productivity growth is smaller for productivity measures that strip out di'erences in materials prices. After documenting these patterns, I discuss three potential sources of materials price variation: geography, di'erences in suppliers. marginal costs, and suppliers. price discriminatory behavior. Together, these variables account for 13% of the dispersion of materials prices. Finally, I demonstrate that plants.marginal costs are correlated with the marginal costs of their intermediate input suppliers.
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Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States
March 2007
Working Paper Number:
CES-07-04
Theory predicts that mandated employment protections may reduce productivity by distorting production choices. Firms facing (non-Coasean) worker dismissal costs will curtail hiring below efficient levels and retain unproductive workers, both of which should affect productivity. These theoretical predictions have rarely been tested. We use the adoption of wrongful discharge protections by U.S. state courts over the last three decades to evaluate the link between dismissal costs and productivity. Drawing on establishment-level data from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the Longitudinal Business Database, our estimates suggest that wrongful discharge protections reduce employment flows and firm entry rates. Moreover, analysis of plant-level data provides evidence of capital deepening and a decline in total factor productivity following the introduction of wrongful discharge protections. This last result is potentially quite important, suggesting that mandated employment protections reduce productive efficiency as theory would suggest. However, our analysis also presents some puzzles including, most significantly, evidence of strong employment growth following adoption of dismissal protections. In light of these puzzles, we read our findings as suggestive but tentative.
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Technology Lock-In and Costs of Delayed Climate Policy
July 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-33
This paper studies the implications of current energy prices for future energy efficiency and climate policy. Using U.S. Census microdata and quasi-experimental variation in energy prices, we first show that manufacturing plants that open when electricity prices are low consume more energy throughout their lifetime, regardless of current electricity prices. We then estimate that a persistent bias of technological change toward energy can explain the long-term effects of entry-year electricity prices on energy intensity. Overall, this 'technology lock-in' implies that increasing entry-year electricity prices by 10% would decrease a plant's energy intensity of production by 3% throughout its lifetime.
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