Papers Containing Keywords(s): 'compliance'
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Viewing papers 1 through 10 of 11
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Working PaperRevisiting the Unintended Consequences of Ban the Box
August 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-58
Ban-the-Box (BTB) policies intend to help formerly incarcerated individuals find employment by delaying when employers can ask about criminal records. We revisit the finding in Doleac and Hansen (2020) that BTB causes statistical discrimination against minority men. We correct miscoded BTB laws and show that estimates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) remain quantitatively similar, while those from the American Community Survey (ACS) now fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of BTB on employment. In contrast to the published estimates, these ACS results are statistically significantly different from the CPS results, indicating a lack of robustness across datasets. We do not find evidence that these differences are due to sample composition or survey weights. There is limited evidence that these divergent results are explained by the different frequencies of these surveys. Differences in sample sizes may also lead to different estimates; the ACS has a much larger sample and more statistical power to detect effects near the corrected CPS estimates.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperIs Affirmative Action in Employment Still Effective in the 21st Century?
November 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-54
We study Executive Order 11246, an employment-based affirmative action policy tar geted at firms holding contracts with the federal government. We find this policy to be in effective in the 21st century, contrary to the positive effects found in the late 1900s (Miller, 2017). Our novel dataset combines data on federal contract acquisition and enforcement with US linked employer-employee Census data 2000'2014. We employ an event study around firms' acquiring a contract, based on Miller (2017), and find the policy had no ef fect on employment shares or on hiring, for any minority group. Next, we isolate the impact of the affirmative action plan, which is EO 11246's preeminent requirement that applies to firms with contracts over $50,000. Leveraging variation from this threshold in an event study and regression discontinuity design, we find similarly null effects. Last, we show that even randomized audits are not effective, suggesting weak enforcement. Our results highlight the importance of the recent budget increase for the enforcement agency, as well as recent policies enacted to improve complianceView Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperLocal Environmental Regulation and Plant-Level Productivity
September 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-30R
This paper examines the impact of environmental regulation on the productivity of manufacturing plants in the United States. Establishment-level data from three Censuses of Manufactures are used to estimate 3-factor Cobb-Douglas production functions that include a measure of the stringency of environmental regulation faced by manufacturing plants. In contrast to previous studies, this paper examines effects on plants in all manufacturing industries, not just those in 'dirty' industries. Further, this paper employs spatial-temporal variation in environmental compliance costs to identify effects, using a time-varying county-level index that is based on multiple years of establishment-level data from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey and the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Results suggest that, for the average manufacturing plant, the effect on productivity of being in a county with higher environmental compliance costs is relatively small and often not statistically significant. For the average plant, the main effect of environmental regulation may not be in the spatial and temporal dimensions.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperOn Spatial Heterogeneity in Environmental Compliance Costs
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-25R
This paper examines the extent of variation in regulatory stringency below the state level, using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey to estimate a county-level index of environmental compliance costs (ECC). County-level variation is found to explain 11-18 times more of the variation in ECC than state-level variation alone, and the range of ECC within a state is often large. At least 34% of U.S. counties have ECC that are statistically different from their states'. Results suggest that important spatial variation is lost in state-level studies of environmental regulation.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperThe Direct and Indirect Costs of Food Safety Regulation
September 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-31
The cost of compliance with the Pathogen Reduction Hazard Analysis Critical Control Program (PR/HACCP) rule of 1996 has been controversial since it was first proposed. Surveys have provided some cost information but examined plant size and other indirect effects with limited data and did not make cost estimates of direct cost components, such as mandated tasks. This paper addresses those deficiencies with data from a national survey of meat and poultry plants on PR/HACCP costs. Results indicate that (1) mandated tasks are the most costly component of the PR/HACCP rule, (2) regulation favors large plants over small ones, and (3) private actions are nearly as costly as direct regulation.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperMarket Forces, Plant Technology, and the Food Safety Technology Use
June 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-14
Economists (Ollinger and Mueller, 2003; Golan et al., 2004) have considered some of the economic forces, such as demands from major customers, that encourage plants to maintain food safety process control. Other economists, such as Roberts (2005), have identified food safety technologies that enable better control harmful pathogens. However, economists have not put the two together. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of economic forces, including firm effects and plant technology, customer demands, and regulation, on food safety technology use. Preliminary results suggest that customer demand has the greatest impact.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperThe Impact of Minimum Quality Standards on Firm Entry, Exit and Product Quality: The Case of the Child Care Market
December 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-28
We examine the impact of minimum quality standards on the supply side of the child care market, using a unique panel data set merged from the Census of Services Industries, state regulation data, and administrative accreditation records from the National Association of Education for Young Children. We control for state-specific and time-specific fixed effects in order to mitigate the biases associated with policy endogeneity. We find that the effects of quality standards specifying the labor intensiveness of child care services are strikingly different from those specifying staff qualifications. Higher staff-child ratio requirements deter entry and reduce the number of operating child care establishments. This entry barrier appears to select establishments with better quality into the market and alleviates competition among existing establishments: existing establishments are more likely to receive accreditation and higher profits, and are less likely to exit. By contrast, higher staff-education requirements do not have entry-deterrence effects. They do have the unintended effects of discouraging accreditation, reducing owners' profits, and driving firms out of businesses.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperEstimating the Hidden Costs of Environmental Regulation
May 2002
Working Paper Number:
CES-02-10
This paper examines whether accounting systems identify all the costs of environmental regulation. We estimate the relation between the 'visible' cost of regulatory compliance, i.e., costs that are correctly classified in firms' accounting systems, and 'hidden' costs i.e., costs that are embedded in other accounts. We use plant-level data from 55 steel mills to estimate hidden costs, and we follow up with structured interviews of corporate-level managers and plant-level accountants. Empirical results show that a $1 increase in the visible cost of environmental regulation is associated with an increase in total cost (at the margin) of $10-11, of which $9-10 are hidden in other accounts. The findings suggest that inappropriate identification and accumulation of the costs of environmental compliance are likely to lead to distorted costs in firms subject to environmental regulation.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperEmployment that is not covered by state unemployment
January 2002
Working Paper Number:
tp-2002-16
View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperWhen Do Firms Shift Production Across States to Avoid Environmental Regulation?
December 2001
Working Paper Number:
CES-01-18
This paper examines whether a firm's allocation of production across its plants responds to the environmental regulation faced by those plants, as measured by differences in stringency across states. We also test whether sensitivity to regulation differs based on differences across firms in compliance behavior and/or differences across states in industry importance and concentration. We use Census data for the paper and oil industries to measure the share of each state in each firm's production during the 1967-1992 period. We use several measures of state environmental stringency and test for interactions between regulatory stringency and three factors: the firm's overall compliance rate, a Herfindahl index of industry concentration in the state, and the industry's share in the state economy. We find significant results for the paper industry: firms allocate smaller production shares to states with stricter regulations. This impact is concentrated among firms with low compliance rates, suggesting that low compliance rates are due to high compliance costs, not low compliance benefits. The interactions between stringency and industry characteristics are less often significant, but suggest that the paper industry is more affected by regulation where it is larger or more concentrated. Our results are weaker for the oil industry, reflecting either less opportunity to shift production across states or a greater impact of environmental regulation on paper mills.View Full Paper PDF
