Combining confidential business-level microdata with housing and banking data, I document large and persistent effects of local house prices on employment at small businesses, and particularly young businesses, during the Great Recession. I show that the effect on entry is important for explaining the disproportionate effect on young businesses, while young firm exit is also disproportionately affected. I then explore the channels through which house prices affect business outcomes. I use survey data to show that reliance on either personal assets or home equity is associated with increased sensitivity to house prices. I then use local bank balance sheet information to show both young and old firms are sensitive to local credit shocks, with some evidence of a larger effect on young businesses. I develop a macroeconomic model that is consistent with these findings where house prices work through two channels: a bank credit supply channel and a housing collateral channel.
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Compositional Nature of Firm Growth and Aggregate Fluctuations
March 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-09
This paper studies firm dynamics over the business cycle. I present evidence from the United Kingdom that more rapidly growing firms are born in expansions than in recessions. Using administrative records from Census data, I find that this observation also holds for the last four recessions in the United States. I also present suggestive evidence that financial frictions play an important role in determining the types of firms that are born at different stages of the business cycle. I then develop a general equilibrium model in which firms choose their managers' span of control at birth. Firms that choose larger spans of control grow faster and eventually get to be larger, and in this sense have a larger target size. Financial frictions in the form of collateral constraints slow the rate at which firms reach their target size. It takes firms longer to get up to scale when collateral constraints tighten; therefore, businesses with the largest target size are affected disproportionately more. Thus, fewer entrepreneurs find it profitable to choose larger projects when financial conditions deteriorate. Using Bayesian methods, I estimate the model using micro and aggregate data from the United Kingdom. I find that financial shocks account for over 80% of fluctuations in the formation of businesses with a large target size, and TFP and labor wedge shocks account for the remaining 20%. An independently estimated version of the model with no choice over the span of control needs larger aggregate shocks in order to account for the same data series, suggesting that the intensive margin of business formation is important at business cycle frequencies. The model with the choice over the span of control generates an empirically relevant and non-targeted collapse in the right tail of the cumulative growth distribution among firms started in recessions, while the model without such a choice does not. The paper also discusses implications for micro-targeted government stimulus policies.
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Borrowing Constraints, Markups, and Misallocation
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-75
We document new facts that link firms' markups to borrowing constraints: (1) less constrained firms within an industry have higher markups, especially in industries where assets are difficult to borrow against and firms rely more on earnings to borrow; (2) markup dispersion is also higher in industries where firms rely more on earnings to borrow. We explain these relationships using a standard Kimball demand model augmented with borrowing against assets and earnings. The key mechanism is a two-way feedback between markups and borrowing constraints. First, less constrained firms charge higher markups, as looser constraints allow them to attain larger market shares. Second, higher markups relax borrowing constraints when firms rely on earnings to borrow, as those with higher markups have higher earnings. This two-way feedback lowers TFP losses from markup dispersion, particularly when firms rely on earnings to borrow.
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How Firms Respond to Business Cycles: The Role of Firm Age and Firm Size
June 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-30
There remains considerable debate in the theoretical and empirical literature about the differences in the cyclical dynamics of firms by firm size. This paper contributes to the debate in two ways. First, the key distinction between firm size and firm age is introduced. The evidence presented in this paper shows that young businesses (that are typically small) exhibit very different cyclical dynamics than small/older businesses. The second contribution is to present evidence and explore explanations for the finding that young/small businesses were hit especially hard in the Great Recession. The collapse in housing prices accounts for a significant part of the large decline of young/small businesses in the Great Recession.
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Housing Booms and the U.S. Productivity Puzzle
January 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-04
The United States has been experiencing a slowdown in productivity growth for more than a decade. I exploit geographic variation across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to investigate the link between the 2006-2012 decline in house prices (the housing bust) and the productivity slowdown. Instrumental variable estimates support a causal relationship between the housing bust and the productivity slowdown. The results imply that one standard deviation decline in house prices translates into an increment of the productivity gap -- i.e. how much an MSA would have to grow to catch up with the trend -- by 6.9p.p., where the average gap is 14.51%. Using a newly-constructed capital expenditures measure at the MSA level, I find that the long investment slump that came out of the Great Recession explains an important part of this effect. Next, I document that the housing bust led to the investment slump and, ultimately, the productivity slowdown, mostly through the collapse in consumption expenditures that followed the bust. Lastly, I construct a quantitative general equilibrium model that rationalizes these empirical findings, and find that the housing bust is behind roughly 50 percent of the productivity slowdown.
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Older and Slower: The Startup Deficit's Lasting Effects on Aggregate Productivity Growth
June 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-29
We investigate the link between declining firm entry, aging incumbent firms and sluggish U.S. productivity growth. We provide a dynamic decomposition framework to characterize the contributions to industry productivity growth across the firm age distribution and apply this framework to the newly developed Revenue-enhanced Longitudinal Business Database (ReLBD). Overall, several key findings emerge: (i) the relationship between firm age and productivity growth is downward sloping and convex; (ii) the magnitudes are substantial and significant but fade quickly, with nearly 2/3 of the effect disappearing after five years and nearly the entire effect disappearing after ten; (iii) the higher productivity growth of young firms is driven nearly exclusively by the forces of selection and reallocation. Our results suggest a cumulative drag on aggregate productivity of 3.1% since 1980. Using an instrumental variables strategy we find a consistent pattern across states/MSAs in the U.S. The patterns are broadly consistent with a standard model of firm dynamics with monopolistic competition.
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Dynamics of High-Growth Young Firms and the Role of Venture Capitalists
June 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-38
Motivated by the substantial growth and upfront investments of venture capital (VC) backed firms observed in administrative US Census data, this paper develops a firm dynamics model over the life cycle. In the model, startups choose the source of financing from VC, Angel investors, or banks, depending on their growth potential, and invest in innovation. The calibrated model explains the life-cycle dynamics of firms with different sources of financing and implies that venture capitalists' advice accounts for around 22% of the growth of VC-backed firms. A counterfactual economy without VC financing would lose aggregate consumption by around 0.4%.
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Specialization in a Knowledge Economy
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-77
Using firm-level data from the US Census Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), this paper exhibits novel evidence about a wave of specialization experienced by US firms in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically: (i) Firms, especially innovating ones, decreased production scope, i.e., the number of industries in which they produce. (ii) Innovation and production separated, with small firms specializing in innovation and large firms in production. Higher patent trading efficiency and stronger patent protection are proposed to explain these phenomena. An endogenous growth model is developed with potential mismatches between innovation and production. Calibrating the model suggests that increased trading efficiency and better patent protection can explain 20% of the observed production scope decrease and 108% of the innovation and production separation. They result in a 0.64 percent point increase in the annual economic growth rate. Empirical analyses provide evidence of causality from pro-patent reforms in the 1980s to the two specialization patterns.
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Firm Dynamics, Persistent Effects of Entry Conditions, and Business Cycles
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-29
This paper examines how the state of the economy when businesses begin operations affects
their size and performance over the lifecycle. Using micro-level data that covers the entire universe of businesses operating in the U.S. since the late 1970s, I provide new evidence that businesses born in downturns start on a smaller scale and remain smaller over their entire lifecycle. In fact, I find no evidence that these differences attenuate even long after entry. Using new data on the productivity and composition of startup businesses, I show that this persistence is related to selection at entry and demand-side channels.
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Technology-Driven Market Concentration through Idea Allocation
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-78
Using a newly-created measure of technology novelty, this paper identifies periods with and without technology breakthroughs from the 1980s to the 2020s in the US. It is found that market concentration decreases at the advent of revolutionary technologies. We establish a theory addressing inventors' decisions to establish new firms or join incumbents of selected sizes, yielding two key predictions: (1) A higher share of inventors opt for new firms during periods of heightened technology novelty. (2). There is positive assortative matching between idea quality and firm size if inventors join incumbents. Both predictions align with empirical findings and collectively contribute to a reduction in market concentration when groundbreaking technologies occur. Quantitative analysis shows the overall slowdown in technological breakthroughs can capture 95.9% of the rising trend in market concentration and the correlation between the model-generated and the actual detrended market concentration is 0.910.
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How Credit Constraints Impact Job Finding Rates, Sorting & Aggregate Output*
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-25
We empirically and theoretically examine how consumer credit access affects dis- placed workers. Empirically, we link administrative employment histories to credit reports. We show that an increase in credit limits worth 10% of prior annual earnings allows individuals to take .15 to 3 weeks longer to find a job. Conditional on finding a job, they earn more and work at more productive firms. We develop a labor sorting model with credit to provide structural estimates of the impact of credit on employ- ment outcomes, which we find are similar to our empirical estimates. We use the model to understand the impact of consumer credit on the macroeconomy. We find that if credit limits tighten during a downturn, employment recovers quicker, but output and productivity remain depressed. This is because when limits tighten, low-asset, low- productivity job losers cannot self-insure. Therefore, they search less thoroughly and take more accessible jobs at less productive firms.
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