Custom software is distinct from other types of capital in that it is non-rival'once a firm makes an investment in custom software, it can be used simultaneously across its many establishments. Using confidential U.S. Census data, we document that while firms with more establishments are more likely to invest in custom software, they spend less on it as a share of total capital expenditure. We explain these empirical patterns by developing a model that incorporates the non-rivalry of custom software. In the model, firms choose whether to adopt custom software, the intensity of their investment, and their scope, balancing the cost of managing multiple establishments with the increasing returns to scope from the nonrivalrous custom software investment. Using the calibrated model, we assess the extent to which the decline in the rental rate of custom software over the past 40 years can account for a number of macroeconomic trends, including increases in firm scope and concentration.
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Specialization in a Knowledge Economy
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-77
Using firm-level data from the US Census Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), this paper exhibits novel evidence about a wave of specialization experienced by US firms in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically: (i) Firms, especially innovating ones, decreased production scope, i.e., the number of industries in which they produce. (ii) Innovation and production separated, with small firms specializing in innovation and large firms in production. Higher patent trading efficiency and stronger patent protection are proposed to explain these phenomena. An endogenous growth model is developed with potential mismatches between innovation and production. Calibrating the model suggests that increased trading efficiency and better patent protection can explain 20% of the observed production scope decrease and 108% of the innovation and production separation. They result in a 0.64 percent point increase in the annual economic growth rate. Empirical analyses provide evidence of causality from pro-patent reforms in the 1980s to the two specialization patterns.
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The Intangible Divide: Why Do So Few Firms Invest in Innovation?
February 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-15
Investments in software, R&D, and advertising have surged, nearing half of U.S. private nonresidential investment. Yet just a few hundred firms dominate this growth. Most firms, including large ones, regularly invest little in capitalized software and R&D, widening this 'intangible divide' despite falling intangible prices. Using comprehensive US Census microdata, we document these patterns and explore factors associated with intangible investment. We find that firms invest significantly less in innovation-related intangibles when their rivals invest more. One firm's investment can obsolesce rivals' investments, reducing returns. This negative pecuniary externality worsens the intangible divide, potentially leading to significant misallocation.
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What Drives Stagnation: Monopsony or Monopoly?
October 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-45
Wages for the vast majority of workers have stagnated since the 1980s while productivity
has grown. We investigate two coexisting explanations based on rising market power: 1. Monopsony, where dominant firms exploit the limited mobility of their own workers to pay lower wages; and 2. Monopoly, where dominant firms charge too high prices for what they sell, which lowers production and the demand for labor, and hence equilibrium wages economy-wide. Using establishment data from the US Census Bureau between 1997 and 2016, we find evidence of both monopoly and monopsony, where the former is rising over this period and the latter is stable. Both contribute to the decoupling of productivity and wage growth, with monopoly being the primary determinant: in 2016 monopoly accounts for 75% of wage stagnation, monopsony for 25%.
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Market Power And Wage Inequality
September 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-37
We propose a theory of how market power affects wage inequality. We ask how goods and labor market power jointly affect the level of wages, the Skill Premium, and wage inequality. We then use detailed microdata from the US Census between 1997 and 2016 to estimate the parameters of labor supply, technology and the market structure. We find that a less competitive market structure lowers the wage level, contributes 7% to the rise in the Skill Premium and accounts for half of the increase in between-establishment wage variance.
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Urban-Biased Growth: A Macroeconomic Analysis
June 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-33
After 1980, larger US cities experienced substantially faster wage growth than smaller ones. We show that this urban bias mainly reflected wage growth at large Business Services firms. These firms stand out through their high per-worker expenditure on information technology and disproportionate presence in big cities. We introduce a spatial model of investment-specific technical change that can rationalize these patterns. Using the model as an accounting framework, we find that the observed decline in the investment price of information technology capital explains most urban-biased growth by raising the profits of large Business Services firms in big cities.
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Technology-Driven Market Concentration through Idea Allocation
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-78
Using a newly-created measure of technology novelty, this paper identifies periods with and without technology breakthroughs from the 1980s to the 2020s in the US. It is found that market concentration decreases at the advent of revolutionary technologies. We establish a theory addressing inventors' decisions to establish new firms or join incumbents of selected sizes, yielding two key predictions: (1) A higher share of inventors opt for new firms during periods of heightened technology novelty. (2). There is positive assortative matching between idea quality and firm size if inventors join incumbents. Both predictions align with empirical findings and collectively contribute to a reduction in market concentration when groundbreaking technologies occur. Quantitative analysis shows the overall slowdown in technological breakthroughs can capture 95.9% of the rising trend in market concentration and the correlation between the model-generated and the actual detrended market concentration is 0.910.
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Borrowing Constraints, Markups, and Misallocation
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-75
We document new facts that link firms' markups to borrowing constraints: (1) less constrained firms within an industry have higher markups, especially in industries where assets are difficult to borrow against and firms rely more on earnings to borrow; (2) markup dispersion is also higher in industries where firms rely more on earnings to borrow. We explain these relationships using a standard Kimball demand model augmented with borrowing against assets and earnings. The key mechanism is a two-way feedback between markups and borrowing constraints. First, less constrained firms charge higher markups, as looser constraints allow them to attain larger market shares. Second, higher markups relax borrowing constraints when firms rely on earnings to borrow, as those with higher markups have higher earnings. This two-way feedback lowers TFP losses from markup dispersion, particularly when firms rely on earnings to borrow.
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How Destructive is Innovation?
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-04
Entrants and incumbents can create new products and displace the products of competitors. Incumbents can also improve their existing products. How much of aggregate productivity growth occurs through each of these channels? Using data from the U.S. Longitudinal Business Database on all non-farm private businesses from 1976'1986 and 2003'2013, we arrive at three main conclusions: First, most growth appears to come from incumbents. We infer this from the modest employment share of entering firms (defined as those less than 5 years old). Second, most growth seems to occur through improvements of existing varieties rather than creation of brand new varieties. Third, own-product improvements by incumbents appear to be more important than creative destruction. We infer this because the distribution of job creation and destruction has thinner tails than implied by a model with a dominant role for creative destruction.
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Same Shock, Separate Channels: House Prices and Firm Performance in the Great Recession
January 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-03
Combining confidential business-level microdata with housing and banking data, I document large and persistent effects of local house prices on employment at small businesses, and particularly young businesses, during the Great Recession. I show that the effect on entry is important for explaining the disproportionate effect on young businesses, while young firm exit is also disproportionately affected. I then explore the channels through which house prices affect business outcomes. I use survey data to show that reliance on either personal assets or home equity is associated with increased sensitivity to house prices. I then use local bank balance sheet information to show both young and old firms are sensitive to local credit shocks, with some evidence of a larger effect on young businesses. I develop a macroeconomic model that is consistent with these findings where house prices work through two channels: a bank credit supply channel and a housing collateral channel.
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Foreign Direct Investment, Geography, and Welfare
September 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-45
We study the impact of FDI on domestic welfare using a model of internal trade with variable markups that incorporates intranational transport costs. The model allows us to disentangle the various channels through which FDI affects welfare. We apply the model to the case of Ethiopian manufacturing, which received considerable amounts of FDI during our study period. We find substantial gains from the presence of foreign firms, both in the local market and in other connected markets in the country. FDI, however, resulted in a modest worsening of allocative efficiency because foreign firms tend to have significantly higher markups than domestic firms. We report consistent findings from our empirical analysis, which utilises microdata on manufacturing firms, information on FDI projects, and geospatial data on improvements in the road network.
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