A reduction in travel time between headquarters and plants makes it easier for headquarters to monitor plants and gather 'soft' information--i.e., information that cannot be transmitted through non-personal means. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that the introduction of new airline routes that reduce the travel time between headquarters and plants leads to an increase in plant-level investment of 8% to 9% and an increase in plants' total factor productivity of 1.3% to 1.4%. Consistent with the notion that a reduction in travel time makes it easier for headquarters to monitor plants and gather soft information, I find that my results are stronger: i) for plants whose headquarters are more time constrained; ii) for plants operating in soft-information industries; iii) during the earlier years of my sample period, when alternative, non-personal, means of monitoring and transmitting information were less developed; iv) for plants where information uncertainty is likely to be greater and soft information is likely to be more valuable, such as smaller plants and peripheral plants operating in industries that are not the firm's main industry.
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CAPITAL AND LABOR REALLOCATION INSIDE FIRMS
April 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-22
We document how a plant-specific shock to investment opportunities at one plant of a firm ("treated plant") spills over to other plants of the same firm-but only if the firm is financially constrained. While the shock triggers an increase in investment and employment at the treated plant, this increase is offset by a decrease at other plants of the same magnitude, consistent with headquarters channeling scarce resources away from other plants and toward the treated plant. As a result of the resource reallocation, aggregate firm-wide productivity increases, suggesting that the reallocation is beneficial for the firm as a whole. We also show that-in order to provide the treated plant with scarce resources-headquarters does not uniformly "tax" all of the firm's other plants in the same way: It is more likely to take away resources from plants that are less productive, are not part of the firm's core industries, and are located far away from headquarters. We do not find any evidence of investment or employment spillovers at financially unconstrained firms.
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Creditor Rights, Technology Adoption, and
Productivity: Plant-Level Evidence
April 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-20
I analyze the impact of stronger creditor rights on productivity using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws that give lenders greater access to the collateral of firms in financial distress, total factor productivity of treated plants increases by 2.6 percent. This effect is mainly observed among plants belonging to financially constrained firms. Furthermore, treated plants invest in capital of younger vintage and newer technology, and become more capital-intensive. My results suggest that stronger creditor rights relax borrowing constraints and help firms adopt more efficient production technologies.
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Creditor Rights, Technology Adoption, and Productivity: Plant-Level Evidence
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-36
I analyze the impact of strengthening of creditor rights on productivity using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Following the adoption of anti-recharacterization laws that improve the ability of lenders to access the collateral of the firm, total factor productivity of treated plants increases by 2.6 percent. This effect is mainly observed among plants belonging to financially constrained firms. Furthermore, treated plants invest in capital of younger vintage and newer technology, and become more capital-intensive. My results suggest that strengthening of creditor rights leads to a relaxation in borrowing constraints, and helps firms adopt a more efficient production technology.
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Collateral Values and Corporate Employment
September 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-30R
We examine the impact of real estate collateral values on corporate employment. Our empirical strategy exploits regional variation in local real estate price growth, firm-level data on real estate holdings, as well as establishment-level data on employment and the location of firms' operations from the U.S. Census Bureau. Over the period from 1993 until 2006, we show that a typical U.S. publicly-traded firm increases employment expenditures by $0.10 per $1 increase in collateral. We show this additional hiring is funded through debt issues and the effects are stronger for firms likely to be financially constrained. These firms increase employment at establishments outside of their core industry focus and away from the location of real estate holdings, leading to regional spillover effects. We document how shocks to collateral values influence labor allocation within firms and how these effects show up in the aggregate.
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Creditor Control Rights and Resource Allocation within Firms
November 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-39
We examine the within-firm resource allocation effects of creditor interventions and their relationship to performance gains at firms violating financial covenants. By linking firm-level data to establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we show that covenant violations are followed by large reductions in employment and more frequent establishment sales and closures. These operational cuts are concentrated in violating firms' noncore business lines and unproductive establishments. We conclude that refocusing activities and improving productive efficiency are important mechanisms through which creditors enhance violating firms' performance.
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PRODUCTIVITY, RESTRUCTURING, AND THE GAINS FROM TAKEOVERS
April 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-18
This paper investigates how takeovers create value. Using plant-level data, I show that acquirers increase targets' productivity through more efficient use of capital and labor. Acquirers significantly reduce capital expenditures, wages, and employment in target plants, though output is unchanged. Acquirers improve targets'investment efficiency through better capital reallocation. Moreover, changes in productivity help explain the merging firms' announcement returns. The combined announcement returns are driven by improvements in target's productivity. Targets with greater productivity improvements receive higher premiums. These results provide some first empirical evidence on the relation between productivity and stock returns in the context of takeovers.
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DO LOCAL MANAGERS GIVE LABOR AN EDGE?
April 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-16
Based on the psychological theory of place attachments, native local managers should be more rooted in their communities than non-locals and should act accordingly. Consistent with this, local managers are 33% less likely to lay of employees than their non-local industry peers following industry distress. Additionally, when managers are forced to lay off employees, establishments near managers' homes are less likely to experience layoffs than those located elsewhere. Locals pay for these higher employment levels by spending cash, cutting investment, and selling assets. While there is no direct evidence that labor-friendly policies of locals have a differential impact on firm performance or value, only locals with weaker incentives implement these policies, suggesting that favoritism by locals may be suboptimal. Taken together these results suggest that managerial preferences impact corporate employment decisions.
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INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND INVESTMENT IN CONGLOMERATES
May 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-26
The literature on conglomerates has focused on the misallocation of investments as the cause of the conglomerate discount. I study frictions in the internal labor market as a possible cause of misallocation of investments. Using detailed plant-level data, I document wage convergence in conglomerates: workersin low-wage industries collect higher-than-industry wages when the diversified rm is also present in high-wage industries (by 5.2%). I con rm this effect by exploiting a quasi-experiment involving the implementation of the NAFTA agreement that exogenously increases worker wages of exporting plants. I track the evolution of wages in non-exporting plants in diversi ed rms that also own exporting plants and nd a signi cant increase in wages of these plants relative to una liated non-exporting plants after the event. This pattern of wage convergence affects investments. Plants where workers collect higher-than-industry wages increase the capital-labor ratio in response to their higher labor cost -- and this response to higher wages is associated with higher investment in some divisions.
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How Does Venture Capital Financing Improve Efficiency in Private Firms? A Look Beneath the Surface
June 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-16
Using a unique sample from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, we study several related questions regarding the efficiency gains generated by venture capital (VC) investment in private firms. First, does VC backing improve the efficiency (total factor productivity, TFP) of private firms, and are certain kinds of VCs (higher reputation versus lower reputation) better at generating such efficiency gains than others? Second, how are such efficiency gains generated: Do venture capitalists invest in more efficient firms to begin with (screening) or do they improve efficiency after investment (monitoring)? Third, how are these efficiency gains spread out over rounds subsequent to VC investment? Fourth, what are the channels through which such efficiency gains are generated: increases in product market performance (sales) or reductions in various costs (labor, materials, total production costs)? Finally, how do such efficiency gains affect the probability of a successful exit (IPO or acquisition)? Our main findings are as follows. First, the overall efficiency of VC backed firms is higher than that of non-VC backed firms. Second, this efficiency advantage of VC backed firms arises from both screening and monitoring: the efficiency of VC backed firms prior to receiving financing is higher than that of non-VC backed firms and further, the growth in efficiency subsequent to receiving VC financing is greater for such firms relative to non-VC backed firms. Third, the above increase in efficiency of VC backed firms relative to non-VC backed firms increases over the first two rounds of VC financing, and remains at the higher level till exit. Fourth, while the TFP of firms prior to VC financing is lower for higher reputation VC backed firms, the increase in TFP subsequent to financing is significantly higher for the former firms, consistent with higher reputation VCs having greater monitoring ability. Fifth, the efficiency gains generated by VC backing arise primarily from improvement in product market performance (sales); however for higher reputation VCs, the additional efficiency gains arise from both an additional improvement in product market performance as well as from reductions in various input costs. Finally, both the level of TFP of VC backed firms prior to receiving financing and the growth in TFP subsequent to VC financing positively affect the probability of a successful exit (IPO or acquisition).
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Do Short-Term Incentives Affect Long-Term Productivity?
March 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-10
Previous research shows that stock repurchases that are caused by earnings management lead to reductions in firm-level investment and employment. It is natural to expect firms to cut less productive investment and employment first, which could lead to a positive effect on firm-level productivity. However, using Census data, we find that firms make cuts across the board irrespective of plant productivity. This pattern seems to be associated with frictions in the labor market. Specifically, we find evidence that unionization of the labor force may prevent firms from doing efficient downsizing, forcing them to engage in easy or expedient downsizing instead. As a result of this inefficient downsizing, EPS-driven repurchases lead to a reduction in long-term productivity.
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