Conventional wisdom suggests that after a technological breakthrough, the number of active firms first surges, and then sharply declines, in what is known as a 'shakeout'. This paper challenges that notion with new empirical evidence from across the U.S. economy, revealing that shakeouts are the exception, not the rule. I develop a statistical strategy to detect breakthroughs by isolating sustained anomalies in net firm entry rates, offering a robust alternative to narrative-driven approaches that can be applied to all industries. The results of this strategy, which reliably align with well-documented breakthroughs and remain consistent across various validation tests, uncover a novel trend: the number of entry-driven breakthroughs has been declining over time. The variability and frequent absence of shakeouts across breakthrough industries are consistent with breakthroughs primarily occurring in industries with low returns to scale and with modest learning curves, shifting the narrative on the nature of innovation over the past forty years in the U.S.
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High-Growth Firms in the United States: Key Trends and New Data Opportunities
March 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-11
Using administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we introduce a new public-use database that tracks activities across firm growth distributions over time and by firm and establishment characteristics. With these new data, we uncover several key trends on high-growth firms'critical engines of innovation and economic growth. First, the share of firms that are high-growth has steadily decreased over the past four decades, driven not only by falling firm entry rates but also languishing growth among existing firms. Second, this decline is particularly pronounced among young and small firms, while the share of high-growth firms has been relatively stable among large and old firms. Third, the decline in high-growth firms is found in all sectors, but the information sector has shown a modest rebound beginning in 2010. Fourth, there is significant variation in high-growth firm activity across states, with California, Texas, and Florida having high shares of high-growth firms. We highlight several areas for future research enabled by these new data.
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Technology-Driven Market Concentration through Idea Allocation
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-78
Using a newly-created measure of technology novelty, this paper identifies periods with and without technology breakthroughs from the 1980s to the 2020s in the US. It is found that market concentration decreases at the advent of revolutionary technologies. We establish a theory addressing inventors' decisions to establish new firms or join incumbents of selected sizes, yielding two key predictions: (1) A higher share of inventors opt for new firms during periods of heightened technology novelty. (2). There is positive assortative matching between idea quality and firm size if inventors join incumbents. Both predictions align with empirical findings and collectively contribute to a reduction in market concentration when groundbreaking technologies occur. Quantitative analysis shows the overall slowdown in technological breakthroughs can capture 95.9% of the rising trend in market concentration and the correlation between the model-generated and the actual detrended market concentration is 0.910.
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Growth is Getting Harder to Find, Not Ideas
April 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-21
Relatively flat US output growth versus rising numbers of US researchers is often interpreted as evidence that "ideas are getting harder to find." We build a new 46-year panel tracking the universe of U.S. firms' patenting to investigate the micro underpinnings of this claim, separately examining the relationships between research inputs and ideas (patents) versus ideas and growth. Over our sample period, we find that researchers' patenting productivity is increasing, there is little evidence of any secular decline in high-quality patenting common to all firms, and the link between patents and growth is present, differs by type of idea, and is fairly stable. On the other hand, we find strong evidence of secular decreases in output unrelated to patenting, suggesting an important role for other factors. Together, these results invite renewed empirical and theoretical attention to the impact of ideas on growth. To that end, our patent-firm bridge, which will be available to researchers with approved access, is used to produce new, public-use statistics on the Business Dynamics of Patenting Firms (BDS-PF).
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Patents, Innovation, and Market Entry
September 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-45
Do patents facilitate market entry and job creation? Using a 2014 Supreme Court decision that limited patent eligibility and natural language processing methods to identify invalid patents, I find that large treated firms reduce job creation and create fewer new establishments in response, with no effect on new firm entry. Moreover, companies shift toward innovation aimed at improving existing products consistent with the view that patents incentivize creative destruction.
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Entry, Growth, and the Business Environment: A Comparative Analysis of Enterprise Data from the U.S. and Transition Economies
September 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-20
What role does new firm entry play in economic growth? Are entrants and young firms more or less productive than incumbents, and how are their relative productivity dynamics affected by financial constraints and the business environment? This paper uses comprehensive manufacturing firm data from seven economies (United States, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine) to measure new firm entry and the productivity dynamics of entrants relative to incumbents in the same industries. We contrast hypotheses based on 'leapfrogging,' in which entrants embody superior productivity, with an 'experimentation' approach, in which entrants face uncertainty and incumbents can innovate. The results imply that leapfrogging is typical of early and incomplete transition, but experimentation better characterizes both the US and mature transition economies. Improvements in financial markets and the business environment tend to raise both the entry rate and productivity growth, but they are associated with negative relative productivity of entrants and smaller contributions of reallocation to growth among both entrants and incumbents.
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Same Shock, Separate Channels: House Prices and Firm Performance in the Great Recession
January 2026
Working Paper Number:
CES-26-03
Combining confidential business-level microdata with housing and banking data, I document large and persistent effects of local house prices on employment at small businesses, and particularly young businesses, during the Great Recession. I show that the effect on entry is important for explaining the disproportionate effect on young businesses, while young firm exit is also disproportionately affected. I then explore the channels through which house prices affect business outcomes. I use survey data to show that reliance on either personal assets or home equity is associated with increased sensitivity to house prices. I then use local bank balance sheet information to show both young and old firms are sensitive to local credit shocks, with some evidence of a larger effect on young businesses. I develop a macroeconomic model that is consistent with these findings where house prices work through two channels: a bank credit supply channel and a housing collateral channel.
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Where Has All the Skewness Gone? The Decline in High-Growth (Young) Firms in the U.S.
November 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-43
The pace of business dynamism and entrepreneurship in the U.S. has declined over recent decades. We show that the character of that decline changed around 2000. Since 2000 the decline in dynamism and entrepreneurship has been accompanied by a decline in high-growth young firms. Prior research has shown that the sustained contribution of business startups to job creation stems from a relatively small fraction of high-growth young firms. The presence of these high-growth young firms contributes to a highly (positively) skewed firm growth rate distribution. In 1999, a firm at the 90th percentile of the employment growth rate distribution grew about 31 percent faster than the median firm. Moreover, the 90-50 differential was 16 percent larger than the 50-10 differential reflecting the positive skewness of the employment growth rate distribution. We show that the shape of the firm employment growth distribution changes substantially in the post-2000 period. By 2007, the 90-50 differential was only 4 percent larger than the 50-10, and it continued to exhibit a trend decline through 2011. The reflects a sharp drop in the 90th percentile of the growth rate distribution accounted for by the declining share of young firms and the declining propensity for young firms to be high-growth firms.
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Automation and the Workforce: A Firm-Level View from the 2019 Annual Business Survey
April 2022
Authors:
John Haltiwanger,
Lucia Foster,
Emin Dinlersoz,
Nikolas Zolas,
Daron Acemoglu,
Catherine Buffington,
Nathan Goldschlag,
Zachary Kroff,
David Beede,
Gary Anderson,
Eric Childress,
Pascual Restrepo
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-12R
This paper describes the adoption of automation technologies by US firms across all economic sectors by leveraging a new module introduced in the 2019 Annual Business Survey, conducted by the US Census Bureau in partnership with the National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES). The module collects data from over 300,000 firms on the use of five advanced technologies: AI, robotics, dedicated equipment, specialized software, and cloud computing. The adoption of these technologies remains low (especially for AI and robotics), varies substantially across industries, and concentrates on large and young firms. However, because larger firms are much more likely to adopt them, 12-64% of US workers and 22-72% of manufacturing workers are exposed to these technologies. Firms report a variety of motivations for adoption, including automating tasks previously performed by labor. Consistent with the use of these technologies for automation, adopters have higher labor productivity and lower labor shares. In particular, the use of these technologies is associated with a 11.4% higher labor productivity, which accounts for 20'30% of the difference in labor productivity between large firms and the median firm in an industry. Adopters report that these technologies raised skill requirements and led to greater demand for skilled labor, but brought limited or ambiguous effects to their employment levels.
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Trapped or Transferred: Worker Mobility and Labor Market Power in the Energy Transition
December 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-76
Using matched employer-employee data covering 1.35 million US workers separated from the fossil fuel extraction industry between 1999 and 2019, I estimate how local fossil fuel labor demand shocks affect employment and earnings. Employment probabilities fall markedly after exposure, and earnings decline gradually over the first seven years with only partial recovery by ten years since exposure to the shocks. Workers who remain in the fossil fuel sector, disproportionately men in sector-specific roles, experience nearly twice the earnings losses of those who switch sectors, possibly due to limited occupational mobility. Among non-switchers, losses are larger in labor markets with high employer concentration, indicating that scarce outside options translate into lower reemployment wages and weaker bargaining positions. Geographic movers fare worse than stayers, reflecting negative selection (younger, lower-earning) and relocation to metropolitan areas where fossil fuel or low-skilled service sectors remain highly concentrated, leaving monopsony power intact.
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Business Dynamics Statistics of High Tech Industries
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-55
Modern market economies are characterized by the reallocation of resources from less productive, less valuable activities to more productive, more valuable ones. Businesses in the High Technology sector play a particularly important role in this reallocation by introducing new products and services that impact the entire economy. Tracking the performance of this sector is therefore of primary importance, especially in light of recent evidence that suggests a slowdown in business dynamism in High Tech industries. The Census Bureau produces the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), a suite of data products that track job creation, job destruction, startups, and exits by firm and establishment characteristics including sector, firm age, and firm size. In this paper we describe the methodologies used to produce a new extension to the BDS focused on businesses in High Technology industries.
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