I outline the sociological theory that would predict that external labor markets ' those in which more positions are filled with new hires rather from firm-internal promotions ' heighten gender based discrimination and contribute to earnings inequality. I test this theory by treating industries as miniature labor markets within the US with varying levels of gender inequality and different hiring practices. Using high quality administrative data from 1985 to 2013, including detailed work histories from this period, I compare the earnings of alike men and women across industries with different levels of reliance on external markets at different times. I find that men experience greater unexplained earnings relative to women ' unexplained in that it is not accounted for by work history or observable demographic characteristics ' when a greater share of earnings increase events occur outside the firm.
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Access to Financing and Racial Pay Gap Inside Firms
July 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-36
How does access to financing influence racial pay inequality inside firms? We answer this question using the employer-employee matched data administered by the U.S. Census Bureau and detailed resume data recording workers' career trajectories. Exploiting exogenous shocks to firms' debt capacity, we find that better access to debt financing significantly narrows the earnings gap between minority and white workers. Minority workers experience a persistent increase in earnings and also a rise in the pay rank relative to white workers in the same firm. The effect is more pronounced among mid- and high-skill minority workers, in areas where white workers are in shorter supply, and for firms with ex-ante less diverse boards and greater pre-existing racial inequality. With better access to financing, minority workers are also more likely to be promoted or be reassigned to technology-oriented occupations compared to white workers. Our evidence is consistent with access to financing making firms better utilize minority workers' human capital.
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Entrepreneurial teams' acquisition of talent: a two-sided approach
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-45
While it is crucial for startups to hire high human capital employees, little is known about what drives the hiring decisions. Considering the stakes for both startups and their hires (i.e., joiners), we examine the phenomenon using a two-sided matching model that explicitly reveals the preferences of each side. We apply the model to a sample of startups from five technological manufacturing industries while examining a range of variables grounded in prior work on startup human capital. The analysis is based on the Longitudinal Employer Household dynamics from the U.S. Census Bureau. Our findings indicate that, in the context of entrepreneurship, both startups and joiners rely heavily on signals of quality. Further, quality considerations that are important for the match play a minimal role in determining earnings. Our approach refines our understanding of how entrepreneurial human capital evolves.
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Escaping poverty for low-wage workers The role of employer characteristics and changes
June 2001
Working Paper Number:
tp-2001-02
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The interactions of workers and firms in the low-wage labor market
August 2002
Working Paper Number:
tp-2002-12
This paper presents an analysis of workers who persistently have low earnings in
the labor market over a period of three or more years. Some of these workers manage to
escape from this low-earning status over subsequent years, while many do not. Using
data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) project at the U.S.
Census Bureau, we analyze the characteristics of persons and especially of their firms and
jobs that enable some to improve their earnings status over time.
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The Shifting Job Tenure Distribution
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-12R
There has been a shift in the U.S. job tenure distribution toward longer-duration jobs since 2000. This change is apparent both in the tenure supplements to the Current Population Survey and in matched employer-employee data. A substantial portion of this shift can be accounted for by the ageing of the workforce and the decline in the entry rate of new employer businesses. This shift is accounted for more by declines in the hiring rate, which are concentrated in the labor market downturns associated with the 2001 and 2007-2009 recessions, rather than declines in separation rates. The increase in average real earnings since 2007 is less than what would be predicted by the shift toward longer-tenure jobs because of declines in tenure-held-constant real earnings. Regression estimates of the returns to job tenure provide no evidence that the shift in the job tenure distribution is being driven by better matches between workers and employers.
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Employer Dominance and Worker Earnings in Finance
August 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-41
Large firms in the U.S. financial system achieve substantial economic gains. Their dominance sets them apart while also raising concerns about the suppression of worker earnings. Utilizing administrative data, this study reveals that the largest financial firms pay workers an average of 30.2% more than their smallest counterparts, significantly exceeding the 7.9% disparity in nonfinance sectors. This positive size-earnings relationship is consistently more pronounced in finance, even during the 2008 crisis or compared to the hightech sector. Evidence suggests that large financial firms' excessive gains, coupled with their workers' sought-after skills, explain this distinct relationship.
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Work Organization and Cumulative Advantage
March 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-18
Over decades of wage stagnation, researchers have argued that reorganizing work can boost pay for disadvantaged workers. But upgrading jobs could inadvertently shift hiring away from those workers, exacerbating their disadvantage. We theorize how work organization affects cumulative advantage in the labor market, or the extent to which high-paying positions are increasingly allocated to already-advantaged workers. Specifically, raising technical skill demands exacerbates cumulative advantage by shifting hiring towards higher-skilled applicants. In contrast, when employers increase autonomy or skills learned on-the-job, they raise wages to buy worker consent or commitment, rather than pre-existing skill. To test this idea, we match administrative earnings to task descriptions from job posts. We compare earnings for workers hired into the same occupation and firm, but under different task allocations. When employers raise complexity and autonomy, new hires' starting earnings increase and grow faster. However, while the earnings boost from complex, technical tasks shifts employment toward workers with higher prior earnings, worker selection changes less for tasks learned on-the-job and very little for high autonomy tasks. These results demonstrate how reorganizing work can interrupt cumulative advantage.
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The Effect of Firm Compensation Structures on Employee Mobility and Employee Entrepreneurship of Extreme Performers
March 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-06
Previous studies of employee entrepreneurship have not considered the rewards available to potential entrepreneurs inside of their current organizations. This study hopes to fill this gap by investigating how the firm's compensation structure, an important strategic decision closely scrutinized by human resource management, affects the mobility and entrepreneurship decisions of its employees, particularly those employees at the extreme ends of the performance distribution. Using a comprehensive U.S. Census data set covering all employees in the legal services industry across ten states for fifteen years, we find that high performing employees are less likely to leave firms with highly dispersed compensation structures. However, if high performers do leave employers that offer highly disperse compensation structures, they are more likely to join new firms. Less talented employees, on the other hand, are more likely to leave firms with greater pay dispersion. Unlike high performers, we find that low performers are less likely to move to new ventures when departing firms with highly disperse compensation structures.
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How Does Geography Matter in Ethnic Labor Market Segmentation Process? A Case Study of Chinese Immigrants in the San Francisco CMSA
March 2007
Working Paper Number:
CES-07-09
In the context of continuing influxes of large numbers of immigrants to the United States, urban labor market segmentation along the lines of race/ethnicity, gender, and class has drawn considerable growing attention. Using a confidential dataset extracted from the United States Decennial Long Form Data 2000 and a multilevel regression modeling strategy, this paper presents a case study of Chinese immigrants in the San Francisco metropolitan area. Correspondent with the highly segregated nature of the labor market as between Chinese immigrant men and women, different socioeconomic characteristics at the census tract level are significantly related to their occupational segregation. This suggests the social process of labor market segmentation is contingent on the immigrant geography of residence and workplace. With different direction and magnitude of the spatial contingency between men and women in the labor market, residency in Chinese immigrant concentrated areas is perpetuating the gender occupational segregation by skill level. Whereas abundant ethnic resources may exist in ethnic neighborhoods and enclaves for certain types of employment opportunities, these resources do not necessarily help Chinese immigrant workers, especially women, to move upward along the labor market hierarchy.
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Is it Who You Are, Where You Work, or With Whom You Work? Reassessing the Relationship Between Skill Segregation and Wage Inequality
June 2002
Working Paper Number:
tp-2002-10
In a recent paper, Kremer & Maskin (QJE, forthcoming) develop an assignment model in
which increases in the dispersion and mean of the skill distribution can lead simultaneously
to increases in wage inequality and skill segregation. They then present evidence that,
concurrent with rising wage inequality, wage segregation increased for production workers in
the United States between 1975 and 1986. My paper argues that relying on wages as a proxy
for skill may be problematic. Using a newly developed longitudinal dataset linking virtually
the entire universe of workers in the state of Illinois to their employers, I decompose wages
into components due, not only to person and firm heterogeneity, but also to the characteristics
of their co-workers. Such "co-worker effects" capture the impact of a weighted sum of the
characteristics of all workers in a firm on each individual employee's wage. While rising wage
segregation can result from greater skill segregation, it may also be due to changes in the
variance of co-worker effects in the economy, or to changes in the covariance between the
person, firm, and co-worker components of wages.
Due to the limited availability of demographic information on workers, I rely on the
person specific component of wages to proxy for co-worker "skills." Because these person
effects are unknown ex ante, I implement an iterative estimation approach where they are
first obtained from a preliminary regression that excludes any role for co-workers. Because
virtually all person and firm effects are identified, the approach yields consistent estimates
of the co-worker parameters. My estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase
in both a firm's average person effect and experience level is associated, on average, with
wage increases of 3% to 5%. Firms that increase the wage premia they pay workers appear
to do so in conjunction with upgrading worker quality. Interestingly, the average effect
masks considerable variation in the relative importance of co-workers across industries. After
allowing the co-worker parameters to vary across 2 digit industries, I find that industry
average co-worker effects explain 26% of observed inter-industry wage differentials. Finally,
I decompose the overall distribution of wages into components due to persons, firms, and coworkers.
While co-worker effects do indeed serve to exacerbate wage inequality, the tendency
for high and low skilled workers to sort non-randomly into firms plays a considerably more
prominent role.
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