This paper examines the extent and consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR) using administrative worker-firm linked data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) program for a large representative U.S. state. Prior to the Great Recession, only 7-8% of job stayers are paid the same nominal hourly wage rate as one year earlier - substantially less than previously found in survey-based data - and about 20% of job stayers experience a wage cut. During the Great Recession, the incidence of wage cuts increases to 30%, followed by a large rise in the proportion of wage freezes to 16% as the economy recovers. Total earnings of job stayers exhibit even fewer zero changes and a larger incidence of reductions than hourly wage rates, due to systematic variations in hours worked. The results are consistent with concurrent findings in the literature that reductions in base pay are exceedingly rare but that firms use different forms of non-base pay and variations in hours worked to flexibilize labor cost. We then exploit the worker-firm link of the LEHD and find that during the Great Recession, firms with indicators of DNWR reduced employment by about 1.2% more per year. This negative effect is driven by significantly lower hiring rates and persists into the recovery. Our results suggest that despite the relatively large incidence of wage cuts in the aggregate, DNWR has sizable allocative consequences.
-
Hours Off the Clock
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-44
To what extent do workers work more hours than they are paid for? The relationship
between hours worked and hours paid, and the conditions under which employers can demand more hours 'off the clock,' is not well understood. The answer to this question impacts worker welfare, as well as wage and hour regulation. In addition, work off the clock has important implications for the measurement and cyclical movement of productivity and wages. In this paper, I construct a unique administrative dataset of hours paid by employers linked to a survey of workers on their reported hours worked to measure work off the clock. Using cross-sectional variation in local labor markets, I find only a small cyclical component to work off the clock. The results point to labor hoarding rather than efficiency wage theory, indicating work off the clock cannot explain the counter-cyclical movement of productivity. I find workers employed by small firms, and in industries with a high rate of wage and hour violations are associated with larger differences in hours worked than hours paid. These findings suggest the importance of tracking hours of work for enforcement of labor regulations.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Earnings Inequality and Mobility Trends in the United States: Nationally Representative Estimates from Longitudinally Linked Employer-Employee Data
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-24
Using earnings data from the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper analyzes the role of the employer in explaining the rise in earnings inequality in the United States. We first establish a consistent frame of analysis appropriate for administrative data used to study earnings inequality. We show that the trends in earnings inequality in the administrative data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program are inconsistent with other data sources when we do not correct for the presence of misused SSNs. After this correction to the worker frame, we analyze how the earnings distribution has changed in the last decade. We present a decomposition of the year-to-year changes in the earnings distribution from 2004-2013. Even when simplifying these flows to movements between the bottom 20%, the middle 60% and the top 20% of the earnings distribution, about 20.5 million workers undergo a transition each year. Another 19.9 million move between employment and nonemployment. To understand the role of the firm in these transitions, we estimate a model for log earnings with additive fixed worker and firm effects using all jobs held by eligible workers from 2004-2013. We construct a composite log earnings firm component across all jobs for a worker in a given year and a non-firm component. We also construct a skill-type index. We show that, while the difference between working at a low-or middle-paying firm are relatively small, the gains from working at a top-paying firm are large. Specifically, the benefits of working for a high-paying firm are not only realized today, through higher earnings paid to the worker, but also persist through an increase in the probability of upward mobility. High-paying firms facilitate moving workers to the top of the earnings distribution and keeping them there.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-15
Concave hiring rules imply that firms respond more to bad shocks than to good shocks. They provide a united explanation for several seemingly unrelated facts about employment growth in macro and micro data. In particular, they generate countercyclical movement in both aggregate conditional 'macro' volatility and cross-sectional 'micro' volatility as well as negative skewness in the cross section and in the time series at different level of aggregation. Concave establishment level responses of employment growth to TFP shocks estimated from Census data induce significant skewness, movements in volatility and amplification of bad aggregate shocks.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Payroll Tax Incidence: Evidence from Unemployment Insurance
June 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-35
Economic models assume that payroll tax burdens fall fully on workers, but where does tax incidence fall when taxes are firm-specific and time-varying? Unemployment insurance in the United States has the key feature of varying both across employers and over time, creating the potential for labor demand responses if tax costs cannot be fully passed through to worker wages. Using state policy changes and administrative data of matched employer-employee job spells, I study how employment and earnings respond to unexpected payroll tax increases for highly exposed employers. I find significant drops in employment growth driven by lower hiring, and minimal evidence of passthrough to earnings. The negative employment effects are strongest for young workers and single-establishment firms.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Wage Dispersion, Compensation Policy and the Role of Firms
November 2005
Working Paper Number:
tp-2005-04
Empirical work in economics stresses the importance of unobserved firm- and person-level characteristics
in the determination of wages, finding that these unobserved components account for the overwhelming
majority of variation in wages. However, little is known about the mechanisms sustaining these wage di'er-
entials. This paper attempts to demystify the firm-side of the puzzle by developing a statistical model that
enriches the role that firms play in wage determination, allowing firms to influence both average wages as
well as the returns to observable worker characteristics.
I exploit the hierarchical nature of a unique employer-employee linked dataset for the United States,
estimating a multilevel statistical model of earnings that accounts for firm-specific deviations in average
wages as well as the returns to components of human capital - race, gender, education, and experience -
while also controlling for person-level heterogeneity in earnings. These idiosyncratic prices reflect one aspect
of firm compensation policy; another, and more novel aspect, is the unstructured characterization of the
covariance of these prices across firms.
I estimate the model's variance parameters using Restricted (or Residual) Maximum Likelihood tech-
niques. Results suggest that there is significant variation in the returns to worker characteristics across
firms. First, estimates of the parameters of the covariance matrix of firm-specific returns are statistically
significant. Firms that tend to pay higher average wages also tend to pay higher than average returns to
worker characteristics; firms that tend to reward highly the human capital of men also highly reward the
human capital of women. For instance, the correlation between the firm-specific returns to education for
men and women is 0.57. Second, the firm-specific returns account for roughly 9% of the variation in wages
- approximately 50% of the variation in wages explained by firm-specific intercepts alone. The inclusion of
firm-specific returns ties variation in wages, otherwise attributable to firm-specific intercepts, to observable
components of human capital.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Capital Investment and Labor Demand
February 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-04
We study how bonus depreciation, a policy designed to lower the cost of capital, impacted investment and labor demand in the US manufacturing sector. Difference-in-differences estimates using restricted-use US Census Data on manufacturing establishments show that this policy increased both investment and employment, but did not lead to wage or productivity gains. Using a structural model, we show that the primary effect of the policy was to increase the use of all inputs by lowering overall costs of production. The policy further stimulated production employment due to the complementarity of production labor and capital. Supporting this conclusion, we nd that investment is greater in plants with lower labor costs. Our results show that recent policies that incentivize capital investment do not lead manufacturing plants to replace workers with machines.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Ranking Firms Using Revealed Preference
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-61
This paper estimates workers' preferences for firms by studying the structure of employer-toemployer transitions in U.S. administrative data. The paper uses a tool from numerical linear algebra to measure the central tendency of worker flows, which is closely related to the ranking of firms revealed by workers' choices. There is evidence for compensating differential when workers systematically move to lower-paying firms in a way that cannot be accounted for by layoffs or
differences in recruiting intensity. The estimates suggest that compensating differentials account
for over half of the firm component of the variance of earnings.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Eclipse of Rent-Sharing: The Effects of Managers' Business Education on Wages and the Labor Share in the US and Denmark
December 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-58
This paper provides evidence from the US and Denmark that managers with a business degree
('business managers") reduce their employees' wages. Within five years of the appointment of a business manager, wages decline by 6% and the labor share by 5 percentage points in the US, and by 3% and 3 percentage points in Denmark. Firms appointing business managers are not on differential trends and do not enjoy higher output, investment, or employment growth thereafter. Using manager retirements and deaths and an IV strategy based on the diffusion of the practice of appointing business managers within industry, region and size quartile cells, we provide additional evidence that these are causal effects. We establish that the proximate cause of these (relative) wage effects are changes in rent-sharing practices following the appointment of business managers. Exploiting exogenous export demand shocks, we show that non-business managers share profits with their workers, whereas business managers do not. But consistent with our first set of results, these business managers show no greater ability to increase sales or profits in response to exporting opportunities. Finally, we use the influence of role models on college major choice to instrument for the decision to enroll in a business degree in Denmark and show that our estimates correspond to causal effects of practices and values acquired in business education--rather than the differential selection into business education of individuals unlikely to share rents with workers.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Estimating Measurement Error in SIPP Annual Job Earnings: A Comparison of Census Bureau Survey and SSA Administrative Data
July 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-20
We quantify sources of variation in annual job earnings data collected by the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to determine how much of the variation is the result of measurement error. Jobs reported in the SIPP are linked to jobs reported in an administrative database, the Detailed Earnings Records (DER) drawn from the Social Security Administration's Master Earnings File, a universe file of all earnings reported on W-2 tax forms. As a result of the match, each job potentially has two earnings observations per year: survey and administrative. Unlike previous validation studies, both of these earnings measures are viewed as noisy measures of some underlying true amount of annual earnings. While the existence of survey error resulting from respondent mistakes or misinterpretation is widely accepted, the idea that administrative data are also error-prone is new. Possible sources of employer reporting error, employee under-reporting of compensation such as tips, and general differences between how earnings may be reported on tax forms and in surveys, necessitates the discarding of the assumption that administrative data are a true measure of the quantity that the survey was designed to collect. In addition, errors in matching SIPP and DER jobs, a necessary task in any use of administrative data, also contribute to measurement error in both earnings variables. We begin by comparing SIPP and DER earnings for different demographic and education groups of SIPP respondents. We also calculate different measures of changes in earnings for individuals switching jobs. We estimate a standard earnings equation model using SIPP and DER earnings and compare the resulting coefficients. Finally exploiting the presence of individuals with multiple jobs and shared employers over time, we estimate an econometric model that includes random person and firm effects, a common error component shared by SIPP and DER earnings, and two independent error components that represent the variation unique to each earnings measure. We compare the variance components from this model and consider how the DER and SIPP differ across unobservable components.
View Full
Paper PDF
-
Slow to Hire, Quick to Fire: Employment Dynamics with Asymmetric Responses to News
January 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-02
We study the distribution of employment growth when hiring responds more to bad shocks than to good shocks. Such a concave hiring rule endogenously generates higher moments observed in establishment-level Census data for both the cross section and the time series. In particular, both aggregate conditional volatility ("macro-volatility") and the cross-sectional dispersion of employment growth ("micro-volatility") are countercyclical. Moreover, employment growth is negatively skewed in the cross section and time series, while TFP is not. The estimated response of employment growth to TFP innovations is su ciently concave to induce signi cant skewness as well as movements in volatility of employment growth.
View Full
Paper PDF