Empirical work in economics stresses the importance of unobserved firm- and person-level characteristics
in the determination of wages, finding that these unobserved components account for the overwhelming
majority of variation in wages. However, little is known about the mechanisms sustaining these wage di'er-
entials. This paper attempts to demystify the firm-side of the puzzle by developing a statistical model that
enriches the role that firms play in wage determination, allowing firms to influence both average wages as
well as the returns to observable worker characteristics.
I exploit the hierarchical nature of a unique employer-employee linked dataset for the United States,
estimating a multilevel statistical model of earnings that accounts for firm-specific deviations in average
wages as well as the returns to components of human capital - race, gender, education, and experience -
while also controlling for person-level heterogeneity in earnings. These idiosyncratic prices reflect one aspect
of firm compensation policy; another, and more novel aspect, is the unstructured characterization of the
covariance of these prices across firms.
I estimate the model's variance parameters using Restricted (or Residual) Maximum Likelihood tech-
niques. Results suggest that there is significant variation in the returns to worker characteristics across
firms. First, estimates of the parameters of the covariance matrix of firm-specific returns are statistically
significant. Firms that tend to pay higher average wages also tend to pay higher than average returns to
worker characteristics; firms that tend to reward highly the human capital of men also highly reward the
human capital of women. For instance, the correlation between the firm-specific returns to education for
men and women is 0.57. Second, the firm-specific returns account for roughly 9% of the variation in wages
- approximately 50% of the variation in wages explained by firm-specific intercepts alone. The inclusion of
firm-specific returns ties variation in wages, otherwise attributable to firm-specific intercepts, to observable
components of human capital.
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Agent Heterogeneity and Learning: An Application to Labor Markets
October 2002
Working Paper Number:
tp-2002-20
I develop a matching model with heterogeneous workers, rms, and worker-firm
matches, and apply it to longitudinal linked data on employers and employees. Workers
vary in their marginal product when employed and their value of leisure when unemployed.
Firms vary in their marginal product and cost of maintaining a vacancy. The
marginal product of a worker-firm match also depends on a match-specific interaction
between worker and rm that I call match quality. Agents have complete information
about worker and rm heterogeneity, and symmetric but incomplete information about
match quality. They learn its value slowly by observing production outcomes. There
are two key results. First, under a Nash bargain, the equilibrium wage is linear in a
person-specific component, a firm-specific component, and the posterior mean of beliefs
about match quality. Second, in each period the separation decision depends only on
the posterior mean of beliefs and person and rm characteristics. These results have
several implications for an empirical model of earnings with person and rm eects.
The rst implies that residuals within a worker-firm match are a martingale; the second
implies the distribution of earnings is truncated.
I test predictions from the matching model using data from the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program at the US Census Bureau. I present
both xed and mixed model specifications of the equilibrium wage function, taking
account of structural aspects implied by the learning process. In the most general
specification, earnings residuals have a completely unstructured covariance within a
worker-firm match. I estimate and test a variety of more parsimonious error structures,
including the martingale structure implied by the learning process. I nd considerable
support for the matching model in these data.
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Estimating Measurement Error in SIPP Annual Job Earnings: A Comparison of Census Bureau Survey and SSA Administrative Data
July 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-20
We quantify sources of variation in annual job earnings data collected by the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to determine how much of the variation is the result of measurement error. Jobs reported in the SIPP are linked to jobs reported in an administrative database, the Detailed Earnings Records (DER) drawn from the Social Security Administration's Master Earnings File, a universe file of all earnings reported on W-2 tax forms. As a result of the match, each job potentially has two earnings observations per year: survey and administrative. Unlike previous validation studies, both of these earnings measures are viewed as noisy measures of some underlying true amount of annual earnings. While the existence of survey error resulting from respondent mistakes or misinterpretation is widely accepted, the idea that administrative data are also error-prone is new. Possible sources of employer reporting error, employee under-reporting of compensation such as tips, and general differences between how earnings may be reported on tax forms and in surveys, necessitates the discarding of the assumption that administrative data are a true measure of the quantity that the survey was designed to collect. In addition, errors in matching SIPP and DER jobs, a necessary task in any use of administrative data, also contribute to measurement error in both earnings variables. We begin by comparing SIPP and DER earnings for different demographic and education groups of SIPP respondents. We also calculate different measures of changes in earnings for individuals switching jobs. We estimate a standard earnings equation model using SIPP and DER earnings and compare the resulting coefficients. Finally exploiting the presence of individuals with multiple jobs and shared employers over time, we estimate an econometric model that includes random person and firm effects, a common error component shared by SIPP and DER earnings, and two independent error components that represent the variation unique to each earnings measure. We compare the variance components from this model and consider how the DER and SIPP differ across unobservable components.
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Ranking Firms Using Revealed Preference
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-61
This paper estimates workers' preferences for firms by studying the structure of employer-toemployer transitions in U.S. administrative data. The paper uses a tool from numerical linear algebra to measure the central tendency of worker flows, which is closely related to the ranking of firms revealed by workers' choices. There is evidence for compensating differential when workers systematically move to lower-paying firms in a way that cannot be accounted for by layoffs or
differences in recruiting intensity. The estimates suggest that compensating differentials account
for over half of the firm component of the variance of earnings.
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Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in the United States:
New Evidence from Worker-Firm Linked Data
February 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-07
This paper examines the extent and consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity (DNWR) using administrative worker-firm linked data from the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) program for a large representative U.S. state. Prior to the Great Recession, only 7-8% of job stayers are paid the same nominal hourly wage rate as one year earlier - substantially less than previously found in survey-based data - and about 20% of job stayers experience a wage cut. During the Great Recession, the incidence of wage cuts increases to 30%, followed by a large rise in the proportion of wage freezes to 16% as the economy recovers. Total earnings of job stayers exhibit even fewer zero changes and a larger incidence of reductions than hourly wage rates, due to systematic variations in hours worked. The results are consistent with concurrent findings in the literature that reductions in base pay are exceedingly rare but that firms use different forms of non-base pay and variations in hours worked to flexibilize labor cost. We then exploit the worker-firm link of the LEHD and find that during the Great Recession, firms with indicators of DNWR reduced employment by about 1.2% more per year. This negative effect is driven by significantly lower hiring rates and persists into the recovery. Our results suggest that despite the relatively large incidence of wage cuts in the aggregate, DNWR has sizable allocative consequences.
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Hours Off the Clock
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-44
To what extent do workers work more hours than they are paid for? The relationship
between hours worked and hours paid, and the conditions under which employers can demand more hours 'off the clock,' is not well understood. The answer to this question impacts worker welfare, as well as wage and hour regulation. In addition, work off the clock has important implications for the measurement and cyclical movement of productivity and wages. In this paper, I construct a unique administrative dataset of hours paid by employers linked to a survey of workers on their reported hours worked to measure work off the clock. Using cross-sectional variation in local labor markets, I find only a small cyclical component to work off the clock. The results point to labor hoarding rather than efficiency wage theory, indicating work off the clock cannot explain the counter-cyclical movement of productivity. I find workers employed by small firms, and in industries with a high rate of wage and hour violations are associated with larger differences in hours worked than hours paid. These findings suggest the importance of tracking hours of work for enforcement of labor regulations.
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The Long-Term Effects of Job Mobility on the Adult Earnings of Young Men: Evidence from Integrated Employer-Employee Data
June 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-05
The paper follows a population of 18-year-old men to examine the impact that early job mobility has on their earnings prospects as young adults. Longitudinal employer-employee data from the state of Maryland allow me to take into consideration the endogenous determination of mobility in response to unobserved worker as well as firm characteristics, which may lead to spurious results. The descriptive portion of the paper shows that mobility patterns of young workers differ considerably with the characteristics of the firm; however, growth patterns are not significantly different on average. Workers employed in high-turnover firms (such as those in retail and services) experience more job turnover but similar rates of wage growth compared to workers employed in low turnover firms (such as those in manufacturing); however, their wage levels remain below and the wage gap actually increases over time. Regression results controlling for unobservable show that employers in the low-turnover sector discount earnings of workers who displayed early market mobility. By contrast, I find no evidence that mobility has negative effects for workers that remain employed in the high turnover sector.
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A Formal Test of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market
November 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-40
We estimate a structural model of job assignment in the presence of coordination frictions due to Shimer (2005). The coordination friction model places restrictions on the joint distribution of worker and firm effects from a linear decomposition of log labor earnings. These restrictions permit estimation of the unobservable ability and productivity differences between workers and their employers as well as the way workers sort into jobs on the basis of these unobservable factors. The estimation is performed on matched employer-employee data from the LEHD program of the U.S. Census Bureau. The estimated correlation between worker and firm effects from the earnings decomposition is close to zero, a finding that is often interpreted as evidence that there is no sorting by comparative advantage in the labor market. Our estimates suggest that his finding actually results from a lack of sufficient heterogeneity in the workforce and available jobs. Workers do sort into jobs on the basis of productive differences, but the effects of sorting are not visible because of the composition of workers and employers.
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Is it Who You Are, Where You Work, or With Whom You Work? Reassessing the Relationship Between Skill Segregation and Wage Inequality
June 2002
Working Paper Number:
tp-2002-10
In a recent paper, Kremer & Maskin (QJE, forthcoming) develop an assignment model in
which increases in the dispersion and mean of the skill distribution can lead simultaneously
to increases in wage inequality and skill segregation. They then present evidence that,
concurrent with rising wage inequality, wage segregation increased for production workers in
the United States between 1975 and 1986. My paper argues that relying on wages as a proxy
for skill may be problematic. Using a newly developed longitudinal dataset linking virtually
the entire universe of workers in the state of Illinois to their employers, I decompose wages
into components due, not only to person and firm heterogeneity, but also to the characteristics
of their co-workers. Such "co-worker effects" capture the impact of a weighted sum of the
characteristics of all workers in a firm on each individual employee's wage. While rising wage
segregation can result from greater skill segregation, it may also be due to changes in the
variance of co-worker effects in the economy, or to changes in the covariance between the
person, firm, and co-worker components of wages.
Due to the limited availability of demographic information on workers, I rely on the
person specific component of wages to proxy for co-worker "skills." Because these person
effects are unknown ex ante, I implement an iterative estimation approach where they are
first obtained from a preliminary regression that excludes any role for co-workers. Because
virtually all person and firm effects are identified, the approach yields consistent estimates
of the co-worker parameters. My estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase
in both a firm's average person effect and experience level is associated, on average, with
wage increases of 3% to 5%. Firms that increase the wage premia they pay workers appear
to do so in conjunction with upgrading worker quality. Interestingly, the average effect
masks considerable variation in the relative importance of co-workers across industries. After
allowing the co-worker parameters to vary across 2 digit industries, I find that industry
average co-worker effects explain 26% of observed inter-industry wage differentials. Finally,
I decompose the overall distribution of wages into components due to persons, firms, and coworkers.
While co-worker effects do indeed serve to exacerbate wage inequality, the tendency
for high and low skilled workers to sort non-randomly into firms plays a considerably more
prominent role.
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Earnings Inequality and Mobility Trends in the United States: Nationally Representative Estimates from Longitudinally Linked Employer-Employee Data
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-24
Using earnings data from the U.S. Census Bureau, this paper analyzes the role of the employer in explaining the rise in earnings inequality in the United States. We first establish a consistent frame of analysis appropriate for administrative data used to study earnings inequality. We show that the trends in earnings inequality in the administrative data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Program are inconsistent with other data sources when we do not correct for the presence of misused SSNs. After this correction to the worker frame, we analyze how the earnings distribution has changed in the last decade. We present a decomposition of the year-to-year changes in the earnings distribution from 2004-2013. Even when simplifying these flows to movements between the bottom 20%, the middle 60% and the top 20% of the earnings distribution, about 20.5 million workers undergo a transition each year. Another 19.9 million move between employment and nonemployment. To understand the role of the firm in these transitions, we estimate a model for log earnings with additive fixed worker and firm effects using all jobs held by eligible workers from 2004-2013. We construct a composite log earnings firm component across all jobs for a worker in a given year and a non-firm component. We also construct a skill-type index. We show that, while the difference between working at a low-or middle-paying firm are relatively small, the gains from working at a top-paying firm are large. Specifically, the benefits of working for a high-paying firm are not only realized today, through higher earnings paid to the worker, but also persist through an increase in the probability of upward mobility. High-paying firms facilitate moving workers to the top of the earnings distribution and keeping them there.
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Sorting Between and Within Industries: A Testable Model of Assortative Matching
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-43
We test Shimer's (2005) theory of the sorting of workers between and within industrial sectors based on directed search with coordination frictions, deliberately maintaining its static general equilibrium framework. We fit the model to sector-specific wage, vacancy and output data, including publicly-available statistics that characterize the distribution of worker and employer wage heterogeneity across sectors. Our empirical method is general and can be applied to a broad class of assignment models. The results indicate that industries are the loci of sorting-more productive workers are employed in more productive industries. The evidence confirm that strong assortative matching can be present even when worker and employer components of wage heterogeneity are weakly correlated.
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