Papers written by Author(s): 'Michael B. Hawes'
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Working PaperA Simulated Reconstruction and Reidentification Attack on the 2010 U.S. Census
August 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-57
For the last half-century, it has been a common and accepted practice for statistical agencies, including the United States Census Bureau, to adopt different strategies to protect the confidentiality of aggregate tabular data products from those used to protect the individual records contained in publicly released microdata products. This strategy was premised on the assumption that the aggregation used to generate tabular data products made the resulting statistics inherently less disclosive than the microdata from which they were tabulated. Consistent with this common assumption, the 2010 Census of Population and Housing in the U.S. used different disclosure limitation rules for its tabular and microdata publications. This paper demonstrates that, in the context of disclosure limitation for the 2010 Census, the assumption that tabular data are inherently less disclosive than their underlying microdata is fundamentally flawed. The 2010 Census published more than 150 billion aggregate statistics in 180 table sets. Most of these tables were published at the most detailed geographic level'individual census blocks, which can have populations as small as one person. Using only 34 of the published table sets, we reconstructed microdata records including five variables (census block, sex, age, race, and ethnicity) from the confidential 2010 Census person records. Using only published data, an attacker using our methods can verify that all records in 70% of all census blocks (97 million people) are perfectly reconstructed. We further confirm, through reidentification studies, that an attacker can, within census blocks with perfect reconstruction accuracy, correctly infer the actual census response on race and ethnicity for 3.4 million vulnerable population uniques (persons with race and ethnicity different from the modal person on the census block) with 95% accuracy. Having shown the vulnerabilities inherent to the disclosure limitation methods used for the 2010 Census, we proceed to demonstrate that the more robust disclosure limitation framework used for the 2020 Census publications defends against attacks that are based on reconstruction. Finally, we show that available alternatives to the 2020 Census Disclosure Avoidance System would either fail to protect confidentiality, or would overly degrade the statistics' utility for the primary statutory use case: redrawing the boundaries of all of the nation's legislative and voting districts in compliance with the 1965 Voting Rights Act.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperAn In-Depth Examination of Requirements for Disclosure Risk Assessment
October 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-49
The use of formal privacy to protect the confidentiality of responses in the 2020 Decennial Census of Population and Housing has triggered renewed interest and debate over how to measure the disclosure risks and societal benefits of the published data products. Following long-established precedent in economics and statistics, we argue that any proposal for quantifying disclosure risk should be based on pre-specified, objective criteria. Such criteria should be used to compare methodologies to identify those with the most desirable properties. We illustrate this approach, using simple desiderata, to evaluate the absolute disclosure risk framework, the counterfactual framework underlying differential privacy, and prior-to-posterior comparisons. We conclude that satisfying all the desiderata is impossible, but counterfactual comparisons satisfy the most while absolute disclosure risk satisfies the fewest. Furthermore, we explain that many of the criticisms levied against differential privacy would be levied against any technology that is not equivalent to direct, unrestricted access to confidential data. Thus, more research is needed, but in the near-term, the counterfactual approach appears best-suited for privacy-utility analysis.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperDetermination of the 2020 U.S. Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) Using Administrative Records and Statistical Methodology Technical Report
October 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-33
This report documents the efforts of the Census Bureau's Citizen Voting-Age Population (CVAP) Internal Expert Panel (IEP) and Technical Working Group (TWG) toward the use of multiple data sources to produce block-level statistics on the citizen voting-age population for use in enforcing the Voting Rights Act. It describes the administrative, survey, and census data sources used, and the four approaches developed for combining these data to produce CVAP estimates. It also discusses other aspects of the estimation process, including how records were linked across the multiple data sources, and the measures taken to protect the confidentiality of the data.View Full Paper PDF
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