This paper examines the hypothesis that regulation negatively affects pesticide innovation, causes pesticide companies to introduce more harmful pesticides, and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. The results confirm that pesticide regulation adversely affects innovation and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, regulation encourages firms to develop less toxic pesticides. Estimates suggest that it requires about $29 million in industry expenditures on health and environmental testing to affect the toxicity of one new pesticide.
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Regulation and Firm Size, Foreign-Based Company Market Presence, Merger Choice In The U.S. Pesticide Industry
June 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-06
This paper uses Two-Stage Least Squares to examine the impact of pesticide product regulation on the number of firms and the foreign-based company market share of U.S. Pesticide Companies. It also investigates merger choice with a multinomial logit model. The principal finding is that greater research and regulatory costs affected small innovative pesticide companies more than large ones and encouraged foreign company expansion in the U.S. pesticide market. It was also found that the stage of the industry growth cycle and farm sector demand influenced the number of innovative companies and foreign-based company market share. Finally, firms that remain in the industry were found to have greater price cost margins, lower regulatory penalties costs, and a much greater multinational business presence than those that departed.
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Learning By Doing And Competition In The Early Rayon Industry
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-04
In this paper, I derive a structural econometric model of learning by doing from a dynamic oligopoly game. Unlike previous empirical models, this model is capable of testing hypotheses concerning both the technological nature and behavioral implications of learning. I estimate the model with firm level data from the early U.S. rayon industry. The empirical results show that there were considerable differences across firms in both proprietary and spillover learning. The results also indicate that two of the three firms took their rival's reactions into account when choosing their strategies.
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Technological Change and Economies of Scale in U.S. Poultry Slaughter
April 2000
Working Paper Number:
CES-00-05
This paper uses a unique data set provided by the Census Bureau to empirically examine technological change and economies of scale in the chicken and turkey slaughter industries. Results reveal substantial scale economies that show no evidence of diminishing with plant size and that are much greater than those realized in cattle and hog slaughter. Additionally, it is shown that controlling for plant product mix is critical to cost estimation and animal inputs are much more elastic to prices than in either cattle or hogs. Results suggest that consolidation is likely to continue, particularly if demand growth diminishes.
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Scale Economies and Consolidation in Hog Slaughter
March 2000
Working Paper Number:
CES-00-03
We use establishment based panel data to estimate a cost function which identifies the role of scale economies in hog slaughter consolidation. We find modest by extensive technological scale economies in the 1990s, and they became more important over time. But wages rose sharply with plant size through the 1970s and those wage premiums generated a pecuniary scale diseconomy that largely offset the effects of technological scale economies. The size-wage relation disappeared in the 1980; with growing technological scale economies and disappearing pecuniary diseconomies, large plants realized growing cost advantages over smaller plants, and production shifted to larger plants.
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Mergers and Acquisitions and Productivity in the U.S. Meat Products Industries: Evidence from the Micro Data
March 2002
Working Paper Number:
CES-02-07
This paper investigates the motives for mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. meat products industry from1977-92. Results show that acquired meat and poultry plants were highly productive before mergers, and that meat plants significantly improved productivity growth in the post-merger periods, but poultry plants did not.
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The Effects of Productvity and Demand-Specific Factors on Plant Survival and Ownership Change in the U.S. Poultry Industry
July 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-20
In this paper we study the productivity-survival link in the U.S. poultry processing industry using the longitudinal data constructed from five Censuses of Manufactures between 1987 and 2007. First, we study the effects of physical productivity and demand-specific factors on plant survival and ownership change. Second, we analyze the determinants of the firm-level expansion. The results show that higher demand-specific factors decrease the probability of exit and increase the probability of ownership change. The effect of physical productivity on the probability of exit or ownership change is generally insignificant. Also, firms with higher demand-specific factors have higher probability to expand whereas the average firm-level physical productivity turns out to be an insignificant determinant of firm expansion.
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Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation And Plant-Level Productivity
December 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-14
We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.
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Measuring Total Factor Productivity, Technical Change And The Rate Of Returns To Research And Development
May 1991
Working Paper Number:
CES-91-03
Recent research indicates that estimates of the effect of research and development (R&D) on total factor productivity growth are sensitive to different measures of total factor productivity. In this paper, we use establishment level data for the flat glass industry extracted from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) to construct three competing measures of total factor productivity. We then use these measures to estimate the conventional R&D intensity model. Our empirical results support previous finding that the estimated coefficients of the model are sensitive to the measurement of total factor productivity. Also, when using microdata and more detailed modeling, R&D is found to be a significant factor influencing productivity growth. Finally, for the flat glass industry, a specific technical change index capturing the learning-by-doing process appears to be superior to the conventional time trend index.
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Reconciling the Firm Size and Innovation Puzzle
March 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-20RR
There is a prevailing view in both the academic literature and the popular press that firms need to behave more entrepreneurially. This view is reinforced by a stylized fact in the innovation literature that R&D productivity decreases with size. However, there is a second stylized fact in the innovation literature that R&D investment increases with size. Taken together, these stylized facts create a puzzle of seemingly irrational behavior by large firms--they are increasing spending despite decreasing returns. This paper is an effort to resolve that puzzle. We propose and test two alternative resolutions: 1) that it arises from mismeasurement of R&D productivity, and 2) that firm size endogenously drives R&D strategy, and that the returns to R&D strategies depend on scale. We are able to resolve the puzzle under the first tack--using a recent measure of R&D productivity, RQ, we find that both R&D spending and R&D productivity increase with scale. We had less success with the second tack--while firm size affects R&D strategy in the manners expected by theory, there is no strategy whose returns decrease in scale. Taken together, our results are consistent with the Schumpeter view that large firms are the major engine of growth, they both spend more in aggregate than small firms, and are more productive with that spending. Moreover the prescription that firms should behave more entrepreneurially, should be treated with caution--one small firm strategy has lower returns to scale than its large firm counterpart.
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The Structure Of Technology, Substitution, And Productivity In The Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Industry Under The NGPA Of 1978
August 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-09
The structure of production in the natural gas transmission industry is estimated using the dual restricted cost function based on panel data for twenty four firms. A standard translog variable cost function with firm fixed effects is augmented with controls for capacity utilization, technical change, and shifting regulatory regimes. During the implementation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 1978-1985, the industry exhibited no significant increase in productivity, largely attributable to the decline in output for the industry. Regulatory efforts to promote voluntary non-contract transmission appear to have enabled some firms to mitigate the overall industry productivity stagnation. The NGPA instituted a complex schedule of partial and gradual decontrol of natural gas prices at the well head. This form of deregulation costs natural gas producers over $100 billion in lost revenues, relative to immediate and full price deregulation. However, the transmission firms benefited by paying $1.5 billion less for natural gas than they would have under total deregulation. The benefits to consumers, totaling $98.7 billion, were unevenly distributed. On average, for the 1978-1985 period, utilities, commercial, and industrial users paid less for their gas than they would have under total decontrol and residential users paid $8.6 billion more. The NGPA and Federal Regulatory Commission oversight practices allow the transmission industry to price discriminate among customers.
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