Both unemployment insurance (UI) extensions and the availability of disability benefits have disincentive effects on job search. But UI extensions can reduce the efficiency cost of disability benefits if UI recipients delay disability application until they exhaust their unemployment benefits. This paper, the first to focus on the effect of UI extensions on disability applications, investigates whether UI eligibility, extension, and exhaustion affect the timing of disability applications and the composition of the applicant pool. Jobless individuals are significantly less likely to apply to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) during UI extensions, and significantly more likely to apply when UI is ultimately exhausted. Healthier potential applicants appear more likely to delay, as state allowance rates increase after a new UI extension. Simulations find that a 13-week UI extension decreases SSDI and Medicare costs, offsetting about half of the increase in UI payments; this suggests that the benefits of UI extensions may be understated ' permanent disability benefits are diverted to shorter-run unemployment benefits and, potentially, new jobs, while easing the burden on the nearly insolvent SSDI Trust Fund.
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Unemployment Insurance, Wage Pass-Through, and Endogenous Take-Up
September 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-59
This paper studies how unemployment insurance (UI) generosity affects reservation wages, re-employment wages, and benefit take-up. Using Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data, we estimate a cross-sectional elasticity of reservation wages with respect to weekly UI benefits of 0.014. Exploiting state variation in Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) intensity and the timing of federal supplements, we find that expanded benefits during COVID-19 increased reservation wages by 8'12 percent. Using CPS rotation data, we also document a 9 percent rise in re-employment wages for UI-eligible workers relative to ineligible workers. Over the same period, the UI take-up rate rose from roughly 30 to 40 percent; Probit estimates indicate that higher benefit levels, rather than changes in observables, account for this increase. A directed search model with an endogenous filing decision replicates these facts: generosity primarily operates through the extensive margin of take-up, which mutes the pass-through from benefits to wages.
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The Effect of Wage Insurance on Labor Supply: A Test for Income Effects
October 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-37
Studies of moral hazard in wage insurance programs such as Unemployment Insurance (UI) or Workers Compensation (WC) have demonstrated that higher benefits discourage work, emphasizing the price distortion inherent in benefit provision. Utilizing administrative data linking WC claim records to wage records from a UI payroll tax database, I find that the effect of WC benefits on the duration of benefit receipt cannot fully account for the effect of these benefits on post-injury unemployment. This indicates that a significant fraction of the effect of WC benefits on employment is due to an income effect rather than a price distortion.
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Long-Run Earnings Volatility and Health Insurance Coverage: Evidence from the SIPP Gold Standard File
October 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-35
Despite the notable increase in earnings volatility and the attention paid to the growing ranks of the uninsured, the relationship between career earnings and short- and mediumrun health insurance status has been ignored due to a lack of data. I use a new dataset, the SIPP Gold Standard File, that merges health insurance status and demographics from the Survey of Income and Program Participation with career earnings records from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to examine the relationship between long-run family earnings volatility and health insurance coverage. I find that more volatile career earnings are associated with an increased probability of experiencing an uninsured episode, with larger effects for men, young workers, and the unmarried. These findings are consistent with the 'scarring' literature, and suggest the importance of safety-net measures for job losses and health insurance coverage.
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The Consequences of Long Term Unemployment:
Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data*
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-40
It is well known that the long-term unemployed fare worse in the labor market than the short-term unemployed, but less clear why this is so. One potential explanation is that the long-term unemployed are 'bad apples' who had poorer prospects from the outset of their spells (heterogeneity). Another is that their bad outcomes are a consequence of the extended unemployment they have experienced (state dependence). We use Current Population Survey (CPS) data on unemployed individuals linked to wage records for the same people to distinguish between these competing explanations. For each person in our sample, we have wage record data that cover the period from 20 quarters before to 11 quarters after the quarter in which the person is observed in the CPS. This gives us rich information about prior and subsequent work histories not available to previous researchers that we use to control for individual heterogeneity that might be affecting subsequent labor market outcomes. Even with these controls in place, we find that unemployment duration has a strongly negative effect on the likelihood of subsequent employment. This finding is inconsistent with the heterogeneity ('bad apple') explanation for why the long-term unemployed fare worse than the short-term unemployed. We also find that longer unemployment durations are associated with lower subsequent earnings, though this is mainly attributable to the long-term unemployed having a lower likelihood of subsequent employment rather than to their having lower earnings once a job is found.
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The Work Disincentive Effects of the Disability Insurance Program in the 1990s
February 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-05
In this paper we evaluate the work disincentive effects of the Disability Insurance program during the 1990s. To accomplish this we construct a new large data set with detailed information on DI application and award decisions and use two different econometric evaluation methods. First, we apply a comparison group approach proposed by John Bound to estimate an upper bound for the work disincentive effect of the current DI program. Second, we adopt a Regression-Discontinuity approach that exploits a particular feature of the DI eligibility determination process to provide a credible point estimate of the impact of the DI program on labor supply for an important subset of DI applicants. Our estimates indicate that during the 1990s the labor force participation rate of DI beneficiaries would have been at most 20 percentage points higher had none received benefits. In addition, we find even smaller labor supply responses for the subset of 'marginal' applicants whose disability determination is based on vocational factors.
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Differences in Disability Insurance Allowance Rates
August 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-54
Allowance rates for disability insurance applications vary by race and ethnicity, but it is unclear to what extent these differences are artifacts of other differing socio-economic and health characteristics, or selection issues in SSA's race and ethnicity data. This paper uses the 2015 American Community Survey linked to 2015-2019 SSA administrative data to investigate DI application allowance rates among non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic Asian, non-Hispanic American Indian/Alaska Native, and Hispanic applicants aged 25-65. The analysis uses regression, propensity score matching, and inverse probability weighting to estimate differences in allowance rates among applicants who are similar on observable characteristics. Relative to raw comparisons, differences by race and ethnicity in multivariate analyses are substantially smaller in magnitude and are generally not statistically significant.
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Locate Your Nearest Exit: Mass Layoffs and Local Labor Market Response
September 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-25
Large shocks to local labor markets cause lasting changes to communities and their residents. We examine four main channels through which the local labor force adjusts following mass layoffs: in- and out-migration, retirement, and disability insurance enrollment. We show that these channels account for over half of the labor force reductions following a mass layoff event. By measuring the residual difference between these channels and labor force change, we also show that labor force non-participation grew in the period during and after the Great Recession. This result highlights the growing importance of non-participation as a response to labor demand shocks.
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The Closure Effect: Evidence from Workers Compensation Litigation
January 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-01
Consideration of the "best interests" of Workers Compensation (WC) claimants often involves the assumption that those who receive benefits in a "lump-sum" behave "too myopically" with respect to labor supply. However, many attorneys argue that lump-sum settlements induce a beneficial "sense of closure." In this paper, I provide an empirical context for these ideas using a unique set of linked administrative databases owned by the State of California. Upon receipt of a court-approved lump-sum settlement, WC claimants immediately increase labor supply. No such change is found for claimants who receive a court-approved settlement in which the insurer provides benefits over time, suggesting that the method of litigation settlement is a determinant of labor supply.
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The Effect of Food Assistance Work Requirements on Labor Market Outcomes
September 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-54
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly named the Food Stamp Program, has long been an integral part of the US social safety net. During US welfare reforms in the mid-1990s, SNAP eligibility became more restrictive with legislation citing a need to improve self-sufficiency of participating households. As a result, legislatures created two of these eligibility requirements: the General Work Requirement (GWR), which forces an adult to work to receive benefits, and the Able-Bodied Adult Without Dependents (ABAWD) work requirement, which requires certain adults to work a certain number of hours to receive benefits. Using restricted-access SNAP microdata from nine states, we exploit age cutoffs of the ABAWD work requirement and General Work Requirement (GWR) to estimate the effect of these policies on labor outcomes. We find that at the ABAWD age cutoff, there is no statistically significant evidence of a discontinuity across static and dynamic employment outcomes. At the GWR age cutoff, unemployed SNAP users and SNAP-eligible adults are on average more likely to leave the labor force than to continue to search for work.
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Complex Survey Questions and the Impact of Enumeration Procedures: Census/American Community Survey Disability Questions
April 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-10
This paper explores challenges relating to the identification of the population with disabilities,focusing on Census Bureau efforts using the 2000 Decennial Census Long-Form (Census 2000) and 2000-2005 American Community Survey (ACS). In particular, the analyses explore the impact of survey methods on responses to the work limitation (i.e., employment disability) question in these two Census products. Building on the research of Stern (2003) and Stern and Brault (2005), we look for further evidence of misreporting of an employment disability by specific sub-populations using the participation in the Supplemental Security Income program as an exogenous employment disability status indicator along with a subset of ACS disability questions. We expand upon these earlier studies by examining both false-positive and falsenegative reports of employment disability by implementing logit estimations to examine the role of respondent/enumerator error on the accuracy of the employment disability response. In this manner, we enhance our understanding of Census 2000 and ACS responses to employment disability questions through an exploration of the role of enumeration procedures in two types of misclassifications, as well as by evaluating existing data and estimates to uncover characteristics that might make an individual more likely to misreport an employment disability.
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