This paper addresses a longstanding puzzle involving the unbundling of services that has occurred over more than two decades in the U.S. advertising agency industry: How can the shift from the bundling to the unbundling of services be explained and what accounts for the slow pace of change? Using a cost-based theoretical framework of bundling due to Evans and Salinger (2005, 2008), we develop a simple model of an advertising agency's decision to unbundle its services as a tradeoff between the fixed cost to the advertiser of establishing and maintaining a relationship with an advertising agency and pecuniary economies of scale available in providing media services. The results from an econometric analysis of cross-sectional and pooled data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau for quinquenial censuses conducted between 1982 and 2002 support the key predictions of the model. We find that advertising agency establishments are more likely to unbundle if they are large and diversified in their service offerings and are less likely to do so with increasing age and greater geographical scope. We also find a strong trend toward unbundling over time, a result that is partially explained by increases in media prices over time.
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Concentration Levels in the U.S. Advertising and Marketing Services Industry: Myth vs. Reality
August 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-16
We analyze changes in concentration levels in the U.S. Advertising and Marketing Services industry using data from the U.S. Census Bureau's quinquennial Economic Census and the Service Annual Survey. Heretofore largely ignored, these data allow us to redress some of the measurement problems surrounding estimates found in the existing literature Firm level concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index varies across the sectors comprising the industry, but all are within the range generally considered as indicative of a competitive industry. At the holding company level, the four largest organizations account for about a quarter of the industry's total revenue, a share lower by an order of magnitude than that frequently cited in the trade press.
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Intra-Firm Spillovers? The Stock and Flow Effects of Collocation
January 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-01
We examine the impact of collocation on local within-firm performance, or intra-firm spillovers, by decomposing spillovers into one-time stock and recurring flow effects. Stock effects include one-time learning effects. Flow effects include ongoing resource sharing as well as cannibalization. Using data on the population of U.S. hotels and restaurants from 1977-2007, we exploit changes in the number of collocated establishments owned by the same firm to estimate the relative importance of stock and flow benefits. We find that collocation improves the productivity of new and existing establishments by 1-2%, even when correcting for endogenous sorting into collocation. The results, in conjunction with our field work, suggest that collocation generally facilitates the transfer of knowledge within the firm, but that flow effects of collocation are more sensitive to the broader economic environment.
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Residual Claims and Incentives in Restaurant Chains
July 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-18
I examine the relationship between ownership and production activities using a new dataset of restaurant chains. Production in restaurant chains provides an opportunity to examine the effects of residual claims on incentives because production is decentralized and fairly uniform across restaurants in the same chain. Yet the allocation of residual claims varies between company-owned and franchised units, affecting the strength of incentives for restaurantlevel activities. The decision to own or franchise each restaurant reflects the value of either withholding or allocating residual claims for performing these activities. I find that more complex production activities are systematically correlated with company ownership. Onsite food production raises the likelihood of company ownership by 28% relative to offsite food production. Table service raises the likelihood of company ownership by 26% relative to counter service. The results are not consistent with straightforward effort-promoting effects of residual claims in simple principal agent models. They are consistent with the view that residual claims can generate unbalanced incentives across diverse tasks.
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NEW EVIDENCE ON EMPLOYER PRICE-SENSITIVITY OF OFFERING HEALTH INSURANCE
January 2014
Working Paper Number:
CES-14-01
Economic incentives such as the preferential tax treatment of premiums and economies of scale encourage employers to provide health insurance through the workplace. The employer's decision to offer health insurance depends on how much workers value insurance relative to wages, and that value is likely to vary, given the composition of the establishment's workforce. Using the 2008-2010 MEPS Insurance Component augmented with information from other data sources, we generate new estimates of employers' price-sensitivity of offering insurance. Our results suggest that employers are sensitive to changes in the tax price of insurance, with very small employers exhibiting the largest price-sensitivity. Employer size, workforce composition, and local labor market conditions also influence the employer's decision to offer insurance. New evidence can inform policy discussions about the implications of broad-based reforms that change marginal tax rates as well as targeted strategies that address the tax-exempt status of premiums.
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The Rise of Specialized Firms
February 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-06
This paper studies firm diversification over 6-digit NAICS industries in U.S. manufacturing. We find that firms specializing in fewer industries now account for a substantially greater share of production than 40 years ago. This reallocation is a key driver of rising industry concentration. Specialized firms have displaced diversified firms among industry leaders'absent this reallocation concentration would have decreased. We then provide evidence that specialized firms produce higher-quality goods: specialized firms tend to charge higher unit prices and are more insulated against Chinese import competition. Based on our empirical findings, we propose a theory in which growth shifts demand toward specialized, high-quality firms, which eventually increases concentration. We conclude that one should expect rising industry concentration in a growing economy.
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Re-engineering Key National Economic Indicators
July 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-22
Traditional methods of collecting data from businesses and households face increasing challenges. These include declining response rates to surveys, increasing costs to traditional modes of data collection, and the difficulty of keeping pace with rapid changes in the economy. The digitization of virtually all market transactions offers the potential for re-engineering key national economic indicators. The challenge for the statistical system is how to operate in this data-rich environment. This paper focuses on the opportunities for collecting item-level data at the source and constructing key indicators using measurement methods consistent with such a data infrastructure. Ubiquitous digitization of transactions allows price and quantity be collected or aggregated simultaneously at the source. This new architecture for economic statistics creates challenges arising from the rapid change in items sold. The paper explores some recently proposed techniques for estimating price and quantity indices in large scale item-level data. Although those methods display tremendous promise, substantially more research is necessary before they will be ready to serve as the basis for the official economic statistics. Finally, the paper addresses implications for building national statistics from transactions for data collection and for the capabilities and organization of the statistical agencies in the 21st century.
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Talent Recruitment and Firm Performance: The Business of Major League Sports
November 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-54R
Firms rely heavily on their investments in human capital to achieve profits. This research takes advantage of detailed information on worker performance and confidential information on firm revenue and operating costs to investigate the relationship between talent migration and firm profitability in major league sports. One key problem that firms have is identifying performance measures for its workforce, especially for potential employees (recruits). In contrast to nearly all other industries, in the industry of professional team sports, detailed information about the past performance of each individual worker (athlete) is known to all potential employers. First, I demonstrate using public data that worker (athlete) statistics aggregated to the establishment (team) level correlate with success on the field (measured in win percentage). Second, I use confidential data from the 2007 Economic Censuses, and from the 2007 and 2008 Service Annual Surveys to investigate the link between individual worker performance and team profitability, controlling for many other aspects of the sports business, specifically taking account of the mobility of athletic 'stars' and 'superstars' from one team to another. The investigations in this paper provide support for the hypothesis that hiring talented individuals (stars) will increase a firm's profit. However, there is not convincing support for the incremental benefit of hiring superstars. The mixed evidence suggests a benefit on balance.
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Reconciling the Firm Size and Innovation Puzzle
March 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-20RR
There is a prevailing view in both the academic literature and the popular press that firms need to behave more entrepreneurially. This view is reinforced by a stylized fact in the innovation literature that R&D productivity decreases with size. However, there is a second stylized fact in the innovation literature that R&D investment increases with size. Taken together, these stylized facts create a puzzle of seemingly irrational behavior by large firms--they are increasing spending despite decreasing returns. This paper is an effort to resolve that puzzle. We propose and test two alternative resolutions: 1) that it arises from mismeasurement of R&D productivity, and 2) that firm size endogenously drives R&D strategy, and that the returns to R&D strategies depend on scale. We are able to resolve the puzzle under the first tack--using a recent measure of R&D productivity, RQ, we find that both R&D spending and R&D productivity increase with scale. We had less success with the second tack--while firm size affects R&D strategy in the manners expected by theory, there is no strategy whose returns decrease in scale. Taken together, our results are consistent with the Schumpeter view that large firms are the major engine of growth, they both spend more in aggregate than small firms, and are more productive with that spending. Moreover the prescription that firms should behave more entrepreneurially, should be treated with caution--one small firm strategy has lower returns to scale than its large firm counterpart.
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Quality Sorting and Networking: Evidence from the Advertising Agency Industry
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-16
This paper provides a model of knowledge sharing and networking among single unit advertising agencies and investigates the implications of this model in the presence of heterogeneity in agencies' quality. In a stylized screening model, we show that, under a modest set of assumptions, the separation outcome is a Pareto-undominated Nash equilibrium. That is, high quality agencies locate themselves in a high wage and rent area to sift out low quality agencies and guarantee their network quality. We identify a necessary condition for the separating equilibrium to exist and to reject the pooling equilibrium even in the presence of agglomeration economies from networking. We derive the maximum profit of an agency and show the condition has a directly testable implication in the empirical specification of the agency's profit function. We use a sample of movers'existing agencies that relocate among urban areas'in order to extract a predetermined measure of their quality prior to relocation. We estimate the parameters of the profit function, using the Census confidential establishment-level data, and show that the necessary condition for separation is met and that there is strong separation and sorting on quality among agencies in their location decisions.
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Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-23
Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.
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