This paper addresses a longstanding puzzle involving the unbundling of services that has occurred over more than two decades in the U.S. advertising agency industry: How can the shift from the bundling to the unbundling of services be explained and what accounts for the slow pace of change? Using a cost-based theoretical framework of bundling due to Evans and Salinger (2005, 2008), we develop a simple model of an advertising agency's decision to unbundle its services as a tradeoff between the fixed cost to the advertiser of establishing and maintaining a relationship with an advertising agency and pecuniary economies of scale available in providing media services. The results from an econometric analysis of cross-sectional and pooled data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau for quinquenial censuses conducted between 1982 and 2002 support the key predictions of the model. We find that advertising agency establishments are more likely to unbundle if they are large and diversified in their service offerings and are less likely to do so with increasing age and greater geographical scope. We also find a strong trend toward unbundling over time, a result that is partially explained by increases in media prices over time.
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Concentration Levels in the U.S. Advertising and Marketing Services Industry: Myth vs. Reality
August 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-16
We analyze changes in concentration levels in the U.S. Advertising and Marketing Services industry using data from the U.S. Census Bureau's quinquennial Economic Census and the Service Annual Survey. Heretofore largely ignored, these data allow us to redress some of the measurement problems surrounding estimates found in the existing literature Firm level concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index varies across the sectors comprising the industry, but all are within the range generally considered as indicative of a competitive industry. At the holding company level, the four largest organizations account for about a quarter of the industry's total revenue, a share lower by an order of magnitude than that frequently cited in the trade press.
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The Rise of Specialized Firms
February 2024
Working Paper Number:
CES-24-06
This paper studies firm diversification over 6-digit NAICS industries in U.S. manufacturing. We find that firms specializing in fewer industries now account for a substantially greater share of production than 40 years ago. This reallocation is a key driver of rising industry concentration. Specialized firms have displaced diversified firms among industry leaders'absent this reallocation concentration would have decreased. We then provide evidence that specialized firms produce higher-quality goods: specialized firms tend to charge higher unit prices and are more insulated against Chinese import competition. Based on our empirical findings, we propose a theory in which growth shifts demand toward specialized, high-quality firms, which eventually increases concentration. We conclude that one should expect rising industry concentration in a growing economy.
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Efficiency Implications of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Micro Data
November 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-26
In this study, we contribute to the ongoing research on the rationales for corporate diversification. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we examine whether combining several lines of business in one entity leads to increased productive efficiency. Studying the direct effect of diversification on efficiency allows us to discern between two major theories of corporate diversification: the synergy hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis. To measure productive efficiency, we employ a non-parametric approach'a test based on Varian's Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM). This method has several advantages over other conventional measures of productive efficiency. Most importantly, it allows one to perform the efficiency test without relying on assumptions about the functional form of the underlying production function. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first application of the WAPM test to a large sample of non-financial firms. The study provides evidence that business segments of diversified firms are more efficient compared to single-segment firms in the same industry. This finding suggests that the existence of the so-called 'diversification discount' cannot be explained by efficiency differences between multi-segment and focused firms. Furthermore, more efficient segments tend to be vertically integrated with others segments in the same firm and to have been added through acquisitions rather than grown internally. Overall, the results of this study indicate that corporate diversification is value-enhancing, and that it is not necessarily driven by managers' pursuit of their private benefits.
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Residual Claims and Incentives in Restaurant Chains
July 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-18
I examine the relationship between ownership and production activities using a new dataset of restaurant chains. Production in restaurant chains provides an opportunity to examine the effects of residual claims on incentives because production is decentralized and fairly uniform across restaurants in the same chain. Yet the allocation of residual claims varies between company-owned and franchised units, affecting the strength of incentives for restaurantlevel activities. The decision to own or franchise each restaurant reflects the value of either withholding or allocating residual claims for performing these activities. I find that more complex production activities are systematically correlated with company ownership. Onsite food production raises the likelihood of company ownership by 28% relative to offsite food production. Table service raises the likelihood of company ownership by 26% relative to counter service. The results are not consistent with straightforward effort-promoting effects of residual claims in simple principal agent models. They are consistent with the view that residual claims can generate unbalanced incentives across diverse tasks.
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Re-engineering Key National Economic Indicators
July 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-22
Traditional methods of collecting data from businesses and households face increasing challenges. These include declining response rates to surveys, increasing costs to traditional modes of data collection, and the difficulty of keeping pace with rapid changes in the economy. The digitization of virtually all market transactions offers the potential for re-engineering key national economic indicators. The challenge for the statistical system is how to operate in this data-rich environment. This paper focuses on the opportunities for collecting item-level data at the source and constructing key indicators using measurement methods consistent with such a data infrastructure. Ubiquitous digitization of transactions allows price and quantity be collected or aggregated simultaneously at the source. This new architecture for economic statistics creates challenges arising from the rapid change in items sold. The paper explores some recently proposed techniques for estimating price and quantity indices in large scale item-level data. Although those methods display tremendous promise, substantially more research is necessary before they will be ready to serve as the basis for the official economic statistics. Finally, the paper addresses implications for building national statistics from transactions for data collection and for the capabilities and organization of the statistical agencies in the 21st century.
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The Evolution of U.S. Retail Concentration
March 2022
Working Paper Number:
CES-22-07
Increases in national concentration have been a salient feature of industry dynamics in the U.S. and have contributed to concerns about increasing market power. Yet, local trends may be more informative about market power, particularly in the retail sector where consumers have traditionally shopped at nearby stores. We find that local concentration has increased almost in parallel with national concentration using novel Census data on product-level revenue for all U.S. retail stores. The increases in concentration are broad based, affecting most markets, products, and retail industries. We implement a new decomposition of the national Herfindahl Hirschman Index and show that despite similar trends, national and local concentration reflect different changes in the retail sector. The increase in national concentration comes from consumers in different markets increasingly buying from the same firms and does not reflect changes in local market power. We estimate a model of retail competition which links local concentration to markups. The model implies that the increase in local concentration explains one-third of the observed increase in markups.
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Delegation in Multi-Establishment Firms: The Organizational Structure of I.T. Purchasing Authority
October 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-35
A rare large-scale empirical study of delegation within firms, this paper investigates how decision rights over information technology investments are allocated within multi-establishment firms. The core results indicate that a relatively high contribution to firm sales is highly correlated with authority being delegated to the local establishment. Firm-wide operational complexity and local information advantages are also associated with local discretion for IT purchases. Certain IT investments are also positively correlated with delegation. On the other hand, significant operational interdependencies evince a positive correlation with centralization, as do productive similarities among establishments. Surprisingly, absolute size of the firm and having a large IT budget are also correlated with centralized IT decision-making. With the exception of these latter effects, the results are consistent with models of organizational design that predict delegation where there is great demand for locally adapted choices and centralization where firm-wide coordination is most important. The findings document and make sense of widespread heterogeneity in decision rights across a range of firm and industry settings ' even among establishments belonging to the same parent firm. Finally, they suggest important considerations for future empirical and theoretical research into the determinants of delegation.
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Entry, Exit, and the Determinants of Market Structure
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-23
Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers. These decisions are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within the market. In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors. We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. The magnitude of these effects differ substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the dentist and chiropractor industries. Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits. We calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run profits by the same amount as if the firm operated in a duopoly.
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Where Do Manufacturing Firms Locate Their Headquarters?
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-17
Firms' headquarters [HQ] support their production activity, by gathering information and outsourcing business services, as well as, managing, evaluating, and coordinating internal firm activities. In search of locations for these functions, firms often separate the HQ function physically from their production facilities and construct stand-alone HQs. By locating its HQ in a large, service oriented metro area away from its production facilities, a firm may be better able to out-source service functions in that local metro market and also to gather information about market conditions for their products. However if the firm locates the HQ away from its production activity, that increases the coordination costs in managing plant activities. In this paper we empirically analyze the trade-off of these two considerations.
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The Structure Of Technology, Substitution, And Productivity In The Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Industry Under The NGPA Of 1978
August 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-09
The structure of production in the natural gas transmission industry is estimated using the dual restricted cost function based on panel data for twenty four firms. A standard translog variable cost function with firm fixed effects is augmented with controls for capacity utilization, technical change, and shifting regulatory regimes. During the implementation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 1978-1985, the industry exhibited no significant increase in productivity, largely attributable to the decline in output for the industry. Regulatory efforts to promote voluntary non-contract transmission appear to have enabled some firms to mitigate the overall industry productivity stagnation. The NGPA instituted a complex schedule of partial and gradual decontrol of natural gas prices at the well head. This form of deregulation costs natural gas producers over $100 billion in lost revenues, relative to immediate and full price deregulation. However, the transmission firms benefited by paying $1.5 billion less for natural gas than they would have under total deregulation. The benefits to consumers, totaling $98.7 billion, were unevenly distributed. On average, for the 1978-1985 period, utilities, commercial, and industrial users paid less for their gas than they would have under total decontrol and residential users paid $8.6 billion more. The NGPA and Federal Regulatory Commission oversight practices allow the transmission industry to price discriminate among customers.
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