At what point in a firm's life should it go public? How do a firm's ex ante product market characteristics relate to its going public decision? Further, what are the implications of a firm going public on its post-IPO operating and product market performance? In this paper, we answer the above questions by conducting the first large sample study of the going public decisions of U.S. firms in the literature. We use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which covers the entire universe of private and public U.S. manufacturing firms. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, a private firm's product market characteristics (market share, competition, capital intensity, cash flow riskiness) significantly affect its likelihood of going public. Second, private firms facing less information asymmetry and those with projects that are cheaper for outsiders to evaluate are more likely to go public (consistent with Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999)). Third, IPOs of firms occur at the peak of their productivity cycle (consistent with Clementi (2002)): the dynamics of total factor productivity (TFP) and sales growth exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern. Finally, sales, capital expenditures, and other performance variables exhibit a consistently increasing pattern over the years before and after the IPO. The last two findings are consistent with the widely documented post-IPO operating underperformance of firms being due to the real investment effects of a firm going public, and inconsistent with underperformance being solely due to earnings management immediately prior to the IPO.
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The Disappearing IPO Puzzle: New Insights from Proprietary U.S. Census Data on Private Firms
June 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-20
The U.S. equity markets have experienced a remarkable decline in IPOs since 2000, both in terms of smaller IPO volume and entrepreneurial firms' greater tendency to exit through acquisitions rather than IPOs. Using proprietary U.S. Census data on private firms, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the above two notable trends and provide several new insights. First, we find that the dramatic reduction in U.S. IPOs is not due to a weaker economy that is unable to produce enough 'exit eligible' private firms: in fact, the average total factor productivity (TFP) of private firms is slightly higher post-2000 compared to pre-2000. Second, we do not find evidence supporting the conventional wisdom that the disappearing IPO puzzle is mainly driven by the decline in IPO propensity among small private firms. Third, we do not find a significant change in the characteristics of private firms exiting through acquisitions from pre- to post-2000. Fourth, the decline in IPO propensity persists even after we account for the changing characteristics of private firms over time. Fifth, we show that the difference in TFP between IPO firms and acquired firms (and between IPO firms and firms remaining private) went up considerably post-2000 compared to pre-2000. Finally, venture-capital-backed (VC-backed) IPO firms have significantly lower postexit long-term TFP than matched VC-backed private firms in the post-2000 era relative to the pre- 2000 era, while this pattern is absent among IPO and matched private firms without VC backing. Overall, our results strongly support the explanations based on standalone public firms' greater sensitivity to product market competition and entrepreneurial firms' access to more abundant private equity financing in the post-2000 era. We find mixed evidence regarding the explanations based on the smaller net financial benefits of being standalone public firms or the increased need for confidentiality after 2000.
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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition
July 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-14
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention, we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value. Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target firms' productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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IPO Waves, Product Market Competition, and the Going Public Decision: Theory and Evidence
March 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-07
We develop a new rationale for IPO waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.
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Entrant Experience and Plant Exit
August 2004
Working Paper Number:
CES-04-12
Producers entering a market can differ widely in their prior production experience, ranging from none to extensive experience in related geographic or product markets. In this paper, we quantify the nature of prior plant and firm experience for entrants into a market and measure its effect on the plant's decision to exit the market. Using plant-level data for seven regional manufacturing industries in the U.S., we find that a producer's experience at the time it enters a market plays an important role in the subsequent exit decision, affecting both the overall probability of exit and the method of exit. After controlling for observable plant and market profit determinants, there remain systematic differences in failure patterns across three groups of plants distinguished by their prior experience: de novo entrants, experienced plants that enter by diversifying their product mix, and new plants owned by experienced firms. The results indicate that the exit decision cannot be treated as determined solely by current and future plant, firm, and market conditions, but that the plant's history plays an important independent role in conditioning the likelihood of survival.
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On the Lifecycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital- and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms
May 2008
Working Paper Number:
CES-08-13
We use a new data set that tracks U.S. firms from their birth over two decades to understand the life cycle dynamics and outcomes (both successes and failures) of VC- and non-VC financed firms. We first ask to what market-wide and firm-level characteristics venture capitalists respond in choosing to make their investments and how this differs for firms financed solely by non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital. We then ask what are the eventual differences in outcomes for firms that receive VC financing relative to non-VC-financed firms. Our findings suggest that VCs follow public market signals similar to other investors and typically invest largely in young firms, with potential for large scale being an important criterion. The main way that VC financed firms differ from matched non-VC financed firms, is they demonstrate remarkably larger scale both for successful and failed firms, at every point of the firms' life cycle. They grow more rapidly, but we see little difference in profitability measures at times of exit. We further examine a number of hypotheses relating to VC-financed firms' failure. We find that VC-financed firms' cumulative failure rates are lower than non-VC-financed firms but the story is nuanced. VC appears initially 'patient' in that VC-financed firms are less likely to fail in the first five years but conditional on surviving past this point become more likely to fail relative to non-VC-financed firms. We perform a number of robustness checks and find that VC does not appear to have more stringent survival thresholds nor do VC-financed firm failures appear to be disguised as acquisitions nor do particular kinds of VC firms seem to be driving our results. Overall, our analysis supports the view that VC is 'patient' capital relative to other non-VC sources of entrepreneurial capital in the early part of firms' lifecycles and that an important criterion for receiving VC investment is potential for large scale, rather than level of profitability, prior to exit.
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Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-28
We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms' plant-level data to their published segment reports, conducting our tests by grouping a firm's plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a 'pseudo-segment.' We then determine whether that pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We find pseudo-segments are more likely to be aggregated within a line-of-business segment when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. However, for firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.
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An Empirical Analysis of Capacity Costs
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-26
A central premise of management accounting is that including the cost of unused capacity in product costs can distort these costs and misguide users. Yet, there is little large-scale empirical evidence on the materiality of the cost of unused capacity. This study uses a confidential Census sample of 151,900 U.S. manufacturing plants from 1974-2011 to investigate the impact of separating the cost of unused capacity. We find that excluding the cost of unused capacity increases operating profit margins by approximately 26 percent. This order of magnitude is economically significant, and is pervasive across industries and over time. In additional analyses, we find that separating the cost of unused capacity largely smooths the time-series variation in unitized product costs and profit margins. Our finding of higher mean and lower variation of adjusted margins should be of considerable interest to both investors and managers.
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LBOs, Debt And R&D Intensity
February 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-03
This paper details the impact of debt on R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout (LBO). We develop seven hypotheses based on capital market imperfection theories and agency theory. To test these hypotheses, we compare 72 R&D performing LBOs with 3329 non-LBO control observations and 126 LBOs with little or no R&D expenditures. The regressions yield four statistically significant major findings. First, pre-LBO R&D intensity is roughly one-half of the overall manufacturing mean and two-thirds of the firm's industry mean. Second, LBOs cause R&D intensity to drop by 40 percent. Third, large firms tend to have smaller LBO- related declines in R&D intensity. Fourth, R&D intensive LBOs outperform both their non-LBO industry peers and other LBOs without R&D expenditures.
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HUMAN CAPITAL LOSS IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
July 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-37
This paper quantifies the 'human costs of bankruptcy' by estimating employee wage losses induced by the bankruptcy filing of employers using employee-employer matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau's LEHD program. We find that employee wages begin to deteriorate one year prior to bankruptcy. One year after bankruptcy, the magnitude of the decline in annual wages is 30% of pre-bankruptcy wages. The decrease in wages persists (at least) for five years post-bankruptcy. The present value of wage losses summed up to five years after bankruptcy amounts to 29-49% of the average pre-bankruptcy market value of firm. Furthermore, we find that the ex-ante wage premium to compensate for the ex-post wage loss due to bankruptcy can be of similar magnitude with that of the tax benefits of debt.
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Efficiency Implications of Corporate Diversification: Evidence from Micro Data
November 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-26
In this study, we contribute to the ongoing research on the rationales for corporate diversification. Using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we examine whether combining several lines of business in one entity leads to increased productive efficiency. Studying the direct effect of diversification on efficiency allows us to discern between two major theories of corporate diversification: the synergy hypothesis and the agency cost hypothesis. To measure productive efficiency, we employ a non-parametric approach'a test based on Varian's Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM). This method has several advantages over other conventional measures of productive efficiency. Most importantly, it allows one to perform the efficiency test without relying on assumptions about the functional form of the underlying production function. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first application of the WAPM test to a large sample of non-financial firms. The study provides evidence that business segments of diversified firms are more efficient compared to single-segment firms in the same industry. This finding suggests that the existence of the so-called 'diversification discount' cannot be explained by efficiency differences between multi-segment and focused firms. Furthermore, more efficient segments tend to be vertically integrated with others segments in the same firm and to have been added through acquisitions rather than grown internally. Overall, the results of this study indicate that corporate diversification is value-enhancing, and that it is not necessarily driven by managers' pursuit of their private benefits.
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