Large firms in the U.S. financial system achieve substantial economic gains. Their dominance sets them apart while also raising concerns about the suppression of worker earnings. Utilizing administrative data, this study reveals that the largest financial firms pay workers an average of 30.2% more than their smallest counterparts, significantly exceeding the 7.9% disparity in nonfinance sectors. This positive size-earnings relationship is consistently more pronounced in finance, even during the 2008 crisis or compared to the hightech sector. Evidence suggests that large financial firms' excessive gains, coupled with their workers' sought-after skills, explain this distinct relationship.
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Access to Financing and Racial Pay Gap Inside Firms
July 2023
Working Paper Number:
CES-23-36
How does access to financing influence racial pay inequality inside firms? We answer this question using the employer-employee matched data administered by the U.S. Census Bureau and detailed resume data recording workers' career trajectories. Exploiting exogenous shocks to firms' debt capacity, we find that better access to debt financing significantly narrows the earnings gap between minority and white workers. Minority workers experience a persistent increase in earnings and also a rise in the pay rank relative to white workers in the same firm. The effect is more pronounced among mid- and high-skill minority workers, in areas where white workers are in shorter supply, and for firms with ex-ante less diverse boards and greater pre-existing racial inequality. With better access to financing, minority workers are also more likely to be promoted or be reassigned to technology-oriented occupations compared to white workers. Our evidence is consistent with access to financing making firms better utilize minority workers' human capital.
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Pay, Productivity and Management
September 2021
Working Paper Number:
CES-21-31
Using confidential Census matched employer-employee earnings data we find that employees at more productive firms, and firms with more structured management practices, have substantially higher pay, both on average and across every percentile of the pay distribution. This pay-performance relationship is particularly strong amongst higher paid employees, with a doubling of firm productivity associated with 11% more pay for the highest-paid employee (likely the CEO) compared to 4.7% for the median worker. This pay-performance link holds in public and private firms, although it is almost twice as strong in public firms for the highest-paid employees. Top pay volatility is also strongly related to productivity and structured management, suggesting this performance-pay relationship arises from more aggressive monitoring and incentive practices for top earners.
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The Employee Clientele of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from Personal Labor Income Diversification
January 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-01
Using employee job-level data, we empirically test the equilibrium matching between a firm's debt usage and its employee job risk aversion ('clientele effect'), as predicted by the existing theories. We measure job risk aversion for a firm's employees using their labor income concentration in the firm, calculated as the fraction of the employees' total personal labor income or total household labor
income that is accounted for by their income from this particular firm. Using a sample of about 1,400 U.S. public firms from 1990-2008, we find a robust negative relation between leverage and employee job risk aversion, which is consistent with the clientele effect. Specifically, when a firm's existing employees have higher labor income concentration in it, the firm tends to have lower contemporaneous and future leverage. Moreover, in terms of new hires, firms with lower leverage are more likely to recruit employees with less alternative labor income. Our results continue to hold after we control for firm fixed effects, other employee characteristics such as wages, gender, age, race, and education, and managerial risk attitudes. Further, the matching between a firm's leverage and its workers' labor income concentration in it is more pronounced for firms with higher labor intensity and those in financial distress.
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HUMAN CAPITAL LOSS IN CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
July 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-37
This paper quantifies the 'human costs of bankruptcy' by estimating employee wage losses induced by the bankruptcy filing of employers using employee-employer matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau's LEHD program. We find that employee wages begin to deteriorate one year prior to bankruptcy. One year after bankruptcy, the magnitude of the decline in annual wages is 30% of pre-bankruptcy wages. The decrease in wages persists (at least) for five years post-bankruptcy. The present value of wage losses summed up to five years after bankruptcy amounts to 29-49% of the average pre-bankruptcy market value of firm. Furthermore, we find that the ex-ante wage premium to compensate for the ex-post wage loss due to bankruptcy can be of similar magnitude with that of the tax benefits of debt.
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Destructive Creation at Work: How Financial Distress Spurs Entrepreneurship
January 2017
Working Paper Number:
CES-17-19
Using US Census employer-employee matched data, I show that employer financial
distress accelerates the exit of employees to found start-ups. This effect is particularly evident when distressed firms are less able to enforce contracts restricting employee mobility into competing firms. Entrepreneurs exiting financially distressed employers earn higher wages prior to the exit and after founding start-ups, compared to entrepreneurs exiting non-distressed firms. Consistent with distressed firms losing higher-quality workers, their start-ups have higher average employment and payroll growth. The results suggest that the social costs of distress might be lower than the private costs to financially distressed firms.
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Firm Finances and Responses to Trade Liberalization: Evidence from U.S. Tariffs on China
November 2021
Working Paper Number:
CES-21-37
This paper examines the relationship between a firm's finances and its response to trade liberalization. Using a landmark change in U.S. tariff policy vis-'-vis Chinese imports and micro level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, I find larger manufacturing job losses in better capitalized firms - those with less leverage and more cash on hand. The effects concentrate in industries where weaker balance sheets are likely to lead to collateral and other borrowing constraints, helping rule out alternative explanations. Finally, domestic manufacturing job losses are not accompanied by greater reductions in sales or aggregate employment, but better capitalized firms do exhibit reduced input costs and increased productivity. These findings point to offshoring as the predominant firm response to trade liberalization and suggest a role for financial capacity in facilitating offshoring investments.
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Workers' Job Prospects and Young Firm Dynamics
January 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-09
This paper investigates how worker beliefs and job prospects impact the wages and growth of young firms, as well as the aggregate economy. Building a heterogeneous-firm directed search model where workers gradually learn about firm types, I find that learning generates endogenous wage differentials for young firms. High-performing young firms must pay higher wages than equally high-performing old firms, while low-performing young firms offer lower wages than equally low-performing old firms. Reduced uncertainty or labor market frictions lower the wage differentials, thereby enhancing young firm dynamics and aggregate productivity. The results are consistent with U.S. administrative employee-employer matched data.
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Impact Investing and Worker Outcomes
May 2025
Working Paper Number:
CES-25-30
Impact investors claim to distinguish themselves from traditional venture capital and growth equity investors by also pursuing environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives. Whether they successfully do so in practice is unclear. We use confidential Census Bureau microdata to assess worker outcomes across portfolio companies. Impact investors are more likely than other private equity firms to fund businesses in economically disadvantaged areas, and the performance of these companies lags behind those held by traditional private investors. We show that post-funding impact-backed firms are more likely to hire minorities, unskilled workers, and individuals with lower historical earnings, perhaps reflecting the higher representation of minorities in top positions. They also allocate wage increases more favorably to minorities and rank-and-file workers than VC-backed firms. Our results are consistent with impact investors and their portfolio companies acting according to non-pecuniary social goals and thus are not consistent with mere window dressing or cosmetic changes.
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Hiring through Startup Acquisitions:
Preference Mismatch and Employee Departures
September 2018
Working Paper Number:
CES-18-41
This paper investigates the effectiveness of startup acquisitions as a hiring strategy. Unlike conventional hires who choose to join a new firm on their own volition, most acquired employees do not have a voice in the decision to be acquired, much less by whom to be acquired. The lack of worker agency may result in a preference mismatch between the acquired employees and the acquiring firm, leading to elevated rates of turnover. Using comprehensive employee-employer matched data from the US Census, I document that acquired workers are significantly more likely to leave compared to regular hires. By constructing a novel peer-based proxy for worker preferences, I show that acquired employees who prefer to work for startups ' rather than established firms ' are the most likely to leave after the acquisition, lending support to the preference mismatch theory. Moreover, these departures suggest a deeper strategic cost of competitive spawning: upon leaving, acquired workers are more likely to found their own companies, many of which appear to be competitive threats that impair the acquirer's long-run performance.
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Earnings Inequality and Coordination Costs: Evidence from U.S. Law Firms
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-24
Earnings inequality has increased substantially since the 1970s. Using evidence from confidential Census data on U.S. law offices on lawyers' organization and earnings, we study the extent to which the mechanism suggested by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), a scale of operations effect linking spans of control and earnings inequality, is responsible for increases in inequality. We first show that earnings inequality among lawyers increased substantially between 1977 and 1992, and that the distribution of partner-associate ratios across offices changed in ways consistent with the hypothesis that coordination costs fell during this period. We then propose a 'hierarchical production function' in which output is the product of skill and time and estimate its parameters, applying insights from the equilibrium assignment literature. We find that coordination costs fell broadly and steadily during this period, so that hiring one's first associate leveraged a partner's skill by about 30% more in 1992 than 1977. We find also that changes in lawyers' hierarchical organization account for about 2/3 of the increase in earnings inequality among lawyers in the upper tail, but a much smaller share of the increase in inequality between lawyers in the upper tail and other lawyers. These findings indicate that new organizational efficiencies potentially explain increases in inequality, especially among individuals toward the top of the earnings distribution.
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