Hierarchies allow individuals to leverage their knowledge through others. time. This mechanism increases productivity and amplifies the impact of skill heterogeneity on earnings inequality. To quantify this effect, we analyze the earnings and organization of U.S. lawyers and use the equilibrium model of knowledge hierarchies in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to assess how much lawyers, productivity and the distribution of earnings across lawyers reflects lawyers. ability to organize problem-solving hierarchically. We analyze earnings, organizational, and assignment patterns and show that they are generally consistent with the main predictions of the model. We then use these data to estimate the model. Our estimates imply that hierarchical production leads to at least a 30% increase in production in this industry, relative to a situation where lawyers within the same office do not vertically specialize. We further find that it amplifies earnings inequality, increasing the ratio between the 95th and 50th percentiles from 3.7 to 4.8. We conclude that the impact of hierarchy on productivity and earnings distributions in this industry is substantial but not dramatic, reflecting the fact that the problems lawyers face are diverse and that the solutions tend to be customized.
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Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge: Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry
May 2004
Working Paper Number:
CES-04-07
What role do hierarchies play with respect to the organization of production and what determines their structure? We develop an equilibrium model of hierarchical organization, then provide empirical evidence using confidential data on thousands of law offices from the 1992 Census of Services. The driving force in the model is increasing returns in the utilization of acquired knowledge. We show how the equilibrium assignment of individuals to hierarchical positions varies with the degree to which their human capital is field-specialized, then show how this equilibrium changes with the extent of the market. We find empirical evidence consistent with a central proposition of the model: the share of lawyers that work in hierarchies and the ratio of associates to partners increases as market size increases and lawyers field-specialize. Other results provide evidence against alternative interpretations that emphasize unobserved differences in the distribution of demand or 'firm size effects,' and lend additional support to the view that a role hierarchies play in legal services is to help exploit increasing returns associated with the utilization of human capital.
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Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms
May 2003
Working Paper Number:
CES-03-13
What is the role of firms and markets in mediating the division of labor? This paper uses confidential microdata from the Census of Services to examine law firms' boundaries. We find that firms' field scope narrows as market size increases and individuals specialize, indicating that firms' boundaries reflect organizational trade-offs. Moreover, we find that whether the division of labor is mediated by firms differs systematically according to whether lawyers in a particular field are mainly involved in structuring transactions or in dispute resolution. Our evidence is consistent with hypotheses in which firms' boundaries reflect variation in the value of knowledge-sharing or in the costs of monitoring, but not in risk-sharing. Our findings show how the incentive trade-offs associated with exploiting increasing returns from specialization help lead the structure of the industry to be fragmented, but highly-skewed.
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Earnings Inequality and Coordination Costs: Evidence from U.S. Law Firms
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-24
Earnings inequality has increased substantially since the 1970s. Using evidence from confidential Census data on U.S. law offices on lawyers' organization and earnings, we study the extent to which the mechanism suggested by Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), a scale of operations effect linking spans of control and earnings inequality, is responsible for increases in inequality. We first show that earnings inequality among lawyers increased substantially between 1977 and 1992, and that the distribution of partner-associate ratios across offices changed in ways consistent with the hypothesis that coordination costs fell during this period. We then propose a 'hierarchical production function' in which output is the product of skill and time and estimate its parameters, applying insights from the equilibrium assignment literature. We find that coordination costs fell broadly and steadily during this period, so that hiring one's first associate leveraged a partner's skill by about 30% more in 1992 than 1977. We find also that changes in lawyers' hierarchical organization account for about 2/3 of the increase in earnings inequality among lawyers in the upper tail, but a much smaller share of the increase in inequality between lawyers in the upper tail and other lawyers. These findings indicate that new organizational efficiencies potentially explain increases in inequality, especially among individuals toward the top of the earnings distribution.
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A Formal Test of Assortative Matching in the Labor Market
November 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-40
We estimate a structural model of job assignment in the presence of coordination frictions due to Shimer (2005). The coordination friction model places restrictions on the joint distribution of worker and firm effects from a linear decomposition of log labor earnings. These restrictions permit estimation of the unobservable ability and productivity differences between workers and their employers as well as the way workers sort into jobs on the basis of these unobservable factors. The estimation is performed on matched employer-employee data from the LEHD program of the U.S. Census Bureau. The estimated correlation between worker and firm effects from the earnings decomposition is close to zero, a finding that is often interpreted as evidence that there is no sorting by comparative advantage in the labor market. Our estimates suggest that his finding actually results from a lack of sufficient heterogeneity in the workforce and available jobs. Workers do sort into jobs on the basis of productive differences, but the effects of sorting are not visible because of the composition of workers and employers.
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Smart Cafe Cities: Testing Human Capital Externalities in the Boston Metropolitan Area
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-24
Existing studies have explored either only one or two of the mechanisms that human capital externalities percolate at only macrogeographic levels. This paper uses the 1990 Massachusetts Census data and tests four mechanisms at the microgeographic levels in the Boston metropolitan area labor market. We propose that individual workers can learn from their occupational and industrial peers in the same local labor market through four channels: depth of human capital stock, Marshallian labor market externalities, Jacobs labor market externalities, and thickness of the local labor market. We find that all types of human capital externalities are significant across Census blocks. Different types of externalities attenuate at different speeds over distances. For example, the effect of human capital depth decays rapidly beyond three miles away from block centroid. We conclude that knowledge spillovers are very localized within microgeographic scope in cities that we call Smart Caf' Cities.
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Who Values Human Capitalists' Human Capital? Healthcare Spending and Physician Earnings
July 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-23
Is government guiding the invisible hand at the top of the labor market? We study this question among physicians, the most common occupation among the top one percent of income earners, and whose billings comprise one-fifth of healthcare spending. We use a novel linkage of population-wide tax records with the administrative registry of all physicians in the U.S. to study the characteristics of these high earnings, and the influence of government payments in particular. We find a major role for government on the margin, with half of direct changes to government reimbursement rates flowing directly into physicians' incomes. These policies move physicians' relative and absolute incomes more than any reasonable changes to marginal tax rates. At the same time, the overall level of physician earnings can largely be explained by labor market fundamentals of long work and training hours. Competing occupations also pay well and provide a natural lower bound for physician earnings. We conclude that government plays a major role in determining the value of physicians' human capital, but it is unrealistic to use this power to reduce healthcare spending substantially.
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Distribution Preserving Statistical Disclosure Limitation
September 2006
Working Paper Number:
tp-2006-04
One approach to limiting disclosure risk in public-use microdata is to release multiply-imputed,
partially synthetic data sets. These are data on actual respondents, but with confidential data
replaced by multiply-imputed synthetic values. A mis-specified imputation model can invalidate
inferences because the distribution of synthetic data is completely determined by the model used
to generate them. We present two practical methods of generating synthetic values when the imputer
has only limited information about the true data generating process. One is applicable when
the true likelihood is known up to a monotone transformation. The second requires only limited
knowledge of the true likelihood, but nevertheless preserves the conditional distribution of the confidential
data, up to sampling error, on arbitrary subdomains. Our method maximizes data utility
and minimizes incremental disclosure risk up to posterior uncertainty in the imputation model and
sampling error in the estimated transformation. We validate the approach with a simulation and
application to a large linked employer-employee database.
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Immigration and Entrepreneurship in the United States
December 2020
Working Paper Number:
CES-20-44
Immigrants can expand labor supply and compete for jobs with native-born workers. But immigrants may also start new firms, expanding labor demand. This paper uses U.S. administrative data and other data sources to study the role of immigrants in entrepreneurship. We ask how often immigrants start companies, how many jobs these firms create, and how firms founded by native-born individuals compare. A simple model provides a measurement framework for addressing the dual roles of immigrants as founders and workers. The findings suggest that immigrants act more as 'job creators' than 'job takers' and play outsized roles in U.S. high-growth entrepreneurship.
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Founding Teams and Startup Performance
November 2019
Working Paper Number:
CES-19-32
We explore the role of founding teams in accounting for the post-entry dynamics of startups. While the entrepreneurship literature has largely focused on business founders, we broaden this view by considering founding teams, which include both the founders and the initial employees in the first year of operations. We investigate the idea that the success of a startup may derive from the organizational capital that is created at firm formation and is inalienable from the founding team itself. To test this hypothesis, we exploit premature deaths to identify the causal impact of losing a founding team member on startup performance. We find that the exogenous separation of a founding team member due to premature death has a persistently large, negative, and statistically significant impact on post-entry size, survival, and productivity of startups. While we find that the loss of a key founding team member (e.g. founders) has an especially large adverse effect, the loss of a non-key founding team member still has a significant adverse effect, lending support to our inclusive definition of founding teams. Furthermore, we find that the effects are particularly strong for small founding teams but are not driven by activity in small business-intensive or High Tech industries.
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Agent Heterogeneity and Learning: An Application to Labor Markets
October 2002
Working Paper Number:
tp-2002-20
I develop a matching model with heterogeneous workers, rms, and worker-firm
matches, and apply it to longitudinal linked data on employers and employees. Workers
vary in their marginal product when employed and their value of leisure when unemployed.
Firms vary in their marginal product and cost of maintaining a vacancy. The
marginal product of a worker-firm match also depends on a match-specific interaction
between worker and rm that I call match quality. Agents have complete information
about worker and rm heterogeneity, and symmetric but incomplete information about
match quality. They learn its value slowly by observing production outcomes. There
are two key results. First, under a Nash bargain, the equilibrium wage is linear in a
person-specific component, a firm-specific component, and the posterior mean of beliefs
about match quality. Second, in each period the separation decision depends only on
the posterior mean of beliefs and person and rm characteristics. These results have
several implications for an empirical model of earnings with person and rm eects.
The rst implies that residuals within a worker-firm match are a martingale; the second
implies the distribution of earnings is truncated.
I test predictions from the matching model using data from the Longitudinal
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program at the US Census Bureau. I present
both xed and mixed model specifications of the equilibrium wage function, taking
account of structural aspects implied by the learning process. In the most general
specification, earnings residuals have a completely unstructured covariance within a
worker-firm match. I estimate and test a variety of more parsimonious error structures,
including the martingale structure implied by the learning process. I nd considerable
support for the matching model in these data.
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