I investigate whether, as is commonly believed -- and if so how -- firm disclosure of so-called "toxic" releases, required since 1987 by the federal "Toxics Release Inventory ("TRI"), has brought about the reductions in toxic releases that have occurred since that time. Existing literature, consisting principally of event studies of stock market returns, suggest that dirty firms experience abnormal negative returns. Using a micro-level data set that links TRI releases to plant level Census data for petroleum refineries, I study plant-level behavior, exploiting state variation in toxics regulations, and exploring the relationship between TRI releases and concomitant regulation of non-toxic pollutants. I find that, although TRI induced public disclosure may have contributed to the decline in reported toxic releases, that alone has not been the cause of those reductions: the evidence is strong that changes in toxic emission intensity are a byproduct of more traditional command and control regulation of emissions of non-toxic pollutants. I find that (1) since 1987, refineries have become substantially cleaner in terms of over-all toxic releases; (2) the clean-up has not occurred through substitution away from TRI listed substances as inputs or alteration in the mix of outputs; and (3) refineries in states with more stringent supplemental regulation of toxics (e.g. with specific state-wide goals for toxic reductions) have significantly lower toxic emission intensity levels than refineries in other states. I find also that (4) TRI air releases are highly correlated with levels of criteria air pollution; (5) both toxic pollution levels and intensity fall with increases in pollution abatement (operating and maintenance) expenditures for non-toxic air pollution; and (6) TRI air releases are affected by being in more stringent regulatory regions for the criteria air pollutants. Finally, I link my data-set with CRSP data to re-evaluate the effect of TRI reporting on company stock market valuation, correcting for a methodological shortcoming (stemming from the fact that all reporting firms face a common event window) of prior event studies of the impact of the TRI. Correcting for that shortcoming, I find that (7) the evidence of negative abnormal returns around TRI reporting dates for petroleum companies is not significant. My findings suggest that the most probable mechanism through which TRI reporting may induce firms to clean up is local and state governmental use of TRI disclosures. They suggest also not only that the perceived effectiveness of TRI regulation has been overstated, but perhaps more importantly that the benefits of command and control regulation of non-toxic pollutants have been underestimated.
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OFFSHORING POLLUTION WHILE OFFSHORING PRODUCTION*
January 2016
Working Paper Number:
CES-16-09R
We examine the role of firm strategy in the global combat against pollution. We find that U.S. plants release less toxic emissions when their parent firm imports more from low-wage countries (LWCs). Consistent with the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, goods imported by U.S. firms from LWCs are in more pollution-intensive industries; U.S. plants shift production to less pollution-intensive industries, produce less waste, and spend less on pollution abatement when their parent imports more from LWCs. The negative impact of LWC imports on emissions is stronger for U.S. plants located in counties with greater institutional pressure for environmental performance, but weaker for more-capable U.S. plants and firms. These results highlight the role of local institutions and firm capability in explaining firms' choice of offshoring and environmental strategy.
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Pollution Havens and the Trade in Toxic Chemicals: Evidence from U.S. Trade Flows
June 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-12
Does increased environmental protection decrease the emission of pollutants or merely displace them? Using newly available trade data, this study examines the flows of a panel of chemicals designated as toxic by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Estimates from a differences-in-differences model indicate a significant increase in net imports when a chemical is listed on TRI, which suggests production offshoring. Furthermore, I find that increased imports due to this 'pollution haven effect' are sourced disproportionately from poorer countries, which are likely to have lower environmental protection standards. At the same time, I observe the bulk of American trade in toxic chemicals occurs with other wealthy countries, which may be attributed to the capital intensity of chemical production.
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U.S. Trade in Toxics: The Case of Chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22)
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-29
This paper explores whether environmental regulation affects where pollution-intensive goods are produced. Here we examine chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22), a chemical designated as toxic in 1994 by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Trends show a decline in the number of domestic producers of this chemical, a decline in the number of manufacturing facilities using it, and an increase in the number (and share) of facilities claiming to import it. Transaction-level trade data show an increase in the import of HCFC-22 imports since its TRI listing ' an increase that is faster than that of all non-TRI listed chemicals. This is suggestive of a pollution haven effect. Meanwhile, we find that the vast majority of U.S. imports of HCFC-22 come from OECD countries. However, an increase in the share of imports from non-OECD countries since the chemical's listing suggests a shift of production to countries with more lax environmental standards. While the findings here are suggestive of regulatory effects, more rigorous analyses are needed to rule out other possible explanations.
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Cross Sectional Variation In Toxic Waste Releases From The U.S. Chemical Industry
August 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-08
This paper measures and examines the 1987 cross sectional variation in toxic releases from the U.S. chemical industry. The analysis is based on a unique plant level data set of over 2,100 plants, combining EPA toxic release data with Census Bureau data on economic activity. The main results are that intra-industry variation in toxic releases are as great as, or greater, than inter-industry variation, and that plant, firm, and regulatory characteristics are important factors in explaining observed variation in toxic releases. Even after controlling for primary product and plant characteristics, there are some firms that generate significantly lower toxic waste due to managerial ability and/or technology differences.
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The Impact of Heterogeneous NOx Regulations on Distributed Electricity Generation in U.S. Manufacturing
April 2015
Working Paper Number:
CES-15-12
The US EPA's command-and-control NOx policies of the early 1990s are associated with a 3.1 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of manufacturing plants vertically integrating the electricity generation process. During the same period California adopted a cap-and-trade program for NOx emissions that resulted in no significant impact on distributed electricity generation in manufacturing. These results suggest that traditional command-and-control approaches to air pollution may exacerbate other market failures such as the energy efficiency gap, because distributed generation is generally recognized as a more energy efficient means of producing electricity
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Air Pollution Abatement Costs Under the Clean Air Act: Evidence from the PACE Survey
December 2001
Working Paper Number:
CES-01-12
This paper uses establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey to investigate the effects of air quality regulation on the air pollution abatement capital expenditures and operating costs of manufacturing plants from 1979-1988. Results, based on some 90,000 observations, show that heavy emitters of the 'criteria' air pollutants (covered under the Clean Air Act) had significantly larger APA costs, and those subject to greater 'local' regulation (due to county NAAQS non-attainment) had expenditures that were greater still. The local regulation of a particular air pollutant generally resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars (or more) of additional costs, with larger establishments and capital expenditures disproportionately affected. Federal and state environmental standards appear to have played a notable role, particularly in industries producing chemicals, petroleum, primary metals, and nonmetallic minerals. The findings of this paper support those of several recent studies.
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Estimating the Distribution of Plant-Level Manufacturing Energy Efficiency with Stochastic Frontier Regression
March 2007
Working Paper Number:
CES-07-07
A feature commonly used to distinguish between parametric/statistical models and engineering models is that engineering models explicitly represent best practice technologies while the parametric/statistical models are typically based on average practice. Measures of energy intensity based on average practice are less useful in the corporate management of energy or for public policy goal setting. In the context of company or plant level energy management, it is more useful to have a measure of energy intensity capable of representing where a company or plant lies within a distribution of performance. In other words, is the performance close (or far) from the industry best practice? This paper presents a parametric/statistical approach that can be used to measure best practice, thereby providing a measure of the difference, or 'efficiency gap' at a plant, company or overall industry level. The approach requires plant level data and applies a stochastic frontier regression analysis to energy use. Stochastic frontier regression analysis separates the energy intensity into three components, systematic effects, inefficiency, and statistical (random) error. The stochastic frontier can be viewed as a sub-vector input distance function. One advantage of this approach is that physical product mix can be included in the distance function, avoiding the problem of aggregating output to define a single energy/output ratio to measure energy intensity. The paper outlines the methods and gives an example of the analysis conducted for a non-public micro-dataset of wet corn refining plants.
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Do EPA Regulations Affect Labor Demand? Evidence From the Pulp and Paper Industry
August 2013
Working Paper Number:
CES-13-39
The popular belief is that environmental regulation must reduce employment, since suchregulations are expected to increase production costs, which would raise prices and thus reducedemand for output, at least in a competitive market. Although this effect might seem obvious, a careful microeconomic analysis shows that it is not guaranteed. Even if environmental regulation reduces output in the regulated industry, abating pollution could require additional labor (e.g. to monitor the abatement capital and meet EPA reporting requirements). It is also possible for pollution abatement technologies to be labor enhancing. In this paper we analyze how a particular EPA regulation, the so-called 'Cluster Rule' (CR) imposed on the pulp and paper industry in 2001, affected employment in that sector. Using establishment level data from the Census of Manufacturers and Annual Survey of Manufacturers at the U.S. Census Bureau from 1992-2007 we find evidence of small employment declines (on the order of 3%-7%), which are sometimes statistically significant, at a subset of the plants covered by the CR.
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Estimating the Hidden Costs of Environmental Regulation
May 2002
Working Paper Number:
CES-02-10
This paper examines whether accounting systems identify all the costs of environmental regulation. We estimate the relation between the 'visible' cost of regulatory compliance, i.e., costs that are correctly classified in firms' accounting systems, and 'hidden' costs i.e., costs that are embedded in other accounts. We use plant-level data from 55 steel mills to estimate hidden costs, and we follow up with structured interviews of corporate-level managers and plant-level accountants. Empirical results show that a $1 increase in the visible cost of environmental regulation is associated with an increase in total cost (at the margin) of $10-11, of which $9-10 are hidden in other accounts. The findings suggest that inappropriate identification and accumulation of the costs of environmental compliance are likely to lead to distorted costs in firms subject to environmental regulation.
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RANDOMIZED SAFETY INSPECTIONS AND RISK EXPOSURE ON THE JOB: QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE
January 2014
Working Paper Number:
CES-14-05
Compensating wages for workplace fatality and accident risks are used to infer the value of a statistical life (VSL), which in turn is used to assess the benefits of human health and safety regulations. The estimation of these wage differentials, however, has been plagued by measurement error and omitted variables. This paper employs the first quasi-experimental design within a labor market setting to overcome such limitations in the ex-tant literature. Specifically, randomly assigned, exogenous federal safety inspections are used to instrument for plant-level risks and combined with confidential U.S. Census data on manufacturing employment to estimate the VSL using a difference-in-differences framework. The VSL is estimated to be between $2 and $4 million ($2011), suggesting prior studies may substantially overstate the value workers place on safety, and therefore, the benefits of health and safety regulations.
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