CREAT: Census Research Exploration and Analysis Tool

Using detailed tabulations from matched employer-employee administrative data, I document evidence of an immediate, sizable, and persistent decrease in the level of early career (22-24 year old) hires following introduction of ChatGPT within the industry-state cells that are most exposed to AI. The decline in hires is the primary cause of large observed declines in employment over the subsequent period. Regressionadjusted employment of early career workers in the most AI-exposed quintile of industry-state cells declined by 12% over the 10 quarters following the introduction of ChatGPT, even as employment in lessexposed industries has remained stable. The rate of hiring largely recovered by early 2025, attributable to a smaller employment base. Earnings growth of early career workers in the most exposed industries slowed slightly relative to those in less exposed industries. Although the most AI-exposed quintile of detailed industries is dominated by a handful of industry sectors, I find that the association of higher AI exposure with reduced early career employment and fewer hires is observed across most sectors of the economy. Timing of effects in event studies is consistent with an immediate effect on hiring following introduction of ChatGPT. However, triple difference estimates provide some evidence of earlier trend shifts on employment, hiring, and separations around the onset of the COVID pandemic. I discuss potential explanations, including the increase in remote work and increased educational attainment among workers in AI-exposed occupations. Nonetheless, job gains to early career workers and backfill hires show evidence of discontinuous decline at the time of ChatGPT's release in comparison to older workers in the same industries. A local projections analysis at the NAICS industry group level shows that industries with high AI exposure are not particularly sensitive to unexpected fluctuations in monetary policy on average relative to other industries in employment, hiring, or separations. A historical decomposition suggests that up to one quarter of relative early career employment declines through 2025q2 may be attributable to monetary policy shocks through 2023, but the analysis does not find evidence that these shocks can explain the rapid decline in hires at the most AI-exposed firms in comparison to others.

We explore sources of measured misallocation using establishment data from U.S. manufacturing industries. We decompose standard revenue productivity dispersion statistics into contributions by dispersion in revenue margins over costs and dispersion in input cost shares across plants. We establish a formal link between these components and measured allocative efficiency. The results indicate the components contribute similarly to apparent rising misallocation in US manufacturing. We use the mapping between distortions that influence these distinct components to explore the relationship between inferred distortions and mechanisms that influence one or both sources of revenue productivity dispersion. Finally, we show rising misallocation in the US manufacturing sector in the last several decades is pervasive, and yet a few industries account for over half of the aggregate decline.

Using novel, nationally representative data from the 2026 AI supplement to the U.S. Census Bureau's Business Trends and Outlook Survey (BTOS), we characterize AI diffusion across three interconnected layers: overall firm use, deployment across business functions, and worker-task use. This multi-layered approach provides a nuanced picture of business AI adoption. During the supplement reference period (Nov 2025-Jan 2026), 18% of firms used AI in a business function, rising to 32% on an employment-weighted basis; adoption is expected to reach 22% within six months. AI use is substantially higher in large firms and knowledge-intensive sectors, with use rates reaching 50%-60% (60%-70%, employment-weighted) for very large firms in the Information, Professional Services, and Finance sectors. Among adopting firms, the scope of use remains limited: 57% of users integrate AI in three or fewer business functions, most commonly Sales and Marketing (52%), Strategy and Business Development (45%), and IT (41%). In 23% (41%, employment-weighted) of firms, workers use AI in work-related tasks. Writing, document analysis, and information search are the leading Generative AI use in tasks, though 65% of firms limit use to three or fewer tasks. The evidence points to both top-down and bottom-up diffusion channels: worker task use sometimes occurs without formal firm-level adoption, and firm-level adoption sometimes occurs without worker task use. Most users (66%) rely on AI solely to augment tasks, while AI-related employment decreases are rare, occurring in only 2% of firms. Regression analysis shows a robust positive correlation between firm commercial performance and the breadth of AI integration, including functional deployment, task-level use, and operational investment. A distinct divergence emerges, however, with respect to labor outcomes. Functional breadth and operational investment are positively associated with employment decreases, whereas worker-task integration shows no significant link to headcount reduction once functional integration and operational investment are taken into account.

I investigate whether the effects of UI extensions are different for workers exposed to higher levels of local labor market concentration, a potential source of employer market power. I exploit measurement error in state unemployment rates that led to quasi-random assignment of UI durations in the U.S. during the Great Recession. Using matched employer-employee data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics program, I find that UI extensions lengthen nonemployment durations by one week and cause economically meaningful but not statistically significant increases in earnings. The UI-earnings effect is significantly lower at higher levels of concentration, while there is no difference in the UI-duration effect. The lower UI-earnings effect is driven by the extremes of the distribution of concentration. My results suggest that match improvements from UI are attenuated at higher levels of concentration.

We study the role of victim reporting in the production of public safety. We examine the Secure Communities program, a crime-reduction policy that involved police in detecting unauthorized immigrants and increased deportation fears in immigrant communities. We find that the policy reduced the likelihood that Hispanic victims report crimes to police and increased offending against Hispanics. The number of reported crimes is unchanged, masking these opposing effects. We show that reduced reporting drives the offending increase and provide the first elasticity of offending to victim reporting in the literature, calculating that a 10% decline in reporting increases offending by 7.9%.