CREAT: Census Research Exploration and Analysis Tool

Federal housing assistance programs, such as those run by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), have been shown to reduce rent burden and improve housing stability for program participants, which may in turn have downstream impacts on their labor market attachment and career trajectories. However, existing studies from individual cities or states provide mixed evidence on the association of housing assistance with labor market outcomes. By linking HUD administrative records to matched employee-employer earnings records from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program, we document how the labor market trajectories of program participants change as they enter and exit federal housing assistance programs, examining outcomes over a 14-year window surrounding entry or exit. In our analysis of entry, we find that the employment rates and earnings of first-time HUD program participants begin to increase upon entering a HUD program, which represents a reversal of prior declining trends in these outcomes. Suggestive of a positive association, these increases in employment and earnings trends exceed those of low-income non-participants from the American Community Survey (ACS). In our analysis of exits, we find that program participants who eventually leave a HUD program have increasing pre-exit trends in employment and earnings that then flatten upon exiting. Comparing these negative changes in trend to the relatively stable trajectories of those who remain in HUD programs throughout the analysis suggests that exits are associated with diminished employment and earnings trajectories.

We provide new county-level estimates of intergenerational mobility, covering multiple economic concepts: total income, labor income, homeownership, housing wealth, and total wealth. This is possible via small-area estimation techniques and linked survey and administrative data covering millions of U.S. children born between 1978 and 1986. We find that relative mobility in wealth concepts shows less spatial clustering and more spatial variation than relative mobility in income concepts. Many cities and their suburbs exhibit lower relative mobility (i.e. higher intergenerational persistence) in wealth concepts than in income concepts. Next, we show that various local characteristics are associated with some concepts of economic mobility but not with others. For example, we estimate a strong negative association between the local severity of the Great Recession and child income, regardless of parent position in the income distribution. However, the negative association between recession severity and wealth only exists among children from poorer families. We provide a public-use data package on census.gov to facilitate further research.

Many non-Delaware firms strategically file for bankruptcy in Delaware. Should this "forum shopping" be allowed? This question has motivated nine proposed congressional bills over decades of policy debate. Using a novel natural experiment and Census-Bureau microdata, we inform this debate. Comparing similar firms within a Delaware-adjacent state, we show that proximity to Delaware predicts forum shopping. Instrumenting with proximity, we find that forum shopping causally: (i) prevents closures'and liquidations, (ii) shortens bankruptcies, (iii) boosts creditor recovery, and (iv) increases post-bankruptcy employment by 24.8%. Proximity to Delaware is uncorrelated with growth for not-yet-bankrupt or never-bankrupt firms, validating the exclusion restriction.

Custom software is distinct from other types of capital in that it is non-rival'once a firm makes an investment in custom software, it can be used simultaneously across its many establishments. Using confidential U.S. Census data, we document that while firms with more establishments are more likely to invest in custom software, they spend less on it as a share of total capital expenditure. We explain these empirical patterns by developing a model that incorporates the non-rivalry of custom software. In the model, firms choose whether to adopt custom software, the intensity of their investment, and their scope, balancing the cost of managing multiple establishments with the increasing returns to scope from the nonrivalrous custom software investment. Using the calibrated model, we assess the extent to which the decline in the rental rate of custom software over the past 40 years can account for a number of macroeconomic trends, including increases in firm scope and concentration.

Using detailed tabulations from matched employer-employee administrative data, I document evidence of an immediate, sizable, and persistent decrease in the level of early career (22-24 year old) hires following introduction of ChatGPT within the industry-state cells that are most exposed to AI. The decline in hires is the primary cause of large observed declines in employment over the subsequent period. Regressionadjusted employment of early career workers in the most AI-exposed quintile of industry-state cells declined by 12% over the 10 quarters following the introduction of ChatGPT, even as employment in lessexposed industries has remained stable. The rate of hiring largely recovered by early 2025, attributable to a smaller employment base. Earnings growth of early career workers in the most exposed industries slowed slightly relative to those in less exposed industries. Although the most AI-exposed quintile of detailed industries is dominated by a handful of industry sectors, I find that the association of higher AI exposure with reduced early career employment and fewer hires is observed across most sectors of the economy. Timing of effects in event studies is consistent with an immediate effect on hiring following introduction of ChatGPT. However, triple difference estimates provide some evidence of earlier trend shifts on employment, hiring, and separations around the onset of the COVID pandemic. I discuss potential explanations, including the increase in remote work and increased educational attainment among workers in AI-exposed occupations. Nonetheless, job gains to early career workers and backfill hires show evidence of discontinuous decline at the time of ChatGPT's release in comparison to older workers in the same industries. A local projections analysis at the NAICS industry group level shows that industries with high AI exposure are not particularly sensitive to unexpected fluctuations in monetary policy on average relative to other industries in employment, hiring, or separations. A historical decomposition suggests that up to one quarter of relative early career employment declines through 2025q2 may be attributable to monetary policy shocks through 2023, but the analysis does not find evidence that these shocks can explain the rapid decline in hires at the most AI-exposed firms in comparison to others.