Papers Containing Tag(s): 'Department of Economics'
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Viewing papers 51 through 57 of 57
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Working PaperCementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices
July 2006
Working Paper Number:
CES-06-21
This paper looks at the reasons for and results of vertical integration, with specific regard to its possible effects on market power as proposed in the theoretical literature on foreclosure. It uses a rich data set on producers in the cement and ready-mixed concrete industries over a 34- year period to perform a detailed case study. There is little evidence that foreclosure effects are quantitatively important in these industries. Instead, prices fall, quantities rise, and entry rates remain unchanged when markets become more integrated. We suggest an alternative mechanism that is consistent with these patterns and provide additional evidence in support of it: namely, that higher productivity producers are more likely to vertically integrate, and as has been documented elsewhere, are also larger, more likely to grow and survive, and charge lower prices. We explore possible sources of vertically integrated producers' productivity advantage and find that the advantage is tied to firm size, possibly in part through improved logistics coordination, but not to several other possible explanations.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperPublic Disclosure of Private Information as a Tool for Regulating Environmental Emissions: Firm-Level Responses by Petroleum Refineries to the Toxics Release Inventory
October 2005
Working Paper Number:
CES-05-13
I investigate whether, as is commonly believed -- and if so how -- firm disclosure of so-called "toxic" releases, required since 1987 by the federal "Toxics Release Inventory ("TRI"), has brought about the reductions in toxic releases that have occurred since that time. Existing literature, consisting principally of event studies of stock market returns, suggest that dirty firms experience abnormal negative returns. Using a micro-level data set that links TRI releases to plant level Census data for petroleum refineries, I study plant-level behavior, exploiting state variation in toxics regulations, and exploring the relationship between TRI releases and concomitant regulation of non-toxic pollutants. I find that, although TRI induced public disclosure may have contributed to the decline in reported toxic releases, that alone has not been the cause of those reductions: the evidence is strong that changes in toxic emission intensity are a byproduct of more traditional command and control regulation of emissions of non-toxic pollutants. I find that (1) since 1987, refineries have become substantially cleaner in terms of over-all toxic releases; (2) the clean-up has not occurred through substitution away from TRI listed substances as inputs or alteration in the mix of outputs; and (3) refineries in states with more stringent supplemental regulation of toxics (e.g. with specific state-wide goals for toxic reductions) have significantly lower toxic emission intensity levels than refineries in other states. I find also that (4) TRI air releases are highly correlated with levels of criteria air pollution; (5) both toxic pollution levels and intensity fall with increases in pollution abatement (operating and maintenance) expenditures for non-toxic air pollution; and (6) TRI air releases are affected by being in more stringent regulatory regions for the criteria air pollutants. Finally, I link my data-set with CRSP data to re-evaluate the effect of TRI reporting on company stock market valuation, correcting for a methodological shortcoming (stemming from the fact that all reporting firms face a common event window) of prior event studies of the impact of the TRI. Correcting for that shortcoming, I find that (7) the evidence of negative abnormal returns around TRI reporting dates for petroleum companies is not significant. My findings suggest that the most probable mechanism through which TRI reporting may induce firms to clean up is local and state governmental use of TRI disclosures. They suggest also not only that the perceived effectiveness of TRI regulation has been overstated, but perhaps more importantly that the benefits of command and control regulation of non-toxic pollutants have been underestimated.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperPrices, Spatial Competition, and Heterogeneous Producers: An Empirical Test
August 2004
Working Paper Number:
CES-04-16
In markets where spatial competition is important, many models predict that average prices are lower in denser markets (i.e., those with more producers per unit area). Homogeneous-producer models attribute this effect solely to lower optimal markups. However, when producers instead differ in their production costs, a second mechanism also acts to lower equilibrium prices: competition-driven selection on costs. Consumers' greater substitution possibilities in denser markets make it more difficult for high-cost firms to profitably operate, truncating the equilibrium cost (and price) distributions from above. This selection process can be empirically distinguished from the homogenous-producer case because it implies that not only do average prices fall as density rises, but that upper-bound prices and price dispersion should also decline as well. I find empirical support for this process using a rich set of price data from U.S. ready-mixed concrete plants. Features of the industry offer an arguably exogenous source of producer density variation with which to identify these effects. I also show that the findings do not simply result from lower factor prices in dense markets, but rather because dense-market producers are low-cost because they are more efficient.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperTechnology Locks, Creative Destruction And Non-Convergence In Productivity Levels
April 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-06
This paper presents a simple solution to a new model that seeks to explain the distribution of plants across productivity levels within an industry, and empirically confirms some key predictions using the U.S. textile industry. In the model, plants are locked into a given productivity level, until they exit or retool. Convex costs of adjustment captures the fact that more productive plants expand faster. Provided there is technical change, productivity levels do not converge; the model achieves persistent dispersion in productivity levels within the context of a distortion free competitive equilibrium. The equilibrium, however, is rather turbulent; plants continually come on line with the cutting edge technology, gradually expand and finally exit or retool when they cease to recover their variable costs. The more productive plants create jobs, while the less productive destroy them. The model establishes a close link between productivity growth and dispersion in productivity levels; more rapid productivity growth leads to more widespread dispersion. This prediction is empirically confirmed. Additionally, the model provides an explanation for S-shaped diffusion.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperWhittling Away At Productivity Dispersion
March 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-05
In any time period, in any industry, plant productivity levels differ widely and this dispersion is persistent. This paper explores the sources of this dispersion and their relative magnitudes in the textile industry. Plants that are measured as being more productive but pay higher wages are not necessarily more profitable; wage dispersion can account for approximately 15 percent of productivity dispersion. A plant that is highly productive today may not be as productive tomorrow. I develop a new method for measuring ex-ante dispersion and the percentage of dispersion "explained" by mean reversion. Mean reversion accounts for as much as one half the observed productivity dispersion. A portion of the dispersion, however, appears to reflect real quality differences between plants; plants that are measured as being more productive expand faster and are less likely to exit.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperThe Long-Run Demand for Labor: Estimates From Census Establishment Data
September 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-13
This paper estimates long-run demand functions for production workers, production worker hours, and nonproduction workers using micro data from U.S. establishment surveys. The paper focuses on estimation of the wage and output elasticities of labor demand using data on over 41,000 U.S. manufacturing plants in 1975 and more than 30,000 plants in 1981. Particular attention is focused on the problems of unobserved producer heterogeneity and measurement errors in output that can affect labor demand estimates based on establishment survey data. The empirical results reveal that OLS estimates of both the own-price elasticity and the output elasticity of labor demand are biased downward as a result of unobserved heterogeneity. Differencing the data as a solution to this problem greatly exaggerates measurement error in the output coefficients. The use of capital stocks as instrumental variables to correct for measurement error in output significantly alters output elasticities in the expected direction but has no systematic effect on own-price elasticities. All of these patterns are found in estimates that pool establishment data across industries and in industry-specific regressions for the vast majority of industries. Estimates of the output elasticity of labor demand indicate that there are slight increasing returns for production workers and production hours, with a pooled data estimate of .92. The estimate for nonproduction workers in .98. The variation in the output elasticities across industries is fairly small. Estimates of the own-price elasticity vary more substantially with the year, type of differencing used, and industry. They average -.50 for production hours, -.41 for production workers, and -.44 for nonproduction workers. The price elasticities vary widely across manufacturing industries: the interquartile range for the industry estimates is approximately .40.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperScience, R&D, And Invention Potential Recharge: U.S. Evidence
January 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-02
The influence of academic science on industrial R&D seems to have increased in recent years compared with the pre-World War II period. This paper outlines an approach to tracing this influence using a panel of 14 R&D performing industries from 1961-1986. The results indicate an elasticity between real R&D and indicators of stocks of academic science of about 0.6. This elasticity is significant controlling for industry effects. However, the elasticity declines from its level during the 1961-1973 subperiod, when it was 2.2, to 0.5 during the 1974-1986 subperiod. Reasons for the decline include exogenous and endogenous exhaustion of invention potential, and declining incentives to do R&D stemming from a weakening of intellectual property rights. The growth of R&D since the mid-1980s suggests a restoration of R&D incentives in still more recent times.View Full Paper PDF
