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Papers Containing Tag(s): 'Disability Insurance'

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  • Working Paper

    Employer Concentration and Labor Force Participation

    March 2022

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-22-08

    This paper examines the association between employer concentration and labor outcomes (labor force participation and employment). It uses restricted data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database to estimate, at the county level, to what extent more concentrated labor markets have lower labor force participation rates and lower employment. The analysis also examines whether unionization rates and education levels mediate these associations.
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  • Working Paper

    Ranking Firms Using Revealed Preference

    January 2017

    Authors: Isaac Sorkin

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-17-61

    This paper estimates workers' preferences for firms by studying the structure of employer-toemployer transitions in U.S. administrative data. The paper uses a tool from numerical linear algebra to measure the central tendency of worker flows, which is closely related to the ranking of firms revealed by workers' choices. There is evidence for compensating differential when workers systematically move to lower-paying firms in a way that cannot be accounted for by layoffs or differences in recruiting intensity. The estimates suggest that compensating differentials account for over half of the firm component of the variance of earnings.
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  • Working Paper

    Locate Your Nearest Exit: Mass Layoffs and Local Labor Market Response

    September 2015

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-15-25

    Large shocks to local labor markets cause lasting changes to communities and their residents. We examine four main channels through which the local labor force adjusts following mass layoffs: in- and out-migration, retirement, and disability insurance enrollment. We show that these channels account for over half of the labor force reductions following a mass layoff event. By measuring the residual difference between these channels and labor force change, we also show that labor force non-participation grew in the period during and after the Great Recession. This result highlights the growing importance of non-participation as a response to labor demand shocks.
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  • Working Paper

    EARNINGS ADJUSTMENT FRICTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM SOCIAL SECURITY EARNINGS TEST

    September 2013

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-13-50

    We study frictions in adjusting earnings to changes in the Social Security Annual Earnings Test (AET) using a panel of Social Security Administration microdata on one percent of the U.S. population from 1961 to 2006. Individuals continue to "bunch" at the convex kink the AET creates even when they are no longer subject to the AET, consistent with the existence of earnings adjustment frictions in the U.S. We develop a novel framework for estimating an earnings elasticity and an adjustment cost using information on the amount of bunching at kinks before and after policy changes in earnings incentives around the kinks. We apply this method in settings in which individuals face changes in the AET bene.t reduction rate, and we estimate in a baseline case that the earnings elasticity with respect to the implicit net-of-tax share is 0.23, and the .xed cost of adjustment is $152.08.
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  • Working Paper

    The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Extensions On Disability Insurance Application and Allowance Rates

    March 2013

    Authors: Matthew Rutledge

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-13-10

    Both unemployment insurance (UI) extensions and the availability of disability benefits have disincentive effects on job search. But UI extensions can reduce the efficiency cost of disability benefits if UI recipients delay disability application until they exhaust their unemployment benefits. This paper, the first to focus on the effect of UI extensions on disability applications, investigates whether UI eligibility, extension, and exhaustion affect the timing of disability applications and the composition of the applicant pool. Jobless individuals are significantly less likely to apply to Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) during UI extensions, and significantly more likely to apply when UI is ultimately exhausted. Healthier potential applicants appear more likely to delay, as state allowance rates increase after a new UI extension. Simulations find that a 13-week UI extension decreases SSDI and Medicare costs, offsetting about half of the increase in UI payments; this suggests that the benefits of UI extensions may be understated ' permanent disability benefits are diverted to shorter-run unemployment benefits and, potentially, new jobs, while easing the burden on the nearly insolvent SSDI Trust Fund.
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  • Working Paper

    Changes in Firm Pension Policy: Trends Away from Traditional Defined Benefit Plans

    November 2011

    Authors: Kandice Kapinos

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-11-36

    In light of the recent concerns regarding the solvency of Social Security's Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), private pensions may play an increasingly important role in retirement welfare of US retirees. However, the private pension landscape has evolved in ways that may result in lower private pension wealth for retirees. One recent such phenomenon involves the conversion of traditional defined benefit pension plans to cash balance plans, which resulted in lower pension benefits for many workers. In this study, I investigate how characteristics of the firm's workforce influenced whether the firm converted their traditional pension plan to a cash balance plan and how these characteristics related to the firm's pension plan policy more generally. Using the Longitudinal Employer-Household Data and pension plan data from the Department of Labor/Internal Revenue Service and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, I found little evidence of workforce age distribution effects on the likelihood of DB plan conversion to a cash balance plan in the 1990s. More generally, I consistently find positive associations between firms with older and more female workforces and defined contribution plans during the same time.
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  • Working Paper

    The Work Disincentive Effects of the Disability Insurance Program in the 1990s

    February 2006

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-06-05

    In this paper we evaluate the work disincentive effects of the Disability Insurance program during the 1990s. To accomplish this we construct a new large data set with detailed information on DI application and award decisions and use two different econometric evaluation methods. First, we apply a comparison group approach proposed by John Bound to estimate an upper bound for the work disincentive effect of the current DI program. Second, we adopt a Regression-Discontinuity approach that exploits a particular feature of the DI eligibility determination process to provide a credible point estimate of the impact of the DI program on labor supply for an important subset of DI applicants. Our estimates indicate that during the 1990s the labor force participation rate of DI beneficiaries would have been at most 20 percentage points higher had none received benefits. In addition, we find even smaller labor supply responses for the subset of 'marginal' applicants whose disability determination is based on vocational factors.
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  • Working Paper

    Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System

    April 2002

    Working Paper Number:

    CES-02-09

    Because its benefit formula replaces a greater fraction of the lifetime earnings of lower earners than of higher earnings, Social Security is generally thought to be progressive, providing a 'better deal' to low earners in a cohort than to high earners. However, much of the intra-cohort redistribution in the U.S. Social Security system is related to factors other than lifetime income. Social Security transfers income from people with low life expectancies to people with high life expectancies, from single workers and from married couples with substantial earnings by the secondary earner to married one-earner couples, and from people who work for more than 35 years to those who concentrate their earnings in 35 or fewer years. This paper studies the redistribution accomplished in the retirement portion of the current U.S. Social Security system using a microsimulation model built around a match of the 1990 and 1991 Surveys of Income and Program Participation to Social Security administrative earnings and benefit records. The model simulates the distribution of internal rates of returns, net transfers, and lifetime net tax rates from Social Security that would have been received by members of the 1925 to 1929 birth cohorts if they had lived under current Social Security rules for their entire lives. The paper finds that annual income-related transfers from Social Security are only 5 to 9 percent of Social Security benefits paid, or $19 to $34 billion, at 2001 aggregate benefits levels, when taxes and benefits are discounted at the cohort rate of return of 1.29 percent. At higher discount rates, Social Security appears to be more redistributive by some measures, and less redistributive by others. Because much of the redistribution that occurs through Social Security is not related to income, the range of transfers received at a given level of lifetime income is quite wide. For example, 19 percent of individuals in the top lifetime income quintile receive net transfers that are greater than the average transfer for people in the lowest lifetime income quintile.
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