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Plant-Level Productivity and Imputation of Missing Data in the Census of Manufactures
January 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-02
In the U.S. Census of Manufactures, the Census Bureau imputes missing values using a combination of mean imputation, ratio imputation, and conditional mean imputation. It is wellknown that imputations based on these methods can result in underestimation of variability and potential bias in multivariate inferences. We show that this appears to be the case for the existing imputations in the Census of Manufactures. We then present an alternative strategy for handling the missing data based on multiple imputation. Specifically, we impute missing values via sequences of classification and regression trees, which offer a computationally straightforward and flexible approach for semi-automatic, large-scale multiple imputation. We also present an approach to evaluating these imputations based on posterior predictive checks. We use the multiple imputations, and the imputations currently employed by the Census Bureau, to estimate production function parameters and productivity dispersions. The results suggest that the two approaches provide quite different answers about productivity.
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Soft Information and Investment: Evidence from Plant-Level Data
October 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-38R
A reduction in travel time between headquarters and plants makes it easier for headquarters to monitor plants and gather 'soft' information--i.e., information that cannot be transmitted through non-personal means. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that the introduction of new airline routes that reduce the travel time between headquarters and plants leads to an increase in plant-level investment of 8% to 9% and an increase in plants' total factor productivity of 1.3% to 1.4%. Consistent with the notion that a reduction in travel time makes it easier for headquarters to monitor plants and gather soft information, I find that my results are stronger: i) for plants whose headquarters are more time constrained; ii) for plants operating in soft-information industries; iii) during the earlier years of my sample period, when alternative, non-personal, means of monitoring and transmitting information were less developed; iv) for plants where information uncertainty is likely to be greater and soft information is likely to be more valuable, such as smaller plants and peripheral plants operating in industries that are not the firm's main industry.
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Tariff Pass-Through, Firm Heterogeneity and Product Quality
October 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-37
Previous studies on tariff pass-through were constrained at the industry level. This paper is the first attempt to explore tariff pass-through at the firm level, and to investigate how it depends on firm heterogeneity in productivity and product differentiation in quality. Using an extended version of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model, I show that exporting firms absorb tariff changes by adjusting both their markups and product quality, which leads to an incomplete tariff pass-through. Moreover, tariff absorption elasticity negatively depends on firm productivity for quality differentiated goods, but positively depends on firm productivity for quality homogeneous goods. Using the U.S. transaction level export data and plant-level manufacturing data, I find evidence for these predictions. The firm-level tariff absorption elasticity is 0.87 on average. All products in the sample on average fit the definition of quality differentiated goods, and the tariff absorption elasticity is indeed higher for low productivity firms (1.27) and lower for high productivity firms (0.44). Dividing all products into quality homogeneous goods and quality differentiated goods in terms of various criteria also results in estimates consistent with model predictions for quality differentiated goods.
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Delegation in Multi-Establishment Firms: The Organizational Structure of I.T. Purchasing Authority
October 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-35
A rare large-scale empirical study of delegation within firms, this paper investigates how decision rights over information technology investments are allocated within multi-establishment firms. The core results indicate that a relatively high contribution to firm sales is highly correlated with authority being delegated to the local establishment. Firm-wide operational complexity and local information advantages are also associated with local discretion for IT purchases. Certain IT investments are also positively correlated with delegation. On the other hand, significant operational interdependencies evince a positive correlation with centralization, as do productive similarities among establishments. Surprisingly, absolute size of the firm and having a large IT budget are also correlated with centralized IT decision-making. With the exception of these latter effects, the results are consistent with models of organizational design that predict delegation where there is great demand for locally adapted choices and centralization where firm-wide coordination is most important. The findings document and make sense of widespread heterogeneity in decision rights across a range of firm and industry settings ' even among establishments belonging to the same parent firm. Finally, they suggest important considerations for future empirical and theoretical research into the determinants of delegation.
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Competition and Productivity: Evidence from the Post WWII U.S. Cement Industry
September 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-29
In the mid 1980s, the U.S. cement industry faced a large increase in foreign competition. Foreign cement producers began offering cement at very large discounts on U.S. prices. We show that productivity (measured by TFP) in the industry was falling during the 1960s and 1970s, but that following the increase in competition, productivity has reversed course and is growing strongly. When foreign competition was weak, productivity fell. When it was strong, productivity grew robustly. We explore the reasons for the large productivity increase. We argue that a large share of the productivity gains resulted from significant changes in management practices at plants.
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Information and Industry Dynamics
August 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-16R
This paper develops a dynamic industry model in which firms compete to acquire customers over time by disseminating information about themselves under the presence of random shocks to their efficiency. The properties of the model's stationary equilibrium are related to empirical regularities on firm and industry dynamics. As an application of the model, the effects of a decline in the cost of information dissemination on firm and industry dynamics are explored.
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Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry
April 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-08
In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. The U.S. cement industry is a clear example. For this industry, I study the effect of two policies on the entry behavior and industry equilibrium: An asymmetric environmental policy that creates barriers to greenfield entry and a policy that creates barriers to entry by acquisition (like an antitrust policy). In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and the regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. To model this industry, I use a perfect information static entry game. To estimate the supply and demand primitives of my model, I apply a recent estimator of discrete games to a rich database of the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the years 1963-2002. In my counterfactual analyses, I find that a less favorable environment for mergers during the Reagan-Bush administration would decrease the acquired plants by 70% and increase the new plants by 20%. Also, I find that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 increased the number of acquisitions by 7.8%. Furthermore, my simulations suggest that regulations that create barriers to greenfield entry are less favorable in terms of welfare than regulations that create barriers to entry by acquisition. Finally, I demonstrate how my parameter estimates change when I apply the traditional approach in the entry literature where entry by acquisition is not considered, and when using a simple OLS estimation.
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Information Technology, Capabilities and Asset Ownership: Evidence from Taxicab Fleets
November 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-39
We examine how information technology (IT) influences asset ownership through its impact on firms' and agents' capabilities. In particular, we propose that when IT is a substitute for agents' industry-specific human capital, IT adoption leads to increased vertical integration. We test this prediction using micro data on vehicle ownership patterns from the Economic Census during a period when computerized dispatching systems were first adopted by taxicab firms. The empirical tests exploit exogenous variation in local market conditions, to identify the impact of dispatching technology on firm asset ownership. The results show that firms increase the proportion of taxicabs owned by 12% when they adopt new computerized dispatching systems. The findings suggest that firms increasingly vertically integrate when they acquire resources that substitute for their agents' capabilities.
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Plant-Level Responses to Antidumping Duties: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturers
October 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-38R
This paper describes the effects of a temporary increase in tariffs on the performance and behavior of U.S. manufacturers. Using antidumping duties as an example of temporary protection, I compare the responses of protected manufacturers to those predicted by models of trade with heterogeneous firms. I find that apparent increases in revenue productivity associated with antidumping duties are primarily due to increases in prices and mark-ups, as physical productivity falls among protected plants. Moreover, antidumping duties slow the reallocation of resources from less productive to more productive uses by reducing product-switching behavior among protected plants.
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Why Do Firms Own Production Chains?
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-31
Many firms own links of production chains--i.e., they own both upstream and downstream plants in vertically linked industries. We use broad-based yet detailed data from the economy's goods-producing sectors to investigate the reasons for such vertical ownership. It does not appear that vertical ownership is usually used to facilitate transfers of goods along the production chain, as is often presumed. Shipments from firms' upstream units to their downstream units are surprisingly low, relative to both the firms' total upstream production and their downstream needs. Roughly one-third of upstream plants report no shipments to their firms' downstream units. Half ship less than three percent of their output internally. We do find that manufacturing plants in vertical ownership structures have high measures of 'type' (productivity, size, and capital intensity). These patterns primarily reflect selective sorting of high plant types into large firms; once we account for firm size, vertical structure per se matters much less. We propose an alternative explanation for vertical ownership that is consistent with these results. Namely, that rather than moderating goods transfers down production chains, it instead allows more efficient transfers of intangible inputs (e.g., managerial oversight) within the firm. We document some suggestive evidence of this mechanism.
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