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The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Risk, and Product Market Competition
July 2012
Working Paper Number:
CES-12-14
This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on the productivity of target firms using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves its production efficiency within two years after activism, and this improvement is concentrated in industries with a high degree of product market competition. By following plants that were sold post-intervention, we also find that efficient capital redeployment is an important channel via which activists create value. Furthermore, our analyses demonstrate that measuring performance using the Compustat data is likely to lead to a downward bias because target firms experiencing greater improvement post-intervention are also more likely to disappear from the Compustat database. Finally, consistent with recent work in asset-pricing linking firm investment decisions and expected returns, we show how changes to target firms' productivity are associated with a decline in systemic risk, particularly in competitive industries.
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Acquiring Labor
October 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-32
We present evidence that some firms pursue M&A activity with the objective of obtaining a larger workforce. Firms most likely to be acquired for their large labor force, firms with the largest ex ante employment, are associated with more positive post-merger employment outcomes. Moreover, we find this relation is strongest when acquiring labor outside of an M&A is likely to be most difficult, due to tight labor conditions, or most valuable, in high human capital industries. We further find that high employment target firms are associated with relatively greater post-merger wage increases and lower post-merger employee turnover. We find no evidence that the positive relation between target ex ante employment and ex post employment change is driven by target asset size, market capitalization, industry, profitability or acquirer characteristics. Our findings do not exclude the possibility that a different subset of M&A activity may be motivated to penalize managers who have tolerated over-employment. Indeed, we find evidence consistent with this disciplinary motivation when considering acquisitions of targets in declining industries.
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Post-Merger Restructuring and the Boundaries of the Firm
April 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-11
We examine how firms redraw their boundaries after acquisitions using plant-level data. We find that there is extensive restructuring in a short period following mergers and full-firm acquisitions. Acquirers of full firms sell 27% and close 19% of the plants of target firms within three years of the acquisition. Acquirers with skill in running their peripheral divisions tend to retain more acquired plants. Retained plants increase in productivity whereas sold plants do not. These results suggest that acquirers restructure targets in ways that exploit their comparative advantage.
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What Do I Take With Me: The Impact of Transfer and Replication of Resources on Parent and Spin-Out Firm Performance
February 2011
Working Paper Number:
CES-11-06
Focusing on entrepreneurial ventures created by employees leaving a firm, our study examines the differential impact of knowledge transfer and knowledge spillovers on both parent and spin-out performance. While extant research often uses knowledge transfer and spillover interchangeably, our study distinguishes between the two based on the 'rivalness' of the relevant knowledge. We theorize that both knowledge transfer (proxied by the size of the exiting employee team) and knowledge spillovers (proxied by the experience of the exiting employee team) will aid spin-out performance. However, knowledge transfer, being more rival, will have a greater adverse impact than knowledge spillovers on parent firm performance. Using U.S. Census Bureau linked employee-employer data from the legal services industry, we find support for our hypotheses. Our study thus contributes to extant literature by highlighting a key dimension of knowledge ' rivalness ' and the differential competitive dynamics effect of resources with varying degrees of rivalness.
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Delegation in Multi-Establishment Firms: The Organizational Structure of I.T. Purchasing Authority
October 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-35
A rare large-scale empirical study of delegation within firms, this paper investigates how decision rights over information technology investments are allocated within multi-establishment firms. The core results indicate that a relatively high contribution to firm sales is highly correlated with authority being delegated to the local establishment. Firm-wide operational complexity and local information advantages are also associated with local discretion for IT purchases. Certain IT investments are also positively correlated with delegation. On the other hand, significant operational interdependencies evince a positive correlation with centralization, as do productive similarities among establishments. Surprisingly, absolute size of the firm and having a large IT budget are also correlated with centralized IT decision-making. With the exception of these latter effects, the results are consistent with models of organizational design that predict delegation where there is great demand for locally adapted choices and centralization where firm-wide coordination is most important. The findings document and make sense of widespread heterogeneity in decision rights across a range of firm and industry settings ' even among establishments belonging to the same parent firm. Finally, they suggest important considerations for future empirical and theoretical research into the determinants of delegation.
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Characteristics of the Top R&D Performing Firms in the U.S.: Evidence from the Survey of Industrial R&D
September 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-33
Innovation drives economic growth and productivity growth, and as such, indicators of innovative activity such as research and development (R&D) expenditures are of paramount importance. We combine Census confidential microdata from two sources in order to examine the characteristics of the top R&D performing firms in the U.S. economy. We use the Survey of Industrial Research and Development (SIRD) to identify the top 200 R&D performing firms in 2003 and, to the extent possible, to trace the evolution of these firms from 1957 to 2007. The Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) further extends our knowledge about these firms and enables us to make comparisons to the U.S. economy. By linking the SIRD and the LBD we are able to create a detailed portrait of the evolution of the top R&D performing firms in the U.S.
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Who Creates Jobs? Small vs. Large vs. Young
August 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-17
There's been a long, sometimes heated, debate on the role of firm size in employment growth. Despite skepticism in the academic community, the notion that growth is negatively related to firm size remains appealing to policymakers and small business advocates. The widespread and repeated claim from this community is that most new jobs are created by small businesses. Using data from the Census Bureau Business Dynamics Statistics and Longitudinal Business Database, we explore the many issues regarding the role of firm size and growth that have been at the core of this ongoing debate (such as the role of regression to the mean). We find that the relationship between firm size and employment growth is sensitive to these issues. However, our main finding is that once we control for firm age there is no systematic relationship between firm size and growth. Our findings highlight the important role of business startups and young businesses in U.S. job creation. Business startups contribute substantially to both gross and net job creation. In addition, we find an 'up or out' dynamic of young firms. These findings imply that it is critical to control for and understand the role of firm age in explaining U.S. job creation.
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Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry
April 2010
Working Paper Number:
CES-10-08
In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. The U.S. cement industry is a clear example. For this industry, I study the effect of two policies on the entry behavior and industry equilibrium: An asymmetric environmental policy that creates barriers to greenfield entry and a policy that creates barriers to entry by acquisition (like an antitrust policy). In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and the regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion. To model this industry, I use a perfect information static entry game. To estimate the supply and demand primitives of my model, I apply a recent estimator of discrete games to a rich database of the U.S. Census of Manufactures for the years 1963-2002. In my counterfactual analyses, I find that a less favorable environment for mergers during the Reagan-Bush administration would decrease the acquired plants by 70% and increase the new plants by 20%. Also, I find that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 increased the number of acquisitions by 7.8%. Furthermore, my simulations suggest that regulations that create barriers to greenfield entry are less favorable in terms of welfare than regulations that create barriers to entry by acquisition. Finally, I demonstrate how my parameter estimates change when I apply the traditional approach in the entry literature where entry by acquisition is not considered, and when using a simple OLS estimation.
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Who Leaves, Where to, and Why Worrry? Employee Mobility, Employee Entrepreneurship, and Effects on Source Firm Performance
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-32
We theorize that differences in human assets' ability to generate value are linked to exit decisions and their effects on firm performance. Using linked employee-employer data from the U.S. Census Bureau on legal services, we find that employees with higher earnings are less likely to leave relative to employees with lower earnings, but if they do leave, they are more likely to move to a spin-out instead of an incumbent firm. Employee entrepreneurship has a larger adverse impact on source firm performance than moves to established firms, even controlling for observable employee quality. Findings suggest that the transfer of human capital, complementary assets, and opportunities all affect mobility decisions and their impact on source firms.
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Why Do Firms Own Production Chains?
September 2009
Working Paper Number:
CES-09-31
Many firms own links of production chains--i.e., they own both upstream and downstream plants in vertically linked industries. We use broad-based yet detailed data from the economy's goods-producing sectors to investigate the reasons for such vertical ownership. It does not appear that vertical ownership is usually used to facilitate transfers of goods along the production chain, as is often presumed. Shipments from firms' upstream units to their downstream units are surprisingly low, relative to both the firms' total upstream production and their downstream needs. Roughly one-third of upstream plants report no shipments to their firms' downstream units. Half ship less than three percent of their output internally. We do find that manufacturing plants in vertical ownership structures have high measures of 'type' (productivity, size, and capital intensity). These patterns primarily reflect selective sorting of high plant types into large firms; once we account for firm size, vertical structure per se matters much less. We propose an alternative explanation for vertical ownership that is consistent with these results. Namely, that rather than moderating goods transfers down production chains, it instead allows more efficient transfers of intangible inputs (e.g., managerial oversight) within the firm. We document some suggestive evidence of this mechanism.
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