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Costs of Air Quality Regulation
July 1999
Working Paper Number:
CES-99-09
This paper explores some costs associated with environmental regulation. We focus on regulation pertaining to ground-level- ozone (O) and its effects on two manufacturing industries - industrial organic chemicals (SIC 2865-9) and miscellaneous plastic products (SIC 308). Both are major emitters of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and nitrogen oxides (NO), the chemical precursors to ozone. Using plant-level data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), we examine the effects of regulation on the timing and magnitudes of investments by firms and on the impact it has had on their operating costs. As an alternative way to assess costs, we also employ plant-level data from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey. Analyses employing average total costs functions reveal that plants' production costs are indeed higher in (heavily-regulated) non-attainment areas relative to (less-regulated) attainment areas. This is particularly true for younger plants, consistent with the notion that regulation is most burdensome for new (rather existing) plants. Cost estimates using PACE data generally reveal lower costs. We also find that new heavily-regulated plants start out much larger than less-regulated plants, but then do not invest as much. Among other things, this highlights the substantial fixed costs involved in obtaining expansion permits. We also discuss reasons why plants may restrict their size.
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Manufacturing Plant Location: Does State Pollution Regulation Matter?
July 1997
Working Paper Number:
CES-97-08
This paper tests whether differences across states in pollution regulation affect the location of manufacturing activity in the U.S. Plant-level data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Research Database is used to identify new plant births in each state over the 1963-1987 period. This is combined with several measures of state regulatory intensity, including business pollution abatement spending, regulatory enforcement activity, congressional pro-environment voting, and an index of state environmental laws. A significant connection is found: states with more stringent environmental regulation have fewer new manufacturing plants. These results persist across a variety of econometric specifications, and the strongest regulatory coefficients are similar in magnitude to thos4e on other factors expected to influence location, such as unionization rates. However, a subsample of high-pollution industries, which might have been expected to show much larger impacts, gets similar coefficients. This raises the possibility that differences between states other than environmental regulation might be influencing the results.
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Innovation and Regulation in the Pesticide Industry
December 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-14
This paper examines the hypothesis that regulation negatively affects pesticide innovation, causes pesticide companies to introduce more harmful pesticides, and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. The results confirm that pesticide regulation adversely affects innovation and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, regulation encourages firms to develop less toxic pesticides. Estimates suggest that it requires about $29 million in industry expenditures on health and environmental testing to affect the toxicity of one new pesticide.
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Pollution Abatement Costs, Regulation And Plant-Level Productivity
December 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-14
We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.
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Environmental Regulation And Manufacturing Productivity At The Plant Level
March 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-06
This paper presents results for an analysis of plant-level data from three manufacturing industries (paper, oil, and steel). We combine productivity data from the Longitudinal Research Database ( LRD ) with pollution abatement expenditures from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) survey, as well as regulatory measures taken from datasets maintained by the Environmental Protection Agency. We use data from 1979 to 1985, considering both labor and total factor productivity, both levels and growth rates, and both annual measures and averages over the period. We find a strong connection between regulation and productivity when regulation is measured by compliance costs. More regulated plants have significantly lower productivity levels and slower productivity growth rates than less regulated plants. The magnitude of the impacts are larger than expected: a $1 increase in compliance costs appears to reduce TFP by the equivalent of $3 to $4. Thus, commonly used methods of calculating the impact of regulation on productivity are substantially underestimated. These results are generally consistent across industries and for different estimation methods. Our other measures of regulation (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) show much less consistent results. Higher enforcement, lower compliance, and higher emissions are generally associated with lower productivity levels and slower productivity growth, but the coefficients are rarely significant.
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The Structure Of Technology, Substitution, And Productivity In The Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Industry Under The NGPA Of 1978
August 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-09
The structure of production in the natural gas transmission industry is estimated using the dual restricted cost function based on panel data for twenty four firms. A standard translog variable cost function with firm fixed effects is augmented with controls for capacity utilization, technical change, and shifting regulatory regimes. During the implementation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 1978-1985, the industry exhibited no significant increase in productivity, largely attributable to the decline in output for the industry. Regulatory efforts to promote voluntary non-contract transmission appear to have enabled some firms to mitigate the overall industry productivity stagnation. The NGPA instituted a complex schedule of partial and gradual decontrol of natural gas prices at the well head. This form of deregulation costs natural gas producers over $100 billion in lost revenues, relative to immediate and full price deregulation. However, the transmission firms benefited by paying $1.5 billion less for natural gas than they would have under total deregulation. The benefits to consumers, totaling $98.7 billion, were unevenly distributed. On average, for the 1978-1985 period, utilities, commercial, and industrial users paid less for their gas than they would have under total decontrol and residential users paid $8.6 billion more. The NGPA and Federal Regulatory Commission oversight practices allow the transmission industry to price discriminate among customers.
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The Dynamics Of Productivity In The Telecommunications Equipment Industry
February 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-02
Technological change and deregulation have caused a major restructuring of the telecommunications equipment industry over the last two decades. We estimate the parameters of a production function for the equipment industry and then use those estimates to analyze the evolution of plant-level productivity over this period. The restructuring involved significant entry and exit and large changes in the sizes of incumbents. Since firms choices on whether to liquidate and the on the quantities of inputs demanded should they continue depend on their productivity, we develop an estimation algorithm that takes into account the relationship between productivity on the one hand, and both input demand and survival on the other. The algorithm is guided by a dynamic equilibrium model that generates the exit and input demand equations needed to correct for the simultaneity and selection problems. A fully parametric estimation algorithm based on these decision rules would be both computationally burdensome and require a host of auxiliary assumptions. So we develop a semiparametric technique which is both consistent with a quite general version of the theoretical framework and easy to use. The algorithm produces markedly different estimates of both production function parameters and of productivity movements than traditional estimation procedures. We find an increase in the rate of industry productivity growth after deregulation. This in spite of the fact that there was no increase in the average of the plants' rates of productivity growth, and there was actually a fall in our index of the efficiency of the allocation of variable factors conditional on the existing distribution of fixed factors. Deregulation was, however, followed by a reallocation of capital towards more productive establishments (by a down sizing, often shutdown, of unproductive plants and by a disproportionate growth of productive establishments) which more than offset the other factors' negative impacts on aggregate productivity.
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Technical Inefficiency And Productive Decline In The U.S. Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry Under The Natural Gas Policy Act
October 1991
Working Paper Number:
CES-91-06
The U.S. natural gas industry has undergone substantial change since the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Although the major focus of the NGPA was to initiate partial and gradual price deregulation of natural gas at the well-head, the interstate transmission industry was profoundly affected by changes in the relative prices of competing fuels and contractual relationships among producers, transporters, distributors, and end-users. This paper assesses the impact of the NGPA on the technical efficiency and productivity of fourteen interstate natural gas transmission firms for the period 1978-1985. We focus on the distortionary effects that resulted in the industry during a period in which changes in regulatory policy could neither anticipate changing market conditions nor rapidly adjust to those changes. Two alternative estimating methodologies, stochastic frontier production analysis and data envelopment analysis, are used to measure the firm-specific and temporal distortionary effects. Concordant findings from these alternative methodologies suggest a pervasive pattern of declining technical efficiency in the industry during the period in which this major regulatory intervention was introduced and implemented. The representative firms experience an average annual decline in efficiency of .55 percent over the sample period. In addition, it appears that the industry suffered a decline in productivity during the sample period, averaging -1.18 percent annually.
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