Papers Containing Keywords(s): 'regulatory'
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Viewing papers 31 through 36 of 36
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Working PaperInnovation and Regulation in the Pesticide Industry
December 1995
Working Paper Number:
CES-95-14
This paper examines the hypothesis that regulation negatively affects pesticide innovation, causes pesticide companies to introduce more harmful pesticides, and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. The results confirm that pesticide regulation adversely affects innovation and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, regulation encourages firms to develop less toxic pesticides. Estimates suggest that it requires about $29 million in industry expenditures on health and environmental testing to affect the toxicity of one new pesticide.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperPollution Abatement Costs, Regulation And Plant-Level Productivity
December 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-14
We analyze the connection between productivity, pollution abatement expenditures, and other measures of environmental regulation for plants in three industries (paper, oil, and steel). We examine data from 1979 to 1990, considering both total factor productivity levels and growth rates. Plants with higher abatement cost levels have significantly lower productivity levels. The magnitude of the impact is somewhat larger than expected: $1 greater abatement costs appears to be associated with the equivalent of $1.74 in lower productivity for paper mills, $1.35 for oil refineries, and $3.28 for steel mills. However, these results apply only to variation across plants in productivity levels. Estimates looking at productivity variation within plants over time, or estimates using productivity growth rates show a smaller (and insignificant) relationship between abatement costs and productivity. Other measures of environmental regulation faced by the plants (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) are not significantly related to productivity.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperRegulation and Firm Size, Foreign-Based Company Market Presence, Merger Choice In The U.S. Pesticide Industry
June 1994
Working Paper Number:
CES-94-06
This paper uses Two-Stage Least Squares to examine the impact of pesticide product regulation on the number of firms and the foreign-based company market share of U.S. Pesticide Companies. It also investigates merger choice with a multinomial logit model. The principal finding is that greater research and regulatory costs affected small innovative pesticide companies more than large ones and encouraged foreign company expansion in the U.S. pesticide market. It was also found that the stage of the industry growth cycle and farm sector demand influenced the number of innovative companies and foreign-based company market share. Finally, firms that remain in the industry were found to have greater price cost margins, lower regulatory penalties costs, and a much greater multinational business presence than those that departed.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperEnvironmental Regulation And Manufacturing Productivity At The Plant Level
March 1993
Working Paper Number:
CES-93-06
This paper presents results for an analysis of plant-level data from three manufacturing industries (paper, oil, and steel). We combine productivity data from the Longitudinal Research Database ( LRD ) with pollution abatement expenditures from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) survey, as well as regulatory measures taken from datasets maintained by the Environmental Protection Agency. We use data from 1979 to 1985, considering both labor and total factor productivity, both levels and growth rates, and both annual measures and averages over the period. We find a strong connection between regulation and productivity when regulation is measured by compliance costs. More regulated plants have significantly lower productivity levels and slower productivity growth rates than less regulated plants. The magnitude of the impacts are larger than expected: a $1 increase in compliance costs appears to reduce TFP by the equivalent of $3 to $4. Thus, commonly used methods of calculating the impact of regulation on productivity are substantially underestimated. These results are generally consistent across industries and for different estimation methods. Our other measures of regulation (compliance status, enforcement activity, and emissions) show much less consistent results. Higher enforcement, lower compliance, and higher emissions are generally associated with lower productivity levels and slower productivity growth, but the coefficients are rarely significant.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperThe Structure Of Technology, Substitution, And Productivity In The Interstate Natural Gas Transmission Industry Under The NGPA Of 1978
August 1992
Working Paper Number:
CES-92-09
The structure of production in the natural gas transmission industry is estimated using the dual restricted cost function based on panel data for twenty four firms. A standard translog variable cost function with firm fixed effects is augmented with controls for capacity utilization, technical change, and shifting regulatory regimes. During the implementation of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA), 1978-1985, the industry exhibited no significant increase in productivity, largely attributable to the decline in output for the industry. Regulatory efforts to promote voluntary non-contract transmission appear to have enabled some firms to mitigate the overall industry productivity stagnation. The NGPA instituted a complex schedule of partial and gradual decontrol of natural gas prices at the well head. This form of deregulation costs natural gas producers over $100 billion in lost revenues, relative to immediate and full price deregulation. However, the transmission firms benefited by paying $1.5 billion less for natural gas than they would have under total deregulation. The benefits to consumers, totaling $98.7 billion, were unevenly distributed. On average, for the 1978-1985 period, utilities, commercial, and industrial users paid less for their gas than they would have under total decontrol and residential users paid $8.6 billion more. The NGPA and Federal Regulatory Commission oversight practices allow the transmission industry to price discriminate among customers.View Full Paper PDF
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Working PaperTechnical Inefficiency And Productive Decline In The U.S. Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry Under The Natural Gas Policy Act
October 1991
Working Paper Number:
CES-91-06
The U.S. natural gas industry has undergone substantial change since the enactment of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Although the major focus of the NGPA was to initiate partial and gradual price deregulation of natural gas at the well-head, the interstate transmission industry was profoundly affected by changes in the relative prices of competing fuels and contractual relationships among producers, transporters, distributors, and end-users. This paper assesses the impact of the NGPA on the technical efficiency and productivity of fourteen interstate natural gas transmission firms for the period 1978-1985. We focus on the distortionary effects that resulted in the industry during a period in which changes in regulatory policy could neither anticipate changing market conditions nor rapidly adjust to those changes. Two alternative estimating methodologies, stochastic frontier production analysis and data envelopment analysis, are used to measure the firm-specific and temporal distortionary effects. Concordant findings from these alternative methodologies suggest a pervasive pattern of declining technical efficiency in the industry during the period in which this major regulatory intervention was introduced and implemented. The representative firms experience an average annual decline in efficiency of .55 percent over the sample period. In addition, it appears that the industry suffered a decline in productivity during the sample period, averaging -1.18 percent annually.View Full Paper PDF
